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FOREWORD  
One of the key economic phenomena of the last two decades has been the 
substantial expansion of the global flows of goods, services, capital and 
information, accompanied by the related integration of large developing 
countries into the world economy. This phenomenon, known as globalisation, is 
not new, but rather the latest stage of a long-term process of integration. 
Nevertheless, it has been regarded as a fundamental change and reactions to it 
have been rather mixed. 
The main message of economic theory is that better opportunities for exchange 
enhance welfare, and many empirical observations support this view. Economic 
growth has been rapid in large developing countries, and the standard of living 
has increased substantially for hundreds of millions of people. Economic 
integration has undeniably benefited developed countries too, e.g. through more 
inexpensive imports and booming export markets. 
Nevertheless, in many countries, particularly in Europe, globalisation is regarded 
as a threat rather than an opportunity. It is feared that new competition will 
take jobs away and even destroy the European social model with its emphasis 
on small income disparities and social cohesion. 
It is indeed indisputable that European economies face major adjustment 
challenges following the emergence of low-wage nations increasingly utilising 
modern technology on the same markets. Most obviously, the outcome depends 
on how well economies are able to exploit new opportunities and adjust to 
unavoidable changes. 
Globalisation is a common challenge, but it affects individual countries in 
different ways depending on a variety of factors such as the size and openness 
of the economy, production structure, labour market institutions, social and 
economic policy traditions etc. As a small, open economy, Finland is highly 
dependent on international trade: on the one hand, rapidly expanding markets 
provide major opportunities for a small country, on the other hand, international 
competition can quickly render a substantial part of domestic production 
unprofitable.
These two factors, the general concern in Europe over the consequences of 
globalisation and the crucial importance of globalisation for Finland, formed the 
background to the remit, given to the Secretariat of the Economic Council by 
Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen in March 2006 to analyse the challenges of 
globalisation for Europe and Finland. This analysis follows up the “Finland in the 
global economy” project carried out in 2004 on the Prime Minister’s initiative, 
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examining Finland’s competitiveness in the face of globalisation and presenting 
an array of recommendations to enhance competitiveness. 
This report is divided into two parts, published as separate volumes. Part I, 
“Globalisation challenges for Europe”, Prime Minister’s Office Publications 
18/2006 surveys the phenomenon of globalisation in the light of the latest 
academic research and discusses, on a general level, the ability of Europe to 
meet the challenges of globalisation and factors to enhance this ability. This part 
consists of articles by well-known European experts. The lead article on 
globalisation is by Professor Richard Baldwin. After the globalisation analysis, 
European economic performance and structural policies are surveyed. Other 
articles focus on themes crucial to the development of the EU internal market 
and innovation system. The final two articles discuss topics related to political 
governance.
Part II of the report, this volume, analyses the adjustment of the Finnish 
economy to globalisation and the policies implemented, and assesses possible 
needs to develop the policy strategy further. Different sectors of economy are 
analysed at the beginning of Part II on the basis of contributions by several 
Finnish economic research institutes. One the hand, we examine economic 
performance and structural change in general (chapter 1), the scale of 
offshoring jobs (chapter 2) and the functioning of the labour market (chapter 3). 
On the other hand, the focus is on issues that pose particular challenges for 
Finland: the situation of an energy-intensive economy at a time of rising energy 
prices (chapter 4), agriculture (chapter 5) and the regional structure of a 
sparsely populated country (chapter 6). The Secretariat of the Economic Council 
has turned the analyses into a consistent whole and bears all responsibility for 
the conclusions drawn. 
Chapter 7 deals with the development of Finland’s economic strategy and the 
pressures it faces as a result of globalisation. The chapter also assesses to what 
extent the recommendations proposed by the report “Finland in the global 
economy” have been implemented. The process of assessment was closely 
coordinated with the preparation of an annual progress report on the Finnish 
National Reform Programme 2005-2008 tasked with the Ministry of Finance. 
Chapter 8 discusses the need to develop Finland’s economic strategy with 
respect to three central themes: an education and innovation system combining 
excellence in narrow focus areas and a wide competence base, the ability of the 
economy to respond to emerging needs for renewal and the adjustment to a 
new energy environment. The conclusions remain for the most part rather 
general. Nevertheless, a few more concrete policy proposals are put forward in 
the report, but we do provide an extensive list of recommendations as in the 
“Finland in the global economy” report.   
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As part of the overall project, a set of dialogues, originally started in 2004, was 
activated between employer organisations and unions to develop common views 
at the branch level on the needs to improve various branches’ competitiveness. 
Central labour market organisations were for the most part in charge of 
organising these dialogues. The support group coordinating the dialogues 
included the following representatives of the central organisations: Senior 
Negotiator, Labour Market Analysis, Margareta Heiskanen (Commission for Local 
Authority Employers), Deputy Director Eeva-Liisa Inkeroinen (Confederation of 
Finnish Industries, EK), Secretary General Seppo Junttila (The Finnish 
Confederation of Salaried Employees STTK), Director, Social Affairs, Markku 
Lemmetty (AKAVA – the Confederation of Unions for Academic Professionals in 
Finland) and Deputy Director Matti Viialainen (Central Organisation of Finnish 
Trade Unions, SAK).  
In connection with the project, an international seminar for experts was 
arranged in August alongside two more extensive conferences in October. The 
majority of the articles included in the first part of the project were published in 
English on the Economic Council’s website on 20 September. 
Those in charge of contributions by research institutions were Jyrki Ali-Yrkkö 
and Pekka Ylä-Anttila (ETLA, the Research Institute of Finnish Economy), Reija 
Lilja, Merja Kauhanen and Heikki Taimio (Labour Institute for Economic 
Research), Raija Volk, Janne Huovari, Perttu Pyykkönen, Kalle Laaksonen, Terhi 
Latvala, Meri Virolainen and Tapani Yrjölä (Pellervo Economic Research Institute 
PTT) and Juha Honkatukia (Government Institute for Economic Research VATT). 
In addition to the aforementioned research institutes, the project was supported 
in a variety of ways by an extensive network of experts: Esko Aho, President 
(Finnish National Fund for Research and Development, Sitra), Mikko Alkio, 
Special Adviser, Esko Antola, Professor (University of Turku), Pertti Haaparanta, 
Professor (Helsinki School of Economics), Sirkka Hautojärvi, Permanent 
Secretary (Ministry of the Environment), Satu Helynen, Technology Manager 
(VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland), Reino Hjerppe, Director General 
(VATT Government Institute for Economic Research), Juha Honkatukia, 
Research Director, (VATT Government Institute for Economic Research), Pekka 
Huhtaniemi, Under-Secretary of State (Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland), 
Timo Hämäläinen, Research Director (Sitra), Johanna Ikäheimo, Chairman of the 
Board (Lappset Oy), Arvo Jäppinen, Sixten Korkman, Managing Director (ETLA, 
the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy), Reija Lilja, Research Director 
(Labour Institute for Economic Research), Jukka Pekkarinen, Director General of 
the Economics Department (Ministry of Finance), Matti Pohjola, Professor 
(Helsinki School of Economics), Jari Romanainen, Executive Director (TEKES, 
Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation), Jorma Routti, 
Professor, Veli-Pekka Saarnivaara, Director General (TEKES, Finnish Funding 
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Agency for Technology and Innovation), Markku Wallin, Permanent Secretary 
(Ministry of Labour), Erkki Virtanen, Permanent Secretary (Ministry of Trade and 
Industry), Raija Volk, Research Director (Pellervo Economic Research Institute 
PTT), Professor Raimo Väyrynen, President (Academy of Finland), Pekka Ylä-
Anttila, Research Director (ETLA, the Research Institute of the Finnish 
Economy). We have received valuable advice and comments from these experts. 
However, they are not in any way responsible for the conclusions drawn in this 
report, which reflect the views of the Secretariat of the Economic Council. On 
behalf of the Secretariat, I would like to express my warmest gratitude to all 
participants in the project and those who have supported it for their 
contributions and comments and forthright co-operation. 
From Specialist Services for the Political Leadership at the Prime Minister’s 
Office, the following persons have contributed to the project in various ways: 
Maarit Lindström, Project Manager, Iiris Koskela-Näsänen, Research Assistant, 
Markku Harrinvirta, Counsellor, Outi Hiltunen, Departmental Secretary, Riitta 
Kirjavainen, Counsellor, and Pekka Sinko, Economist. I extend my warmest 
thanks to all of them, with special gratitude to Maarit Lindström and Iiris 
Koskela-Näsänen. Without their competent and untiring efforts this project 
would have been impossible to carry out. 
Vesa Vihriälä 
Secretary General of the Economic Council 
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SUMMARY  
Finnish economy highly successful in recent years 
In the past 2–3 years Finland has seen strong economic growth and positive 
employment trends. Total output grew by approximately three per cent in 2004 
and 2005, and a growth rate of over five per cent is commonly predicted for 
2006, while employment increased by some 100,000 jobs from January 2004 to 
September 2006. The seasonally adjusted employment rate, exceeded 69 per 
cent in September, while the unemployment rate fell to under 8 per cent. 
Simultaneously, Finland has continued to open up to international trade, 
measured by any indicator, e.g. the share of foreign trade in GDP, capital flows, 
international companies’ jobs located in Finland, Finnish companies’ jobs located 
abroad, or international mobility of labour. Globalisation seems to have 
progressed hand in hand with positive domestic economic trends. 
Hence, the fears expressed over global competition leading to massive 
offshoring of jobs from Finland to China or other developing countries have not 
materialised, at least not in the aggregate economy. Few jobs have been 
offshored within multinational corporations or via outsourcing in comparison 
with the number of jobs created in the economy as a whole, or jobs eliminated 
for other reasons. 
Many reasons for success 
Several short-term factors have played a role in the solid economic and 
employment growth of recent years. Domestic demand has developed well due 
to factors such as moderate interest rates and a growth-supporting fiscal policy. 
The robust growth in the world economy – partly based on globalisation – has 
boosted demand in many export industries.  
On average, Finnish production has retained its good price competitiveness 
thanks to moderate pay increases, but there are several other background 
factors supporting long-term economic growth and competitiveness, alongside 
the changing operating methods of companies. Efforts to reinforce the 
economy’s skills base, some of which were started decades ago, have now 
borne fruit. Major public and private investment in research and development, 
together with the skilled workforce produced by the country’s education system, 
have facilitated the rise of Finnish technological expertise, making Finland a 
world leader in several fields of production. A generally well-functioning society 
and, more recently, stable macroeconomic conditions have also promoted the 
preconditions for economic activity in Finland. 
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In fact, Finland has been ranked top in various comparative competitiveness 
surveys seeking to describe factors important to the long-term economic 
success. In this respect, Finland’s ranking is clearly better than that measured 
by GDP per capita, although Finland has improved its position in some rankings 
of that kind too over the past few years. 
Challenges abound, unfortunately 
The mere fact that, measured by GDP per capita, economic success is not fully 
compatible with the results of competitiveness surveys, raises the question as to 
how well Finland actually capitalises on its resources. Close scrutiny reveals 
several problems. 
First of all, Finland specialises in production, such as electronics and many forest 
industry products, where relative prices are tending to fall for a variety of 
reasons. This manifests itself in declining terms of trade, as a consequence of 
which increasing production volumes do not fully contribute to increasing real 
national income. 
Secondly, Finland has been able to achieve high productivity in certain branches 
of industry only. Service sector productivity can only be considered average, 
regardless of an array of measuring problems. However, the majority of the 
workforce are now employed in the service sector, which continues to grow. 
Thirdly, Finland is not very strong in so-called customer-driven innovation, 
where the creation of new products is based on anticipating and catering for the 
preferences of customers together with or even instead of technological 
novelties. However, the importance of precisely this type of innovation is 
increasing as developing countries catch up with the developed countries’ 
technological lead. 
Fourthly, the population is aging faster in Finland than in most other European 
countries. This means that the working-age population is declining while pension 
expenditure, and somewhat later, healthcare and long-term care expenditure, 
will increase. As a consequence, the sustainability of public finances will come 
under pressure, while tax rates would need to be reduced rather than increased 
for reasons of competitiveness. 
Updated analysis underlines global challenges 
The globalisation analysis in the study does not alter the basic view of Finland’s 
economic environment that has taken shape in recent years: the importance of 
so-called developing countries is increasing rapidly in the world economy, 
markets are expanding, competition is intensifying and, in the developed 
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countries, non-skilled jobs in particular, will continue to be subject to offshoring 
pressures. In certain respect, however, the analysis does indicate greater 
adjustment challenges. 
First of all, production would seem to be dividing into smaller parts at task level, 
enabling it to be spread out around the globe. As a consequence, competition 
from developing countries will focus increasingly on various intermediate 
products and production-process tasks rather than final products. This will 
increase the share of added value vulnerable to international competition in 
developed countries’ production. Combined with the size of markets and 
increasing educational standards in developing countries, this task-level 
competition will extend to all educational levels, not only to the work of the less 
educated. Even tasks requiring great analytical powers may become subject to 
the challenges of international competition, or targets for automation. 
Secondly, changes in the advantages of a location for given tasks can be 
unexpected, and thus hard to predict. Simultaneously, the changes may also be 
large, meaning that almost all tasks of a certain type may be transferred to 
another location. Hence, the fact that the direct offshoring of jobs has for the 
time being only applied to a relatively small fraction of all jobs will not guarantee 
that such jobs remain in developed countries in the future. It is estimated that 
some 15 to 20 per cent of service sector jobs in Finland may become susceptible 
to new kinds of international competition. The unpredictable nature and 
potentially significant magnitude of change will simultaneously make educational 
planning more difficult than before. 
Thirdly, environmental problems related to global economic growth and the 
growing demand for energy as such will impose stricter conditions on economic 
development. For Finland, rising energy prices constitute a bigger than average 
challenge because Finland has an energy-intensive economy owing to 
production structures and geographical factors. 
Finland’s competitiveness strategy has a solid basis 
Basically, Finland’s economic strategy, emphasising skills and innovation policy, 
remains a wise solution to globalisation challenges. A country like Finland can 
succeed in international competition only through continuous innovation based 
on solid skills, and through increased productivity. 
Many of the concrete reforms in the economic strategy proposed in the Finland 
in the global economy report two years ago under the headings, “competence”, 
“openness” and “renewability” have proceeded well. Thus, R&D expenditure is 
being increased, efforts are being made to improve R&D quality, and the 
innovation system is attempting to accommodate, more effectively than before, 
14 
the needs of the service sector and the weaknesses in the final part of the 
innovation chain. 
Strategic centres of excellence in science, technology and innovation are being 
established to support key areas of economic activity, and a new programme 
has been created to attract international top researchers. Preconditions for job-
related immigration have been improved, and more public funding is being 
channelled into venture capital for start-up enterprises. Income tax rates have 
been cut, and more concrete measures have been taken to make the public 
sector more efficient through the municipal and service structure project, for 
example. 
Nevertheless, strategy still requires development and determined 
implementation
In spite of its solid basis, Finland’s economic strategy requires further 
development. It is at least equally important that the various sectors of society 
are able to implement the necessary reforms in practical terms. There is a clear 
danger that strong economic development could lull society and decision makers 
into thinking that everything necessary has already been done. This is not the 
case.
Three key sets of issues arise in the area of enhancing competences, which 
clearly call for further attention: (1) combining investment in excellence with the 
strengthening of the broad skills base, (2) the education system’s ability to 
produce the capabilities required in working life and Finland’s ability to attract 
international experts and form international networks and (3) the dimensioning 
of resources as required by the competence strategy. 
The ability of the economy to renew faces many types of problems. Businesses 
are not reforming rapidly enough to enhance productivity and growth 
sufficiently. The labour market needs to function more flexibly than at present. 
In the public sector, enhancing the productivity of service provision is not 
enough. There must also be a re-assessment of the areas in which public 
responsibility is indispensable and those in which it could perhaps be reduced. 
Finally, Finland must give up the idea of being able to base the competitiveness 
of certain industries on inexpensive energy. Instead, we can continue to 
enhance the security of energy supplies on the basis of domestic energy sources 
and, simultaneously, develop energy technology into a significant export 
product.
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Combining excellence and an extensive comptence base requires 
structural reforms 
The policy of creating strategic centres of excellence (SCoE), as approved by the 
Science and Technology Council, is a natural response to the need to channel 
limited resources to the key areas of excellence. The creation of SCoEs must aim 
at the global pinnacle, the business sector must be given a key role in their 
formation, and an exit strategy must also be prepared. 
In order for Finland’s very fragmented university and higher education system in 
general to allocate resources to selected strategic centres of excellence and 
ensure the quality of research in other respects too, its structure must be 
developed into a more compact format. The most viable way of achieving this is 
to enhance the specialisation and profiling of units and to supplement this with 
better networking of higher education institutions both in Finland and elsewhere 
and, if necessary, through mergers of units operating in the same area. 
On the other hand, an adequate degree of innovation outside the chosen focus 
areas must be ensured. In order to support this, tax subsidies for R&D 
expenses, already used by most OECD countries, should be considered. 
Regardless of such considerations, it is important for the Centre of Expertise 
programme under reform to be integrated efficiently with the SCoEs to avoid 
overlapping operations. The complex and incoherent system of regional 
organisations and programmes implementing innovation, industrial, business 
and regional policy should be simplified. There is a tremendous need for 
regional innovative ability since international competition may have a dramatic 
impact on production and employment in Finland’s specialised regional 
economies. 
The ability of the university system to meet the challenge of developing top 
expertise requires reform of the decision-making system. A higher degree of 
autonomy combined with a professional management system is the key to this, 
while new sources of financing must be found. For example donations should be 
encouraged. Tuition fees should not be considered taboo in all situations either, 
provided that opportunities are guaranteed for all students to all levels of study, 
regardless of their family background, through a voucher system, for instance.  
Globalisation places demands on the content and phasing of education 
Globalisation and rapid technological change emphasise the need to be able to 
produce the capabilities required at any time at various educational levels. Such 
an ability requires solid basic capabilities, and Finland’s basis is good in this 
respect. However, it is not clear whether general education sufficiently 
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emphasises social interaction skills (including language skills), mathematical 
deductive skills and learning skills. 
Education should shift to modules consisting of shorter periods of study than at 
present, which would allow integration with working life as flexibly as possible. 
This, in turn, calls for highly flexible opportunities for complementing and 
continuing previous studies. Simultaneously, it is important that overly-specific 
study programmes be avoided, because the skills provided by them may prove 
outdated soon. 
Higher education for a high proportion of the population is not an end in itself. It 
is more important to provide high-quality education at all levels with contents 
that meet the needs of working life. The higher numbers of students per teacher 
in many fields of study, due to the expansion of education, poses a clear 
problem in this respect. 
The complex and incoherent adult education system calls for overall reform, 
which should be based on a consistent financing system providing equal 
opportunities and the correct incentives for further education and re-education, 
regardless of who acquires or provides the training. 
It should also be acknowledged that the talent reserves of a small country will 
not suffice to cater for all needs. Hence, in order to ensure top-quality 
competences, Finland needs not only domestic talent but a considerably higher 
number of skilled people from abroad, both graduates and talented foreign 
students. For students, this requires better planning and marketing of study 
programmes and the development of financing systems. 
Investment in competence should be increased, with discretion 
The Government’s objective of increasing Finland’s R&D expenditure to 4 per 
cent of GDP can be considered justified, given the goals of both advancing the 
technological frontier in selected focus areas, and ensuring an extensive skills 
base. However, in order to achieve this objective by 2010, public R&D 
expenditure must be increased more rapidly than current commitments indicate. 
The necessary growth rate is probably about seven per cent a year. 
The development of the education system in the above-mentioned manner also 
calls for additional resources, which are unlikely to prove attainable only through 
savings due to smaller cohorts, or productivity gains. Finland only spends an 
average amount on education in spite of the good results it achieves. Widening 
the financial basis of higher education institutions will hardly be sufficient, 
either.
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Reforms in the business sector can be supported in several ways 
Sufficiently intensive competition is a key incentive for business development, 
and it remains important that competition be promoted through an effective 
competition policy. Regardless of competition, it seems that Finnish companies 
are not very growth-oriented. In spite of the development of the financial 
market, this may still be due to problems in the availability and cost of venture 
capital. To alleviate this, the tax incentives used by certain countries to activate 
private risk-capital investors should be considered as an option. Innovative 
companies at the forefront of technology often face exceptionally high risks in 
new business. To a certain extent, this problem could be alleviated by making 
innovativeness a criterion for public procurement. 
Business reorganisations often require labour force reductions and/or changes in 
the skills structure, which is naturally easiest when shedding labour does not 
involve high costs. A key characteristic of Denmark’s dynamic labour market is 
its ease with which employees can be dismissed or laid off, and Finland should 
consider reducing job protection as part of a larger reform, in which the risks of 
individual employees and employers and collective risk-bearing are developed in 
the spirit of so-called change security. 
The sphere of Finland’s highly technology-oriented economy’s innovation 
activities must be expanded towards customer-driven innovation. There is no 
single remedy to this, but the development of education may help in the long 
run, as may and paying attention to this type of “soft” innovation activity in the 
allocation of public R&D expenditures. 
Various forms of ownership have different strengths, which makes a diverse 
ownership basis advantageous for Finnish business. This should be promoted, if 
possible.
Ensuring the labour supply requires further action 
The forecast reduction in the labour supply will require more efficient 
employment of existing labour reserves. The best results can be achieved in 
both the oldest and youngest age groups. In addition to the development of 
training and working life, it is also essential to ensure there are adequate 
incentives to offer employment and to take it. From this perspective, continuing 
reductions in labour taxation would be justified, and social benefits should also 
be revised. An option worth considering would be to define the basic 
unemployment allowance as basic income for the older, long-term unemployed, 
thus uncoupling the payment of allowances from possible earned income. 
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In addition to enhancing the employment of domestic labour reserves, Finland 
needs employment-based immigration. To facilitate this, the immigration policy 
must be revised before long. 
In the long run, the most serious problem is related to the willingness of the 
most highly skilled to settle and remain in Finland. More highly educated people 
have moved away from Finland than have come in the opposite direction, and 
the share of highly educated foreigners is exceptionally low in this country. A 
partial remedy to this may be to continue the special tax arrangements for 
foreign experts, but more general measures are necessary in addition. To attract 
skilled people, there is pressure to lower the highest income tax rates, for 
instance. 
Labour mobility is important 
Given the varying labour demand caused by globalisation and a lower labour 
supply, the flexible movement of labour input from one task to another, one 
company to another and quite often from one region to another is increasingly 
important as a means of economic adjustment. Although Finnish labour is more 
mobile in various ways than it is often thought to be, mobility should be further 
enhanced by removing various obstacles to labour mobility. 
With regard to regional mobility, the weak supply of housing in rapidly growing 
areas is a major factor hampering mobility. This supply must be increased using 
various methods related to land use planning and economic incentives for the 
construction of areas with a complete plans (including real estate tax). Measures 
to increase the mere supply of housing are, however, not enough. How the 
forms of housing and the residential environments offered meet people’s 
expectations is equally important. Expansion of working areas by further 
improving the preconditions for commuting is also useful, placing the emphasis 
on communications and efficient public transport services. In addition, the 
possibilities provided by technological advances for expanding telecommuting 
must be exploited more efficiently than now.  
In order to promote both professional and regional mobility, there are reasons 
for tightening the conditions for unemployment benefits in relation to the 
acceptance of various vacancies. In this respect, Finland would seem to apply 
more lenient practices than for instance Sweden or Denmark. Lowering the 
marginal tax rate of labour income would also support mobility to more 
demanding positions, thus enhancing productivity. 
In terms of occupational mobility, the most important factor is probably an 
effective system of further education, continuing education and re-training. 
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Despite certain useful reforms in recent years, the system still requires 
improvement in many respects. 
Flexible wage formation essential to an adaptable labour market 
The Finnish wage formation model has succeeded well in supporting wage 
developments that promote competitiveness and employment at the level of the 
aggregate economy. However, wage rigidity is high and contributes to an 
exceptionally high concentration of unemployment among the non-skilled. 
As globalisation causes production to become increasingly fragmented between 
different countries, it will become progressively more difficult to maintain wage 
structures that do not sufficiently reflect the productivity of employees. 
Moreover, since the changing character of work is increasing the importance of 
pay incentives, wage formation must be linked more clearly with individual and 
team productivity to support employment and increase productivity. This 
requires the determination of wages at company level via local agreements to a 
higher extent than at present.  
The need for enhancing such flexibility of wage formation is acknowledged in 
Finland, but progress has been slow. Therefore, it is important that, while 
attempting to maintain the strengths of the current wage formation mechanism, 
the significance of the company level in wage formation be enhanced. 
Balance required between flexibility and risk bearing 
The need for rapid change due to globalisation and technological development 
requires, as described above, not only companies as a whole but work 
communities and individual employees to be highly flexible and willing to accept 
risks. However, the ability of individuals to bear the risks caused by these 
factors is often poor and, for instance, weak job protection may weaken 
employees’ incentives to enhance their skills. 
Therefore, higher flexibility must be linked with reform of risk-sharing. The 
Danish model of “flexicurity” provides a good example, although it is not 
applicable to Finland as it stands. The change security arrangement introduced 
in Finland in 2006 is a step in the right direction, but the idea could be 
expanded by applying a new kind of balance of rights and responsibilities for 
instance to all employees below a certain age. 
Public sector balance requires efficiency and prioritisation 
The public sector influences the ability of the economy to change through many 
measures of regulation, public expenditure and taxation discussed above. The 
20 
resulting level of total expenditure and the level of taxation it requires is also an 
essential issue. 
The need for systematic increases in expenditure on research and development, 
on education and on enhancing the adaptability of the labour market is at odds 
with trends in public finance. Although Finland’s public finances are in good 
shape at present, and will most probably remain so over the next few years, an 
aging population will generate substantial pressure for additional expenditure in 
the long run. There will therefore be a need to raise taxes from what is already 
a relatively high base. At the same time, however, the need to reduce labour 
taxation and create new tax incentives for innovation argues in favour of lower 
taxes.
Therefore, it is important that the productivity of publicly financed service 
provision be enhanced, and the related measures of the state administration’s 
productivity programme and municipal and service structure project must be 
implemented in a determined manner. In this context, a further aim should be 
to promote genuine service innovations for use beyond the public sector. 
With Finland’s public service production already efficient in international 
comparison, there are limits to how far productivity can be enhanced. This 
makes it necessary to assess the boundaries of public responsibility. The 
pension system is the biggest issue. The scope of the publicly financed pension 
system (pension age, pension levels) and the time profile of the accumulation of 
pension funds should be reconsidered. This is problematic, as a major pension 
reform was implemented very recently. However, postponing the re-assessment 
of reform needs is not a good option, given the sluggishness of the pension 
system. 
The new energy conditions: adjusting is the only option 
Global energy price prospects and the integration of the electricity market in 
Northern Europe mean that Finland cannot continue to use low energy prices as 
a basis for industrial competitiveness. It is thus useless to pursue this aim by 
increasing the supply of domestic energy. Nevertheless, increasing the supply of 
domestic emission-free energy can support security of supply and thereby also 
competitiveness. Therefore, it would still be worth further developing all 
emission-free domestic forms of energy. 
The current European climate policy places Finnish industry at a disadvantage 
compared with many competing nations. This serves to highlight Finland’s 
interest in striving to achieve global solutions for controlling global warming and 
climate change. 
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Bioenergy provides a significant opportunity for domestic emission-free energy 
supply, but owing to the nature of the energy market, wider use of bioenergy 
requires public intervention by means of regulation and various support 
mechanisms. However, measures that would lock producers and consumers in 
to inefficient technologies that are rapidly becoming outdated must be avoided. 
No need to give up the goal of equality in order to enhance 
adaptability 
Economic efficiency and the ability to adapt to various pressures for change 
need not conflict with social equality. Like other Nordic countries, Finland has so 
far been able to combine efficiency with small disparities in welfare levels quite 
well, notwithstanding its openness to international competition. For instance, the 
comprehensive education system offering equal educational opportunities has 
most likely been a key factor in enhancing the economy’s ability to grow and 
adapt. There is no reason why combining equality with efficiency could not also 
be possible in the future. 
What is essential is the ability to accept unavoidable changes, a readiness to re-
consider established practices, willingness to support the adjustment of those hit 
hardest by the changes, and open-minded exploitation of any new opportunities 
that arise. Such adaptability is needed across the board, whether at company 
level, in industry structures, in regional development, in the labour market, in 
functioning of the public sector or in the scope of public responsibility. 
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1 PERFORMANCE AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE 
FINNISH ECONOMY 
1.1 Economic performce, competitiveness and globalisation 
A nation’s economic performance or success is basically measured by its ability 
to create welfare or prosperity for its citizens. The material basis of welfare is 
production per capita, although other factors such as leisure time are also of 
importance. The distribution of income and consumption possibilities are also 
important. On the other hand, people’s welfare, let alone happiness, does not 
depend on economic factors alone. 
Economic competitiveness means many different things and is measured in 
many different ways. In this study, we define the competitiveness of the 
economy as its ability to produce high production per capita in an open 
economic environment, where the country in question participates in exchange 
with other countries and where the production factors (including the labour 
force and technology) move cross the country’s borders.1 In addition to high 
labour input in proportion to the population, high production per capita also 
requires high work productivity.2
A competitive country is able to utilise the possibilities afforded by free 
international exchange in such a way that it uses its own resources for 
production as effectively as possible and is also able to attract mobile production 
factors when there is a lack of them. Here, competitiveness is not so much 
regarded as competition against other economies, but more as the ability to 
utilise one’s own resources and to offer mobile production factors the possibility 
of effective use. In this respect, a competitive country also supports the growth 
of prosperity from an international point of view.  
Globalisation means widening the scope of international exchange and 
competition to encompass an ever-increasing share of the production of goods 
and services. Globalisation as expressed by quickly growing flows of goods, 
capital and technology between countries, has been aided by the removal of 
obstacles to the movement of goods and production factors. The central force 
                                               
1 This definition of competitiveness is close to Cotis and Elmeskov’s (2006) view of the kind of 
content the widely-used term ’competitiveness’ should be given in the description of national 
economies. 
2 Living standards are usually measured by the volume of gross domestic product per capita. This 
can be most simply expressed by the product of gross domestic product per working hour and 
working hours per capita:
population
rsworkinghou
rsworkinghou
GDP
population
GDP u 
Of these factors, GDP/working hours measures work productivity, and working hours/population 
the amount of work done per capita. 
24 
that stimulates globalisation is technological development, which lowers the 
costs of moving products, production factors and capital. The development of 
technology has also supported the rise in total productivity and the introduction 
of completely new products, services and production technologies. 
In the global economy there are ever-expanding market and operative 
possibilities for efficient commercial activities. Efficiently operating enterprises 
are also finding it easier to attract mobile production factors. On the other hand, 
competition is stronger and aimed more and more at domestic production, 
which is a challenge to many time-honoured ways of doing business. 
For these reasons, economic competitiveness requires the ability to make rapid 
use of new business possibilities. Production structures (products, production 
methods) have to be adaptable in accordance with the new needs of 
technological development and consumers’ preferences. Otherwise, production 
factors will remain unused or undeveloped due to competition, and as a result 
production factors may move to more favourable locations. 
1.2 Competitiveness in the light of indicators  
In comparisons measuring international competitiveness, Finland has numbered 
among the top nations already for many years. For example, the World 
Economic Forum indexes from 2005 rated Finland as the strongest in growth 
competitiveness and business economy competitiveness, and in 2006 Finland 
was placed second according to the new ‘global competitiveness’ indicator 
(Table 1.1). Also, in the 2004 report measuring the implementation of the 
Lisbon Strategy (The Lisbon review 2004), all indicators put Finland at the top, 
making it the EU’s most competitive country. Amongst other things, the report 
measures the effectiveness of the information society and financial services, as 
well as investments in innovations and research activity. 
According to the results of the European Innovation Scoreboard published by 
the EU, the leading innovative European nations in 2005 were Sweden, Finland, 
Switzerland, Germany and Denmark. Similarly, in a 2005 comparison by the 
European Commission, Finland as a country investing in its knowledge-based 
economy was again situated near the very top. Finland’s investment of 3.5 per 
cent of GDP in research and development is the third highest of the OECD 
countries after Sweden and Israel. Finland is also among the leaders in the 
World Bank’s economic index comparison, coming directly after Sweden (Figure 
1.1 and 1.2).3
                                               
3  World Bank. Knowledge Assessment Methodology, www.worldbank.org/kam. Factors that 
determine the knowledge economy include economic incentives, an institutional system, 
education, innovations, and communication and information technology. 
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Table 1.1  Competitiveness indicators. 
 WEF: Global competitiveness IMD: Total competitiveness 
 2006 2005 2006 
Switzerland 1 4 8 
Finland 2 2 10 
Sweden 3 7 14 
Denmark 4 3 5 
Singapore 5 5 3 
United States 6 1 1 
Japan 7 10 17 
Germany 8 6 26 
Netherlands 9 11 15 
Great Britain 10 9 21 
Hong Kong  11 14 2 
Norway 12 17 12 
Taiwan, China 13 8 18 
Iceland 14 16 4 
Israel 15 23 25 
Canada 16 13 7 
Austria 17 15 13 
Sources: WEF and IMD.
Figure 1.1 Dimensions of the Finnish knowledge economy.   
Source: World Bank, Knowledge Assessment Methodology. www.worldbank.org/kam. The 
Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) contains 80 structural or qualitative variables. The 
comparison covers 128 countries. The KEI is an aggregate of 12 key variables, which 
have been normalised to a scale of zero to ten (0 = worst and 10 = best). 
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Source: World Bank. www.worldbank.org/kam. 
These competitiveness indicators catalogue the many background factors 
assumed to have an effect on economic competitiveness. Finland’s significant 
overall success in competitiveness comparisons using these indicators is based 
on many different factors, the most important of which are education, 
technology, well-functioning public institutions and economic openness, and 
general integration into the international economy and international systems. In 
addition, flexible and rapid adaptability is considered to be one of Finland’s 
advantages. All in all, in Finland’s economic and industrial policies a 
microeconomic emphasis has been observed in the long-term development of 
national competitiveness, the results of which have been reflected in high 
rankings in international comparisons.4
Competitiveness comparisons used in the calculation of indexes are based on 
those factors which economic theory assumes to influence the economy’s ability 
to perform well.5 It is, however, unfortunate that the resulting indicators are not 
especially good at forecasting output growth after the measurement date 
(Rouvinen 2002, Rouvinen & Vartia 2002). This indicates that the basic factors 
that can be measured with competitiveness indicators can be utilised in many 
different ways in different economies. Competitiveness indicators therefore do 
                                               
4  See also Micro Policies for Growth and Productivity: Final Report OECD (2005). 
5  I.e. using resources effectively so that productivity is high and the labour force is to a large 
extent employed. 
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not tell us directly how economies will perform in future; instead, they indicate 
which economies have the best chances of success. 
1.3 Living standards, labour input and productivity 
Finland is a good example of the difference between competitiveness indicators 
and GDP per capita comparisons. Although Finland belongs to the top on the 
basis of various competitiveness measurements, its gross domestic product per 
capita is clearly lower than in the best performing countries. According to the 
latest University of Groeningen comparison concerning the year 2005, Finland’s 
GDP per capita ratio was the 15th highest in the world, taking the correction for 
purchasing power into account. According to the IMF comparison, Finland has 
already reached rank 12 in the world passing such countries as Sweden and the 
Netherlands.6 In any case, Finland would seem to be a sub-standart performer 
in terms of material prosperity with regard to measurable competitiveness 
factors. Why is Finland not better placed in living standards comparisons? 
One possibility is that the effect of competitiveness factors on economic 
performance materialises with a long time lag. This is to some extent supported 
by the fact that during the last decade the growth rate of the Finnish economy 
has been faster than the average of developed countries. However, the 
explanatory power of this factor is weakened by the fact that during the same 
period Finland was recovering from the depression of the early 1990s, when 
production was at exceptionally low levels. Faster growth can therefore at least 
be partly explained by recovery from the depression (Figure 1.3). A closer 
examination reveals that despite respectable growth, the Finnish economy has 
certain features that impede the transformation of general competitiveness into 
high real income per capita. 
                                               
6  Comparing GDP per capita figures adjusted for purchasing power parities is plagued with 
difficulties, especially with regard to estimating the relevant price levels. Among the researchers 
in the field, the calculations by the University of Groningen are often considered the most 
comparable. The Groningen database is described in detail on the homepage of the University of 
Groningen. http://www.ggdc.net.
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Source: University of Groningen http://www.ggdc.net. 
If the GDP per capita ratio is divided into the amount of labour input and 
productivity, then it becomes clear that Finland has performed less well than the 
most successful countries in both the utilisation rate of labour input as well as in 
productivity (Figure 1.4). In Europe, the standard of living is in general lower 
than in the United States, where both work productivity and labour input are 
high. In Japan, the living standard is nearly at the same level as in Finland due 
to the high labour input, although productivity is lower. With regard to Finland it 
is conspicuous that the present employment rate (the proportion of employed 
persons in the working-age population) is noticeably lower than in the other 
Nordic countries and also lower than it has been in Finland.7 The annual working 
time of the employed has decreased as it has in other developed countries, but 
it is still noticeably longer than in the other Nordic countries. In Finland there 
are thus fewer people of working-age employed, but they put in more hours 
than people elsewhere. 
                                               
7  The proportion of employed persons of the working-age population in Finland is approximately 
69 per cent, whilst it was 74 per cent before the depression of the early 1990s.  
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Figure 1.4  GDP per capita, labour productivity, employment rate and 
comparative price level. 
Source: OECD, Eurostat. 
Although Finland is not at the very top in terms of productivity and employment, 
it has managed to improve the situation after the depression with respect to 
both factors (Table 1.2). Finland has even achieved the same productivity 
development as the United States and its employment rate has increased faster. 
Also most recently, since 2004, the Finnish economy has performed well. The 
GDP grew by slightly over 3 per cent a year in 2004 and 2005 on average, 
despite the loss of production caused by an industrial dispute in the paper 
industry in 2005. Furthermore, a growth rate of over 5 per cent is commonly 
forecast for 2006. 
Employment has increased since the beginning of 2004 untill early autumn 2006 
by some 100 000 jobs, seasonally adjusted. This implies an annual growth rate 
of 1.6 per cent. The seasonally adjusted employment rate has surpassed 69 per 
cent and the unemployment rate declined just under 8 per cent in September 
2006. Price and wage inflation has remained moderate at the same time. 
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All this suggests of quite strong competitiveness in view of Finland’s capacity to 
increase GDP per capita. Nevertheless, one should be cautious in interpreting 
the latest figures as reliable indicators of longer term competitiveness. The 
growth witnessed in the most recent years has been supported by both 
expansionary macro economic policies (tax cuts and low interest rates in the 
euro-area) and booming export markets. In fact, Finland appears to have lost 
markets share a bit in the recent years.8 Neither the stance of macro policies nor 
export market growth will necessarily support growth as much in the future as 
in the past few years.  
Table 1.2 Production growth (%) and its contributory factors 1995–2004.9
 Finland Euro area USA 
GDP 3.6 2.1 3.3 
Population 0.3 0.4 1.2 
GDP per capita 3.3 1.7 2.1 
Productivity 
(GDP/hours) 
 
2.3 
 
1.4 
 
2.3 
Working hours 
(hours/employed persons) 
 
-0.2 
 
-0.4 
 
-0.2 
Employment rate 
(employed persons/working-age population) 
 
1.2 
 
0.8 
 
-0.1 
Population structure 
(working-age population /population) 
 
0.0 
 
-0.1 
 
0.1 
Source: Eurostat, OECD Productivity Database. 
Increasing productivity is a more important determinant of material living 
standards than labour input, in that there is an upper limit to labour input 
growth whilst there are no limits to growth in productivity. In the long term, 
economic growth in Finland can only be based on an increase in productivity. 
With regards to productivity, Finland has been catching up fast. In 
manufacturing the level of labour productivity is already among the world’s 
highest. This is due to the strength of the high-productivity ICT industry and 
capital-intensive and partly very efficient production in the forest and metal 
industry. In the services sector, however, labour productivity in Finland is lower 
than average.10
                                               
8  This is the result when one compares the OECD estimate of the weighted import growth of 
Finland’s export countries (OECD Economic Outlook 80). 
9  Economic well-being (GDP/capita) can be divided into the more specific contributory factors by 
which it is determined. These are productivity, working time, employment rate and population 
structure. 
10  This applies expressly to individual service production. The productivity of public service 
production cannot be measured in the same way as the productivity of service products sold on 
the market, a fact that complicates the comparison. 
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One factor that weakens Finland’s position in income comparisons is the 
decrease in the terms of trade. The prices of products exported by Finland have 
decreased in comparison with imports. This situation meant, for example, in the 
beginning of the decade that nearly half of the growth in production per capita 
has been ‘lost’ due to the weakened terms of trade (Figure 1.5). This reduction, 
which has continued over the last ten years, is mainly due to the fact that 
export prices, especially of electronics, have only slightly increased, as have 
those of paper products. In recent years, the increase in energy prices has also 
weakened the terms of trade. None of these three factors are expected to 
disappear in the next few years, which means that the challenge of increasing 
material living standards is greater than that of increasing productivity. 
Figure 1.5  GDP growth adjusted to the terms of trade in 2000–2004, per 
cent11.
Source: OECD (2006d). 
The Finnish wage level is average in Europe, but price levels are clearly higher 
than average, which reduces the purchasing power of Finns, although in 
comparison with the other Nordic countries Finland’s price level is not that 
exceptional (Figure 1.4). Important social values in Finland, in addition to 
competitiveness and the effectiveness of economic activity, are the typical 
Nordic values of equality and social cohesion. Most social cohesion indicators 
show that Finland has succeeded well in avoiding poverty, inequality and 
exclusion, without having to compromise over efficiency (Figure 1.6) (cf. e.g. 
Dahlman et al. 2006, Sapir 2005). 
                                               
11  The figure on the right shows that average GDP growth in 2000–2004 was greatest in Finland. 
The figure in the middle shows the effect of the terms of trade, which was negative in both 
Finland and Sweden during this time period. The figure on the left shows the end result, taking 
the terms of trade into account. 
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Figure 1.6 Social cohesion indicators. 
Source: Eurostat. 
It is obvious that although productivity growth determines the overall 
development of available economic resources, employment is of fundamental 
importance to welfare. The generally valued equal distribution of income is more 
easily realised when the greatest possible fraction of the working-age population 
obtains its income from gainful employment. At the same time, the equilibrium 
problems of the public-sector economy, worsened by the ageing of the 
population, are more easily controlled with higher employment rates. 
Employment is also of notable importance as such with regard to wellbeing.12
1.4 Structural change in the economy 
The structure of the Finnish economy has changed drastically over the last 15 
years. At industry level, the proportion of basic industries as a source of value 
added and employment has continued its long-term declining trend. 
Correspondingly, the service sector’s share has grown, following the example of 
other developed countries (Table 1.3). The development of manufacturing has 
                                               
12  This is e.g. shown by the so-called happiness studies, which look at the effect of unemployment 
on perceived wellbeing. Long-term unemployment is one of the most important underlying 
factors causing exclusion. 
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been more complex. After the depression, industrial production increased 
rapidly, and its share of both production and employment rose. In the beginning 
of the present decade the relative importance of manufacturing decreased, but 
lately industrial production and employment have again seen auspicious growth 
due to the favourable economic situation.  
There have been fundamental changes in the structure of the economy due to 
the increase in the importance of technology. The fastest growth in production 
has been associated with the application and development of state-of-the-art 
technology and significant R&D investments. This especially applies to the ICT 
sector, whose research and development expenditure constitute more than half 
of the total R&D costs of all sectors. 
The internationalisation of the economy has continued at a rapid pace. In 
addition to the increase in the proportion of exports and imports in GDP, more 
and more companies operating in Finland are under foreign ownership, and 
Finnish companies are moving their production abroad in ever-increasing 
numbers.
A significant aspect of structural change has been the regional concentration of 
growth in production, employment and population. Although the development of 
different regions has varied, and for example the size and direction of migration 
has often changed, the main direction has been the concentration of operations 
in or on the outskirts of areas that are already densely populated. 
The change in the structure of the economy is due to various factors. An 
important common denominator seems to be the increased pressure to raise 
production efficiency, i.e. to raise productivity, which is caused by increased 
competition due to globalisation, and to utilise the possibilities afforded by new 
technology, new markets and new types of division of labour. 
In the following section, a closer look will be taken at development by sector 
and ‘inside’ the sectors. 
1.4.1 Development by sector 
There have been major differences between the levels and growth rates of 
different sectors within Finland. The labour productivity in manufacturing in 
Finland has been high in comparison with other countries, and Finland has 
caught up with and overtaken many industrial nations including the United 
States, if one takes the value added of manufacturing industry per working hour 
as a measure. The productivity of the service sector, however, has been lower.  
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Table 1.3 GDP by sector in Finland: value added and employment in 1995 
and 2003, %.  
 Value added 
Total  
employment 
 
ISIC 
Rev.3 1995 2003 1995 2003 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 01-05 4.5 3.4 7.9 5.2 
Mining and quarrying 10-14 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Total manufacturing 15-37 25.1 22.6 20.1 18.7 
Wood and products of wood and cork 20 1.3 1.0 1.4 1.3 
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 21-22 6.6 4.3 3.6 3.0 
Basic metals and fabricated metal products 27-28 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.5 
Machinery and equipment 29-33 6.1 8.2 5.2 5.3 
Radio, television and communication equipment 32 1.7 4.6 1.1 1.5 
Electricity, gas and water supply 40-41 2.7 2.3 1.0 0.7 
Construction 45 4.5 5.3 5.8 6.5 
Transport and storage and communication 60-64 9.5 10.8 7.7 7.2 
Finance, insurance, real estate and business services 65-74 19.1 21.4 9.8 11.8 
Computer and related activities 72 0.9 1.8 0.9 1.9 
Research and development 73 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 
Other business activities 74 3.4 4.3 4.4 5.8 
Community social and personal services 75-99 22.7 22.1 32.6 33.7 
Total services 50-99 62.8 66.2 64.9 68.7 
Business sector services 50-74 40.1 44.0 32.3 35.0 
Non-agriculture business sector 
10-67,
71-74 62.6 63.1 57.9 59.6 
Source: OECD, STAN database. 
Unlike most other Western industrial countries, the share of manufacturingin 
total production increased in Finland after the beginning of the 1990s for nearly 
ten years. The electric equipment and electronics industry functioned as the 
driving force of structural change, becoming the largest industrial sector in 
terms of both production and exports.
From a historical point of view, Finland’s economic growth (and its fluctuations) 
had its origin in the forest industry. In 1960 approximately two thirds of export 
revenues came from the forest industry. In 1990 the proportion of forest 
industry products still made up approximately 40 per cent of Finland’s exports. 
After the depression (1991–1993) and the rapid structural change following it, 
the share of the forest industry has, however, declined despite the growth of the 
sector’s production, and in 2005 its share was just over 20 per cent (Figure 1.7). 
The technology industry has taken the forest industry’s place as the largest 
industry, mainly due to the rapid growth in production in the ICT industry after 
the depression. However, a significant part of the technology industry is linked 
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with the forest industry, through the production of equipment for this sector 
forming a part of what can be called forest cluster. 
Figure 1.7 Structural change in Finland’s exports in 1960–2005.  
Source: Finnish Customs. 
In the beginning of the 2000s the growth in communication technology 
production slowed down, but since then it has picked up again. At the same 
time the production of machines, machinery and vehicles, and basic metals and 
metal products has increased substantially. In all, the dependency of Finland’s 
exports and total production on the production of communication technology 
decreased somewhat since the end of the 1990s. 
The structural change in manufacturing has been reflected strongly in the 
nature of employment (cf. Figure 1.8). After the depression, growth in 
manufacturing employment was concentrated in high technology and 
knowledge-driven production. This also led to an increase in well-paid jobs with 
higher-than-average skill levels. The number of less demanding jobs, however, 
stagnated or, in certain sectors, even decreased.  
During the present decade the dip in ICT production has had a clear impact on 
the nature of manufacturing employment. The number of jobs with higher-than-
average skill levels decreased significantly in the beginning of the decade. Since 
2004, the improving economic situation has led again to growth in industrial 
employment. 
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Figure 1.8 Structural change in manufacturing employment in Finland in 
1980–2005, 1980=100.      
Source: ETLA Sarja B:144, updated. Sources: 1980–1994 OECD Stan, 1995–2005 
Statistics Finland, industrial statistics; data for 2005 is a preliminary estimate. 
The structural change in industry has also been accompanied by growth in 
productivity, which has been strongest in sectors subject to global competition, 
such as the electronics, base metals and paper industries. It is in these sectors 
that Finnish products come top with regard to global productivity. In sectors 
which are less exposed to international competition, productivity has clearly 
lagged behind; e.g. in agriculture and the retail trade productivity is 20 to 30 per 
cent belowthe global productivity frontier.  
The positive effect of the structural change in industry on production manifests 
itself in the development of different sectors: for instance, growth in production 
has typically been fastest in areas where productivity has also grown rapidly 
(Figure 1.9). ICT production and teleservices are good examples of this. At the 
other end is construction activity, where development in both growth and 
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productivity has been weak. In agriculture and forestry productivity has 
increased comparatively quickly, but due to the special nature of the sector it 
has been mostly reflected in a reduction of the workforce, whilst production has 
increased only slowly. 
Business services and ICT services make up an interesting group. The growth in 
their productivity has been slow13 and growth in production fast. Despite low 
increases in productivity, information processing services are knowledge-
intensive, high technology services. The productivity of a sector measured in 
terms of value added can be high, even though growth in productivity has been 
low.
Figure 1.9  Growth in production and productivity in different sectors. 
Average change in 1976–2003, % of previous year.   
Source: Berghäll et al. (2006). 
Although production typically grows faster in sectors with high productivity 
growth, rapid growth in productivity also frees up labour for other uses. This has 
been especially common in primary production, where growth in production is 
limited due to various reasons. However, in manufacturing too the employment 
share has been in decline, except for a temporary increase in the second half of 
the 1990s.
                                               
13  Business services are labour-intensive and measuring their output and productivity is 
problematic. In 1996 to 2003 productivity development has been positive, which must be 
interpreted to mean that the development of information technology and its utilisation has 
slowly started to become visible in the sector’s productivity. 
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Increasing income levels deriving from economic growth have also led to growth 
in the demand for services. As in many service sectors, the level of productivity 
and the possibilities for increasing it have been weaker than in manufacturing, 
and this structural change has raised the question of whether the increasing 
service orientation of the economy necessarily leads to a decline in the growth 
of productivity. The answer is not automatically affirmative. In many service 
sectors modern information technology and the novel organisational models that 
it enables can be applied in order to increase productivity. The United States, a 
country that is highly service-oriented, has managed to achieve faster 
productivity growth in the second half of the 1990s than many countries with a 
higher reliance on industry.  
The low productivity of services poses a significant challenge for Finland, 
because the service sectors are the biggest employers, and their share of total 
employment will continue to grow; the high productivity growth in the US 
economy is to a great extent based on the rapid growth of productivity in the 
service sector (Figure 1.10).  
Figure 1.10 Industry contributions to market sector labour productivity 
growth in EU-15, Finland and USA, 1987–2003.
Source: Bart van Ark, University of Groningen. 
In Finland, too, the productivity of service sectors has clearly increased over the 
last 10 years. The level of productivity, however, is still low compared to many 
other countries. This is a cause for concern, although it must be remembered 
that in individual services the measured productivity level in relation to 
comparison countries depends on the analysis methods and sources used (cf. 
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e.g. Kaitila et al. 2006), such that the conclusions drawn must be treated with 
caution. In the special focus below, the importance and productivity of the 
service sector is considered in greater detail. 
1.4.2 Change in enterprise structure as a source of productivity growth 
The productivity growth of the sector described above shows how rapidly 
productivity grows on average in enterprises belonging to the sector.14 It does 
not, however, say anything about the mechanisms of productivity change in 
these sectors. Besides the fact that the productivity of an individual enterprise 
increases through the utilisation of new technology and new procedures, the 
change in enterprise structure is also of importance. In other words, productivity 
improves through enterprise replacement, i.e. through the elimination of 
enterprises and plants with low profitability and productivity and the 
establishment of enterprises that are more efficient. This also takes the form of 
the growth of enterprises with lower productivity being weaker than that of 
faster-growing enterprises. Correspondingly, an important source of productivity 
growth for enterprises with multiple plants is production growth in the most 
productive plants.  
The importance of such productivity-increasing structural change at microlevel is 
significant (Maliranta, 2005). For example, in the textiles, clothing, leather and 
footwear sectors, the metal industry and the electronics sector, growth in 
productivity due to structural change accelerated in the 1980s, and in the 
foodstuffs industry in the 1990s. In retail trade, the increase in growth took 
place at the end of the 1990s. There are also regional differences in Finland with 
respect to productivity-increasing structural change. Böckerman and Maliranta’s 
(2006) calculations show that in the county of Uusimaa the effect of productivity 
due to structural change is clearly greater than elsewhere, especially compared 
to eastern Finland. 
The structural change that increases productivity is linked to competition. When 
competition is stepping up, inefficient enterprises disappear and the efficient 
ones grow rapidly. In general, an increase in competition also increases 
enterprises’ innovativeness (Aghion et al. 2005, Kilponen & Santavirta 2004), 
and being open to international competition through international trade creates 
structural changes that in turn boost productivity (Melitz 2003).  
This view is also supported by the results obtained with Finnish plant level data. 
According to Maliranta, an increase in imports in particular accelerates structural 
change, and high R&D investments also seem to have a positive effect. 
                                               
14  In the literature, the productivity growth of so-called representative enterprises is referred to as 
the ‘within component’. 
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Additionally, R&D expenditures and training are important elements that 
stimulate productivity. Effective training is especially necessary in the initial 
stages of plants’ and enterprises’ life cycles, when new technologies are 
adopted. The increase in competition due to globalisation can be assumed to 
have strengthened competition leading to increased productivity in Finland, 
although there is as yet no new research on the topic. 
1.4.3 Internationalisation 
In addition to changes in sector structure, one of the major changes in the 
Finnish economy has been the increasing internationalisation of Finnish 
companies in all sectors. Strong integration into the world economy can be seen 
most easily in the relation of foreign trade to GDP, which by 2005 had grown 
with respect to exports to 38 per cent of GDP and with respect to imports to 35 
per cent of GDP (Figure 1.11). The openness of the economy, measured by the 
share of foreign trade, no longer increased appreciably during the current 
decade. This may, however, be a temporary phenomenon related to a 
temporary drop in global economic growth, to which the growth in the 
proportions of imports and exports in 2005 points. 
Figure 1.11 Exports and imports in 1975–2005, current prices, % of GDP.  
Source: OECD. 
The internationalisation of Finnish business is also shown in the robust growth 
of foreign holdings in Finnish listed companies. In 2006, the foreign-owned 
proportion of the market value of all shares at the Helsinki stock exchange was 
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approximately 51 per cent.15 Concurrently, direct investments and investments 
in securities abroad by Finnish companies have increased rapidly since the 
middle of the 1990s (Figures 1.12 and 1.13). At the beginning of the current 
decade, growth in direct investments abroad by Finnish enterprises had ended. 
On the other hand, as direct investments in Finland by foreign enterprises have 
continued to increase, the difference between the investment stocks has 
diminished since 2000, but direct investments abroad by Finnish enterprises are 
still clearly greater than those by foreign enterprises in Finland. 
Figure 1.12 Direct investments in 1975–2005, stock, per cent of GDP.   
Sources: Bank of Finland and Statistics Finland. 
Figure 1.13 Securities investment in 1975–2005, stock, per cent of GDP.  
Sources: Bank of Finland and Statistics Finland.
                                               
15  Restrictions on foreign ownership of Finnish enterprises were lifted in 1993, and the proportion 
of foreign ownership of enterprises quoted on the Helsinki stock exchange, one of the highest in 
the world, is especially due to the internationalisation of Nokia’s holdings. 
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Finnish investments in foreign securities, which in terms of quantity clearly 
exceed direct investments, have also continued to increase. Nevertheless, large 
fluctuations in share prices have also led to fluctuations in the portfolio of 
investments in securities. 
In terms of production locations, internationalisation is farthest advanced in 
manufacturing, where the increase in personnel has been especially high. In 
1995 the number of employees employed by the foreign subsidiaries of Finnish 
manufacturing enterprises was approximately 115 000, whilst in 2005 it had 
increased to nearly 240 000. Altogether, Finnish enterprises employed nearly 
350 000 people abroad in 2005 (Figure 1.14). The slower growth of the global 
economy at the beginning of the decade is reflected in the number of employees 
employed abroad by Finnish enterprises, as it is in the proportion of GDP in 
foreign trade. After growth picked up again, production located abroad 
concomitantly increased its labour force. 
It is interesting in light of the available data that the workforce of foreign 
enterprises in Finland has continued to grow. This is in agreement with the 
continuation of direct investments in Finland noted above. This development can 
be considered a positive sign of the strengthening of Finland’s position in the 
competition for enterprise locations.16
Figure 1.14  The number of employees employed abroad by Finnish 
enterprises and the number of employees employed in Finland  
by foreign-owned enterprises, thousand persons.  
Sources: Bank of Finland and Statistics Finland. 
                                               
16  The majority of direct investments in Finland are enterprise acquisitions. 
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The acceleration of globalisation has also led to an increase in the number of 
empirical studies on the effect on national economies of the internationalisation 
of enterprises. An interesting issue is whether production abroad displaces 
domestic production. Although the results vary, the majority of studies show 
that direct investments by enterprises are more likely to further exports than to 
substitute them (Lipsey 2004, Jones 2005). The newest results obtained based 
on Finnish data seem to show that the overwhelming majority of foreign 
investments made by Finnish enterprises have not displaced domestic 
investments (Oksanen 2006).  
Similarly, the results concerning the effect on growth of foreign investments in 
Finland are partly contradictory, though they clearly indicate that they increase 
competition and raise productivity and salary levels (Lipsey 2004).17
When examining the internationalisation of enterprises, the question of the 
decrease in domestic investments often comes up. Finland’s investment rate 
level clearly decreased in the 1990s.18 However, its investment rate has been of 
the same range as in the US, Germany, France and Sweden, and only slightly 
lower than the average in the Euro area. In fact, during the last decade Finland 
has switched from investment-driven growth to knowledge-based growth 
(Dahlman et al. 2006). It is typical of this phase that investments are made in 
the form of R&D and intangible capital rather than through investments in real 
estate, machines and instruments (cf. e.g. Corrado et al. 2006).  
On the other hand, Finland’s investment rate in the previous decades seems to 
some extent to have been unjustifiably high. Investments were encouraged with 
low interest policies, repeated devaluations and tax policies that supported 
investments. In the 1980s the liberalisation of the financial markets also 
temporarily boosted investment. In this regard, the decrease in investment rates 
has meant more efficient use of capital.  
The internationalisation of enterprises means that they have to operate 
wherever their markets are and where production costs are low. In particular, 
the growth period of the Finnish pulp and paper industry’s production capacity 
seems to be over. Investment rates have also decreased in the electronics 
industry and in traditional engineering industries.  
                                               
17 Pajarinen and Ylä-Anttila’s (2006) study examines the connection of ownership and ownership 
form to the success of enterprises. According to this study, foreign-owned enterprises are on 
average more profitable than listed and state enterprises, but on the other hand they have also 
grown more slowly than enterprises of the other three (incl. family enterprises) ownership 
groups.
18  The investment rate in manufacturing industry decreased from 1975 to 1990, on average by 
some 25 per cent.  
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1.4.4 The adjustment of some key sectors 
The forest cluster in the midst of changes
Finland’s forest industry – and especially its core, the paper industry – is 
undergoing one of the greatest changes in its history. The cause of this is the 
change in global division of labour between countries and different regions of 
the world. Paper production and consumption is mainly increasing in Asia, South 
America, Russia and in the eastern Central European countries.  
Demand for many types of paper has either dried up or diminished in Western 
Europe and the United States. Information and communication technology has 
begun to replace paper, and demand for newspaper and office paper has risen 
weakly. The paper industry in Western Europe and the United States is beset by 
overcapacity, a situation that has continued for many years. Relative prices for 
the types of paper in which Finnish companies have specialised in have 
diminished, resulting in low profitability for the sector. The profitability of forest 
industry enterprises based in Finland plummeted after 2000. It is estimated that 
this trend, which sees paper prices decreasing further, will continue for at least 
the next five to ten years. The paper sector is in dire straits.  
The advantage based on technology is slipping away 
The global competitiveness of Finland’s forestry sector was based on knowledge 
and technology, which for decades were at higher levels than those of its 
competitors. This technological advantage was based to a significant extent on a 
high level of investment: production machinery was always of the best available 
technology. Productivity therefore grew faster than elsewhere, which 
compensated for production costs that rose faster than those of competitor 
countries. In addition, competitiveness was sometimes supported by exchange 
rate policies.     
Since the middle of the 1990s, the investment ratio of Finland’s forest industry 
(the ratio of fixed investments over value added) has been about half that of the 
previous two decades. Enterprises based in Finland have invested mostly 
abroad: after the end of the 1990s investments abroad by forest industry 
enterprises have been three times greater than investments in Finland. Due to 
this low level of investment, Finland as a forest industry location has been losing 
its technological lead.  
The other main factor that has been of central importance to the competitive 
success of the forest industry has been a strong supporting forest cluster – a 
concentration of knowledge, based on related fields and supporting industries, 
and a high-quality training system. This cluster is still in existence, but waning, 
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because the manufacturing of machines and instruments, as well as research 
activities, has partly moved to growing markets, following the forest industry.   
The key question thus is: What can competitive advantages be based on in 
future, if production capacity in Finland is no longer growing, and the 
technology-based competitive edge that is dependent on this capacity can no 
longer be maintained? 
Innovations and new products 
The challenges created by changes in the global operational environment have 
been recognised as being very similar by two new studies on the future of the 
forest industry (‘Prosperity Based on Finland’s Forests 2015 published by the 
Finnish Forest Research Institute and ‘The Paper Industry – the Situation at 
Present and Future Challenges’, an outlook report published by labour market 
organisations). Both studies state that the competitive advantages of Finland’s 
forest industry in the global economy have changed decisively, and that the 
trends underlying this change have already been apparent for a long time – at 
least since the middle of the 1990s.  
By developing the present production structure, some measure of adaptation 
can be achieved within a short timeframe. This involves reducing overcapacity 
and making present production more effective. Increasing productivity and 
efficiency is possible with changes in procedures and new labour arrangements. 
This requires measures internal to enterprise, as well as network creation and 
the partial transfer of operations to other enterprises. 
Reducing capacity and increasing efficiency are, however, only part of the 
solution. In order for the sector to grow in future, new products, organisations 
and enterprises are needed. Finland’s role in the global economy can only be 
based on knowledge, and this also applies to the forest industry. Finland has 
created a forest cluster knowledge concentration that is unique in the world, 
where the central elements are training and cooperation between the cluster’s 
actors.  
Along with the development of the current structure, the study by the Finnish 
Forest Research Institute also presents a scenario of active change. Its point of 
departure is the growth of production, employment and in the use of domestic 
wood raw material. The scenario is based on new products and innovations: 
bioenergy, biomaterials and processed bioproducts, the linking of information 
and communication technology to paper and packaging materials (functional 
printing, hybrid media) and chemical products. The realisation of such an 
outlook requires changes in all operations of the forest industry – from forestry 
and the wood market to industrial production.  
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Whilst the growth perspectives at the core of the forest cluster – the wood and 
paper industry – are uncertain, the cluster is gaining strength on the margins: 
the prospects for growth in maintenance and upkeep services, consultancy and 
other services related to the forest industry are good. In any case the whole 
forest cluster, which is still strong, can expand into new fields and new 
technologies; examples of the latter include the chemical industry, bio- and 
nanotechnology, and information and communication technology. The forest 
industry’s research system is changing, and investments in research are on the 
up, aimed at new technology areas in accordance with cluster thinking. These 
changes, however, are only beginning. 
The technology industry: globalisation has increased 
exports, but what will happen after the boom? 
The driving force behind exports and research 
The technology industry (the electronics, electric equipment, machine and metal 
industry, and metal processing) is without doubt Finland’s largest industrial 
sector. Among individual sectors, it has had the greatest effect on the change in 
the enterprise and sector structure that has taken place since the beginning of 
the 1990s. Technology industry sectors represent approximately 45 per cent of 
total industrial production and employment, but the proportion is even larger in 
the core sectors of economic structural change, accounting for over 80 per cent 
of industrial research and development investments, and two thirds of exports of 
industrial products. The technology industry is the main channel through which 
changes in the global economy that transform industrial structures find their 
way to Finland. 
The technology industry sectors are very different. Some are heavily reliant on 
investments and the construction industry; others produce consumer goods. The 
technology intensity of these sectors also varies considerably. The electronics 
industry is responsible for approximately two thirds of all industrial R&D 
investments; Nokia’s share alone is nearly 60 per cent. Research and 
development activities are thus strongly concentrated in one area and one 
enterprise.
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The effect of changes in the global economy on the technology 
industry
The structural changes in the global economy and rapid growth during the 
current decade have affected the technology industry, primarily in two ways. 
Firstly, the exceptional growth of the global economy has increased demand on 
the international market for investment goods and industrial intermediate 
products, i.e. Finland’s traditional strong points. E.g. the shipbuilding industry, 
the engineering industry, and the manufacture of metals have been able to take 
advantage of this. The development of the global economy is in a phase where 
investments and industrial production are growing strongly, especially in East 
Asia and many eastern Central European countries. These countries are 
industrialising or changing their industrial structure in the same way as the 
Western industrial nations did after the war.  
Production and exports of the Finnish technology industry have undergone a 
powerful spurt in growth as a result of this change in the global economy. As a 
consequence, there is a dearth of technically trained workers in many 
technology industry sectors, which has already slowed the sectoral growth of 
production and investments. This can be observed for example in the 
shipbuilding industry, where production will grow rapidly in the coming years, 
due to the rapid growth of the global economy and to the excellent 
competitiveness of the Finnish shipbuilding industry. Of the OECD countries, 
Finland has one of the highest degrees of specialisation in shipbuilding, to a 
large extent due to specialisation in the construction of passenger ships. Finland 
has access to special knowledge in the field, supported by the utilisation of 
enterprise and sector restructuring over recent years. 
Secondly, the opening up of the global economy and, in particular, the rapid 
growth of the markets of developing countries, is attracting an ever-increasing 
amount of investment from Finnish enterprises to foreign countries. The 
technology industry has been at the forefront of this development. Next to the 
internationalisation of production, research and development activities have 
started to become more international. It is in developing countries that R&D 
investments have grown the fastest, although the main proportion of the 
technology industry’s foreign research operations are still in the United States 
and Europe. 
According to the latest studies, the main reasons for investments abroad are 
proximity to markets and the acquisition of extra capacity. However, more 
important than these havebecome increases in flexibility and cost savings. This 
applies to both production and research operations. 
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The research and development activities of enterprises are also continuously 
being split into parts or different activities. In such value chains, the beginning 
consists of research related to strategic core knowledge, and the end comprises 
development work that adapts goods and production to local markets. However, 
this only forms part of the picture. Leading companies also increasingly carry out 
research related to their core knowledge abroad, wherever the optimal 
resources for their operations are to be found.  
Research activities within the technology industry are more internationalised 
than other industry activities. Approximately half of R&D expenditure of 
technology industry enterprises are spent abroad, although less than 30 per 
cent of R&D staff work in units abroad. This mainly applies to the electronics 
industry and to Nokia: this enterprise buys a significant amount of research 
services on the global market. 
Few research activities have been directly transferred abroad. The greatest part 
of the technology industry’s foreign R&D units have either been obtained 
through enterprise acquisitions or have been founded as so-called greenfield 
investments.
The internationalisation of research activities, or of production, is not only a 
one-way process. Many Finnish multinational enterprises have transferred their 
activities abroad (offshoring) as well as to Finland from abroad (inshoring). 
Investment flows in both directions demonstrate the importance of international 
specialisation: countries and regions also specialise in research activities in 
accordance with their own competitive advantages. Finland seems to have a 
special locational advantage for research in ICT and forest industry technology.  
The technology industry functioning in a global network 
The technology industry – especially the electric equipment and electronics 
industry – is globally networked. Partner enterprises, suppliers and 
subcontractors in a network internationalise along with their client enterprises. 
As a result, the number of people employed by technology industry enterprises 
based in Finland has grown, especially in the Far East, Central-East European 
countries and also in Latin America (Figure 1.15). Concurrently, the sector’s 
employment in Finland continuously has diminished until the middle of the 
current decade.  
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Figure 1.15 Technology industry employees in Finland and abroad in  
1998–2005, thousands of persons.  
Sources: Statistics Finland and Technology Industries of Finland. 
As a result of network-like procedures, the structure of technology industry 
production has changed considerably in Finland. In particular, the proportion of 
intermediate products, components and subcontracting (incl. bought-in services) 
in the electronics industry in terms of production value or turnover has rapidly 
increased (Figure 1.16). This has resulted in an increase in the sector’s turnover 
that is considerably greater than value added (GDP share), partly obscuring the 
real growth in the field. The proportion of intermediate investments in the 
electronics industry increased strongly in the beginning of the 1990s, when the 
production of information and communication technology was just at the 
beginning of its life cycle. Then, both domestic and foreign component suppliers 
and contract manufacturers expanded their operations in Finland. At the end of 
the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s growth dipped, but during recent 
years it seems to have picked up again.  
An increasing part of the technology industry’s production in Finland thus 
consists of various intermediate products, of which an ever-increasing number 
are manufactured outside Finland. Finland is part of an international production 
network, within whose framework various countries and regions specialise, 
following their owncomparative advantages. 
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Figure 1.16 The proportion of raw materials, components, subcontracting and 
other intermediate investments in the turnover of technology 
industry’ enterprises, as a per cent.  
Source: Statistics Finland. 
What share of production will then remain in Finland? It is difficult to obtain an 
overall view of the future of a particular sector, because the internationalisation 
of enterprises occurs operation by operation.  
Challenges
In the Finnish technology industry, production increased at the beginning of the 
2000s approximately two times faster than industrial production on average. It 
is assumed that growth will continue rapidly, but the gap with regard to other 
industries will narrow. However, the structural change in the sector will gain 
strength and the challenges that have arisen during the 2000s will intensify. The 
most important challenges concern the ICT industry and guaranteeing the 
knowledge needed by the technology industry in general. 
The expansion of the ICT sector had the greatest effect of all individual sectors 
on the growth and structural change that took place at the end of the 1990s. 
Between 1995 and 2000, the sector’s effect on growth in GDP was on average 
one per cent unit annually. Nokia’s effect alone during this period was of the 
order of approximately half a percentage point. In the beginning of the 2000s 
the ICT sector has contributed considerably lessto growth. It is obvious that the 
growth contribution of the magnitude that occurred at the end of the 1990s will 
not happen again in the coming years, though growth in the ICT sector will 
continue. The central challenge for the economy as a whole, as well as for the 
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technology industry, is how to convert the effect of growth and productivity in 
ICT production into advantages in using ICT. 
Finland will remain one of the world’s leading producers of information and 
communication technology for a long time to come. Since the end of the 1990s, 
however, new globally acting challengers from Asia and eastern Central Europe 
have arisen, who specialise in the same products as Finland. As a result of 
global competition and technological development, world market prices for 
products have rapidly declined and the terms of trade have weakened. To a 
great extent, it has been possible to compensate for this with rapid productivity 
growth, but to keep doing so may turn out to be problematic. 
This is a challenge for the technology industry in general, and in many of its 
sectors productivity development has been slow. An important part of 
productivity development has turned out to be the continuing change in 
enterprise and location structure, i.e. what is known as creative destruction. 
Productivity growth is also supported by R&D activities and the right allocation 
of training investment. In the technology industry, there is not so much a labour 
shortage as a lack of qualified personnel. Anticipating competence needs, 
however, is becoming more difficult in rapidly changing market conditions. On 
the one hand, choices must be made that entail creating narrow pinnacles of 
expertise in university teaching and research, and on the other hand possibilities 
must be created through training for flexible and extensive professional 
identities, as work assignments in enterprises become subject to rapid change. 
Importance and productivity of the service sector19
The importance of the service sector as part of the economy has been 
increasing in all developed countries, both in terms of production value and 
employment. The growth in services aimed at households is related to trends 
occurring in the structure of consumer demand such as the increase in living 
standards and the ageing of the population. On the other hand, various business 
services in industrial value chains are also growing rapidly. The development 
and digitalisation of information and communication technology are creating 
many more international, even global market opportunities for various services.  
In terms of the proportion of production and employment, the Finnish private 
sector is smaller than in countries at a similar level of development. The export 
of services in proportion to the size of the economy is average among the EU-14 
and exceeds the OECD average. The proportion of services with respect to total 
exports remains relatively low in Finland. The relatively small production and 
                                               
19  Based on the study, Palvelualojen kehitys, tuottavuus ja kilpailu (2005). Valtioneuvoston kanslian 
julkaisusarja 11/2005. 
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export proportion of services is partly explained by Finland’s strong export-
oriented manufacturing sector.  
Figure 1.17 The share of the service sector in employment and the level of 
GDP per capita in 2003.
Source: OECD 2005, Enhancing the Performance of the Services Sector. 
In Finland, the average labour productivity of private services is approximately 
five per cent lower than the EU average, although there are large differences in 
the productivity of different sectors. In sector-specific terms, productivity is at its 
highest in the EU-14 countries in the accommodation and restaurant industry, as 
well as in the real estate and business services. In the transport and storage as 
well as the finance and insurance sectors, productivity in Finland exceeds the EU 
average, which is mainly due to the effective utilisation of new ICT technology. 
The capital intensity of business services is relatively low in Finland, but there is 
an element of inefficiency in the use of labour as well. The low productivity of 
business services causes indirect problems too, because such services represent 
important intermediate product inputs for industry and services aimed at 
consumers. Low productivity in the production of intermediate products 
generally raises their price and decreases their use. This may be shown in the 
weak renewal and productivity in the production of the final product20 (Cf. Wölfl 
2005, Pilat & Wölfl 2005). 
                                               
20  The small size of the Finnish services sector could partially stem from the possibility that Finnish 
manufacturing companies have not outsourced services as extensively as companies in other 
countries. This hypothesis is in line with the observation that for many companies classified as 
manufacturing enterprises services constitute a major fraction of total sales; an example is the 
lift producer Kone Ltd. To the extent these services produce high value added, such behaviour 
by the manufacturing companies may also explain a part of the mediocre productivity 
performance of Finnish private services. 
53 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
Hotels and restaurants
Real estate and business
services
Telecommunications
Wholesale and retail trade
Transport and storage
Financial services
Finland
EU-14
Figure 1.18 Productivity per employee in Finland and the EU-14 countries in 
relation to the OECD average (OECD=100) in 2001 (PPP).  
Source: OECD, STAN (the corrections made to the 2006 national economy figures has 
been taken into account). 
There is no single reason for the underdevelopment of the service sector. For 
example, R&D investments are higher than average in Finland, although they do 
not achieve the highest levels of the OECD countries. In addition, the 
educational level of the labour force is exceptionally high in the Finnish service 
sector. The reasons for underdevelopment are perhaps related to the use of 
resources and/or the functioning and special features of the service markets: in 
addition to low capital intensity, the utilisation of information and 
communication technology is low in many areas. There are also reasons to 
believe that there is not enough competition in all service industries. From the 
point of view of the service sector, the labour market does not function in the 
best possible way, either. In addition Finland’s low population density curtails 
the possibilities that an effective service production scale can achieve.  
In Finland many service sectors were previously protected from international 
competition. Opening up the market through membership of the EU and the 
possibilities of new technologies have, however, changed and will continue to 
change the operational conditions of the service sectors. The opening up of the 
market and deregulation are powerful methods for improving the productivity of 
both labour and capital. Open markets also reduce the price level of services. 
Increasing knowledge capital and more intensive product development (through 
the adoption of effective procedures developed elsewhere or the development of 
new service innovations) can improve productivity in service fields. 
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To increase the productivity of the service sector in future it will also be 
important to develop completely new products and service concepts, both 
technical and commercial. A completely new service can create a market which 
was not there previously or where the value added per labour unit is 
significantly higher than before. 
1.5 Conclusions 
Finland’s economic growth has been strong after a period of slower growth, the 
result of the bursting of the technology bubble at the beginning of the 2000s 
and the dip in the growth of the world economy. A stronger world economy and 
strongly developing domestic demand have been the main drivers of the rapid 
economic growth in Finland. It is interesting to note that many of the so-called 
traditional industries have done well over recent years. 
It should be borne in mind that the economy has continued to open up during 
the 2000s and economic growth has been supported by the opening up of the 
markets. There also seem to be faint indications that Finland’s competitiveness 
as a location for enterprises is slowly improving. Direct investments in Finland 
have increased, as has employment in Finland by foreign enterprises. With 
regard to its GDP per capita ratio, Finland is richer than the EU-15 average. This 
result is based on increased productivity and an increased employment rate. 
Finland is still behind the richest EU countries and the United States, despite the 
fact that for years various competitive indicators have shown it to be one of the 
most competitive countries in the world. 
Finland’s ‘underachievement’ is partly due to time lags. Competitiveness can 
only be realised in phases; i.e. it occurs as faster growth than in other countries, 
which over time is also reflected in GDP per capita. Various factors, however, 
indicate that achieving a GDP per capita ratio corresponding to competitiveness 
measurements is still a long way off. 
The terms of trade are one such factor. They have developed weakly and will 
most probably continue to do so. Finland’s industry is specialised in products the 
pricesof which, for various reasons, tend to decrease. Productivity benefits, 
therefore, flow to a significant extent to foreign consumers. Finland’s energy 
intensiveness is also the same sort of effect on the terms of trade. 
Another important structural problem is the fact that Finland has achieved high 
productivity in manufacturing, but in many service sectors productivity is clearly 
lower than the international level, although due to measurement difficulties 
exact figures are not easy to come by. As the proportion of services is large in 
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all developed countries and will increase, especially in Finland, the low 
productivity of the service sectors will be a significant problem in the future.  
In addition, demographic change will affect Finland earlier than it will other 
European countries, and the nature of globalisation is changing in ways which 
may set new challenges to a country like Finland. It would be a mistake to 
believe that Finland can just wait for competitiveness measurements to 
transform into prosperity. 
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2 OUTSOURCING AND OFFSHORING 
Given the current stronger role of the developing countries in the global 
economy and their increasing share in global output, businesses with their 
headquarters in the industrialised countries tend to select a developing country 
as a location for their new units. In addition to these greenfield investments, 
offshoring to low cost countries is a challenge for Western industrialised 
countries. Offshoring is no longer a matter of production but also concerns other 
operations. Digitalised information and fast telecommunications allow some 
service tasks to be performed in one place and consumed in another. The 
development of information technology together with low telecommunication 
costs has enabled the transformation of business activities towards global 
production networks, where companies and their sub-operations are 
decentralised and function in different countries using linked data networks. 
Tasks are offshored from one country to another both due to internal 
reorganisations of corporate groups and offshore outsourcing of tasks. 
Outsourcing can also be domestic (Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1 Outsourcing, offshoring and their combinations. 
  Own production vs. buying 
   Internal to group External to group 
Home 
country No changes 
 
 
Domestic outsourcing 
 Task 
location Foreign 
countries In-house offshoring 
 
Offshore outsourcing 
 
Outsourcing as such is not new in Finland. Previously, many large companies 
managed a large part of the processing chain for their products themselves. In 
the main, the different stages of the processing chain were conducted inside the 
company: it refined raw materials, transformed them into components, 
combined the components into products and provided the logistics needed to 
bring the products to the market. In the late 1980s, large companies started to 
hive off various business operations. Multi-sector companies became single-
sector companies and within their selected sectors they focused on specific parts 
of the processing chain. Selling parts of the processing chain partially entailed 
outsourcing. In many cases, the seller company became an important customer 
of the sold unit. 
In the late 1990s and the 2000s, companies operating in Finland have become 
more integrated into global clusters. Among individual companies competing in 
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the market, there are also global business networks which are partly 
overlapping. As a slight overstatement, one could say that many traditional 
manufacturing companies seek to do everything but manufacture. Instead, they 
try to design products, market them and perhaps perform their final assembly. 
Actual manufacturing is mainly farmed out to partners and subcontractors. As a 
result, the importance of intermediate products (components, semi-finished 
products and component assemblies) as companies’ production inputs has 
increased. The processing chains of various service operations have also become 
fragmented. For example, new product development is no longer conducted 
entirely within single companies, but some of this work is purchased from other 
companies or organisations. The fragmentation of the processing chain has lead 
to the specialisation of companies. Companies have been focusing on specific 
parts of the processing chain only, instead of trying to manage the whole chain 
– which they may not be able to handle. For each processing chain, each 
company needs to answer this question: ”Should we carry out the 
manufacturing ourselves or should we buy it in?” 
Depending on the answer, the next question is: ”Where should we manufacture 
it?” or, ”Where should we buy it?” Two simultaneous developments have 
occurred: 1) Cluster structures have changed due to the fragmentation of value 
chains into ever smaller parts, and 2) Parts of companies and clusters have been 
decentralised between different countries (Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2 Company structure transformation towards global production 
networks. 
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In global production networks, different companies have different roles. 
Typically, the network core is occupied by companies possessing a strong 
distribution chain, trademark or essential technology. The extremities of global 
production networks are producer-led networks and buyer-led networks (Table 
2.1).
Table 2.1 Main characteristics of producer-led and buyer-led production 
networks. 
 Producer-led production 
networks 
Buyer-led production 
networks 
Core operations R&D, production management, 
brand management 
Design, marketing, 
distribution channels 
Barriers to entry Scale economies Scope economies 
Typical sectors Durables, 
investment goods 
Consumables  
Typical products Cars, mobile phones, 
aeroplanes 
Textiles, clothes, shoes, toys 
Ownership of production units Multinational trademark 
owners, multinational supplier 
companies and local supplier 
companies in different 
countries. 
Local companies, or 
multinational company units in 
developing countries 
Examples of companies Nokia, Boeing, Toyota Wal-Mart, IKEA, Nike 
Adapted from classification by Gereffin (2001). 
Durables and investment goods are product groups, often with producer-led 
production networks. Producer-led sectors typically require large investments in 
factories and/or R&D. Due to the large company size required for large 
investments and scale economies, new competitors are not continuously 
emerging in the markets. It is typical of producer-led sectors that only a handful 
of companies occupy most of the global markets. These multinational leading 
companies increasingly require their supplier companies to operate worldwide. 
The global operating model is thus spread further as suppliers too require their 
own subcontractors and service providers to be able to operate on several 
continents. 
At the core of buyer-led production networks there is usually a wholesale and 
retail trade chain (such as Wal-Mart) or a company with a well-known brand 
(such as Nike). The core companies make use of the global production network 
but do not participate in the actual production activities. Design, product 
development and distribution are separated from manufacturing activities as 
much as possible. There is a clear reason for this. In buyer-led chains, the core 
companies seek to render the actual manufacturing subject to competitive 
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tendering. There are often a large number of potential manufacturers and, for 
manufacturing, the barriers to entry are usually minor. No wonder, therefore, 
that manufacturing within buyer-led chains is mainly conducted in low cost 
countries.
The leading Finnish companies are almost always involved in producer-led 
processing chains. For example, Nokia, Kone, Stora-Enso, UPM-Kymmene and 
Metso all operate in sectors where the producer is at the core of the processing 
chain. Their operations are strongly internationalised as regards production and 
procurement as well as distribution and sales. 
In contrast, the Finnish situation is completely different for buyer-led chains. In 
Finland, there is almost a complete absence of buyer-led chains with significant 
expansion in foreign countries. These rare internationalising companies have 
begun building their distribution and sales mainly in neighbouring countries, i.e. 
the Baltic countries, Sweden and Russia. Whereas the internationalisation of 
distribution chains remains minor, most procurement units in retail chains 
operate on an almost fully global basis. As procurement has become more 
internationalised, there are also more store or chain brands available in addition 
to familiar producer trademarks. The products sold under private labels are 
designed by the stores themselves, and are typically very strictly defined. This 
makes it easy to make actual production subject to competitive tendering. As 
the following example illustrates, a product’s value is not generated in 
production but elsewhere: 
”If our company’s private labels are sold in Aleksi 13 stores, nearly 80 % of the 
end price remains in Finland, even if the products were produced elsewhere.”
Source: Citation from Grundström (2004). 
It is in design, logistics, marketing and distribution that a product’s added value 
is mainly generated. The same applies more generally to buyer-led networks. 
2.1 Outsourcing 
In the 2000s, outsourcing has become a normal part of business. According to a 
survey conducted during the summer of 2006 by Etlatieto Oy, no less than two 
thirds of companies operating in Finland with more than 10 staff outsourced 
tasks to other companies at the beginning of the century (figure 2.3). 
Outsourcing has been most common in the wholesale and retail trade sector. 
Nearly three quarters of wholesale and retail trade companies have outsourced 
some of their tasks, but it is also common in the manufacturing and service 
sectors, although their share remains slightly smaller than that of the wholesale 
and retail sector. 
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Figure 2.3 Frequency of outsourcing in different sectors, % of companies in 
sector.  
Source: Survey by Etlatieto Oy, for further information see Ali-Yrkkö (2006).
Most outsourcing from Finnish companies has been domestic. Operations have 
remained in Finland, but the party performing them has changed. Contrary to 
the generally-held belief, outsourced tasks have usually not been offshored but 
transferred to another company in Finland. However, some outsourcing has 
been directed at foreign countries. In the industrial sector, offshore outsourcing 
has been clearly more common than in the wholesale and retail trade and 
service sectors. More than 15 per cent of industrial companies have been 
outsourcing their tasks to foreign countries. In the wholesale and retail trade 
and service sectors, offshore outsourcing is notably more unusual. 
Global competition is not limited to sectors and companies. The use of 
information and communication technology has introduced global competition in 
companies’ sub-operations and even with respect to individual jobs (Baldwin 
2006). The following table (Table 2.2) shows domestic and offshore outsourcing 
in manufacturing, R&D and service tasks. 
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Table 2.2 Outsourced tasks and their target location, percentages. 
Outsourcing Domestic 
outsourcing
Offshore 
outsourcing
Manufacturing and productiona 32.3% 30.8% 12.3% 
R&Db 22.6% 22.3% 6.6% 
Servicesc 60.2% 59.6% 2.7% 
a) Share of industrial companies, b) Share of companies conducting R&D activity, c) Share of all 
companies. Note: The ‘Offshore outsourcing’ column includes companies which have conducted both 
domestic and offshore outsourcing of the relevant activity. 
Source: Survey by Etlatieto Oy, for further information see Ali-Yrkkö (2006).
A third of industrial companies with more than 10 staff have outsourced at least 
part of their manufacturing. Generally, operations have remained in Finland, 
since at least two thirds of outsourcing companies did so only within Finland. On 
the other hand, the nature of manufacturing generally allows offshore 
outsourcing, at least in theory. A total of over 12 per cent of industrial 
companies have outsourced some of their manufacturing activities offshore. In 
such cases, manufacturing has not usually been entirely offshored but part of it 
has been outsourced within Finland. 
Outsourcing by Finnish companies is not limited to manufacturing. Nearly a 
quarter of companies conducting research and development have outsourced 
R&D related tasks. This share is surprisingly large. Often, R&D is considered an 
activity that companies want to carry out internally only. For some R&D, 
outsourcing is a better solution. R&D outsourcing has generally been at least 
partly domestic. In practice, all companies outsourcing R&D offshore have also 
outsourced some of it inside Finland. 
Outsourcing has chiefly concerned service tasks. Nearly 60 per cent of 
companies have outsourced at least one of their service tasks to another 
company. This large share can be explained by the fact that service activities 
include a variety of tasks from accounting and property security services to the 
maintenance of machinery. Many of these service activities are tasks that 
support the company’s actual business. Outsourcer companies have sought to 
surrender the parts that are not their core operations. A significant proportion of 
service tasks require a local presence. Calculated in person years, over 
95 per cent of service task outsourcing has been domestic (see Table 2.2), 
which can also be seen in the service sectors’ growth. In recent years, business 
activities have formed one of the sectors with the highest growth. To some 
extent, the sector’s growth is apparent. Before outsourcing, the same tasks 
were conducted internally within companies and registered in those sectors 
accordingly.
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Globalisation and outsourcing survey by Etlatieto Oy 
Between June and August 2006, Etlatieto Oy conducted a survey charting companies’ 
international activities and views on Finland as their geographic location. The survey 
focused on domestic and offshore outsourcing and offshoring conducted by companies in 
the 2000s, and on their motivating factors. 
The survey was targeted at companies employing at least 10 staff in manufacturing, 
retail, transport, financial or insurance services or business services. This specified target 
population included a total of 12,475 companies, for which stratified random sampling 
was conducted. The sample consisted of a total of 1,827 companies, of which 1,650 
could be reached. Of these, 653 (40%) answered the survey. The respondents 
represented the companies’ top management. 
To calculate the target population statistics, weighting coefficients were elaborated for 
the subsamples. 
Distribution of respondent companies by sector and size (in numbers of companies) 
 Company size (by number of staff) 
 10–49 staff 50–249 staff Over 250 staff Total 
Manufacturing
 
51 162 137 350 
Knowledge intensive services 33 64 26 123 
Other private services and 
retail 
41 53 86 180 
Total 125 279 249 653  
The aggregated global staff in the respondent companies totalled 625,000. In Finland, 
these companies employed a total of 375,000 persons, which accounts for a quarter of 
the staff in the entire Finnish business sector. In 2005, the aggregated turnover of the 
respondent companies amounted to nearly EUR 165 billion.
What are the drivers of outsourcing? The motives and objectives of outsourcing 
can vary depending on the task (Figure 2.4). 
Companies have had several objectives for outsourcing their production. The 
most important has been acquiring additional capacity. Through outsourcing, 
companies can increase their capacity without making investments. The saved 
investment amount is thus freed up for other uses or investment targets. In 
part, the objective of acquiring additional capacity is related to another major 
objective, that of increasing flexibility. For a large part of outsourcer companies, 
outsourcing offered a solution for increasing their flexibility. This need to 
increase flexibility is related to the current operational method according to 
which the goal is to minimise stocks. Since both raw material stocks and end 
product stocks tie up capital, companies seek solutions for avoiding them. 
Furthermore, because customers do not want stocks either, incoming orders 
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require a short delivery time. The need for flexibility arises from the fact that 
short delivery times cause major variations in the utilisation of capacity. 
Adaptation to variations in demand may become easier if part of production is 
outsourced to other companies. Outsourcing has indeed represented a method 
of managing companies’ own production capacity and its variations. A third, 
central objective for outsourcing is obtaining cost savings. Companies aim at 
lowering their production costs by commissioning manufacturing partly or 
entirely from other companies. 
Figure 2.4 Motives for outsourcing manufacturing and R&D.  
 
 
 
Note: Share of companies that have outsourced the related task and that have characterised the 
corresponding motive as significant in making the outsourcing decision. Both domestic and offshore 
outsourcing are included. 
Source: Survey by Etlatieto Oy, for further information see Ali-Yrkkö (2006). 
In part, R&D has been outsourced for the same reasons as manufacturing. 
Acquiring technology or knowledge has, however, clearly been the most 
important reason for outsourcing R&D. Companies use outsourcing in order to 
utilise technological know-how from other companies. In addition to seeking 
know-how, outsourcing has been a means of acquiring additional capacity in 
R&D operations. With additional capacity, companies have often aimed at 
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accelerating their product development process and thus being able to introduce 
products to the market faster. A third essential motive for outsourcing has been 
the desire to obtain cost savings. Over half of R&D outsourcer companies have 
conducted outsourcing of their R&D activities in order to reduce costs. On the 
whole, outsourcing R&D has been driven by the aspiration to obtain various 
benefits, including cost savings and know-how. 
2.2 Offshoring 
After the quiet phase at the turn of the century, the internationalisation of 
Finnish companies1 has continued rapidly. In 2000, Finnish companies employed 
a total of 288,000 staff outside Finland, but by 2005 this number had increased 
to a total of 350,000 (Bank of Finland 2005). Thus, the increase in the number 
of posted staff was about 60,000. Such intensive growth raises the question of 
how much of this growth is due to offshoring tasks from Finland. 
Figure 2.5 Offshoring between 2000 and June 2006, in person years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The vertical lines related to each bar indicate a confidence interval of 95%. 
Source: Survey by Etlatieto Oy, for further information see Ali-Yrkkö (2006).
In the 2000s, approximately 7,000–12,000 jobs have been transferred from 
Finland to foreign subsidiaries of corporate groups. Clearly, most of these 
transfers have been related to production activities, but service tasks have also 
been transferred totalling an equivalent of approximately 2,000 person years. 
On the contrary, offshoring of R&D tasks has been scarce, which at least partly 
                                               
1  Finnish companies, regardless of their form of ownership. 
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suggests that Finland is a competitive location for R&D (see also Ali-Yrkkö & 
Palmberg 2006). 
All in all, increases in foreign staff in Finnish companies during the 2000s have 
been mainly due to the expansion of foreign activities. Offshoring tasks from 
Finland clearly accounted for a smaller proportion of the increase in foreign 
staff: some 15–25 per cent of this increase was due to offshoring. 
Offshoring is bidirectional, i.e. tasks are offshored both from Finland to foreign 
countries and vice versa. Internationalised companies aim at locating each task 
or subtask in optimal areas. Some companies have indeed offshored some tasks 
from Finland, but on the other hand, some have transferred other, previously 
cross-border tasks to Finland. Roughly 10 per cent of companies that have 
offshored tasks from Finland have also inshored tasks from foreign locations to 
Finland.
The motives for offshoring are diverse. In many cases, costs have played a 
significant role, but offshoring has also rested on other goals (Figure 2.6). 
Offshoring production tasks has nearly always been related to cost savings. In 
particular, offshoring to lower cost countries has been a way of decreasing 
production costs. Offshoring has also often been targeted at obtaining other 
savings. The relocation of manufacturing closer to markets can also generate 
transport costs. Clearly, for over a half of offshoring companies, taking 
advantage of the logistics location of the target country has been a motivating 
factor. The companies have benefited from the target country’s logistics location 
not only in the form of reductions in transport costs but also in other ways. In 
some sectors, customers expect short delivery times that would be impossible to 
meet if production operations were located far away. In addition to costs and 
logistics, increasing flexibility has also been an essential factor in offshoring 
production. Close to two thirds of companies that have offshored production 
tasks have aimed at increased flexibility. Increasing flexibility has been a central 
objective both of offshoring (Figure 2.6) and outsourcing production 
(Figure 2.4). 
For R&D, motives for offshoring are more complex than for production. This 
complexity is due to the fact that R&D is not similar in all companies but its 
nature can vary. Even R&D internal to individual companies can often include 
highly varied R&D activities. Some R&D activities include long-term technology 
development that can eventually be productised, but only after several years. 
Other R&D activities can be described as taking account of minor customer 
specific needs. 
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Figure 2.6 Reasons for offshoring from Finland.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Share of companies that have offshored the corresponding task and qualified the corresponding motive 
as central in making the offshoring decision. 
Source: Survey by Etlatieto Oy, for further information see Ali-Yrkkö (2006).
Offshoring R&D has mainly been based on entering a market, improved 
consideration of customer needs or cost savings. Local markets and regulations 
often necessitate making changes in products. The easiest way for implementing 
such changes may be through local operations close to the customer. Operating 
in the developing countries also generates cost savings since the cost of R&D 
staff is, evidently, lower in comparison to Finland. However, some R&D tasks 
have also been offshored to industrialised countries where R&D staff salaries 
and other direct staff expenses are notably higher than in Finland. In such 
cases, cost savings have been sought elsewhere than in direct staff expenses. 
For example, savings from the geographical concentration of certain 
development activities can exceed the increased costs incurred from higher 
wages. 
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Maintaining separate locations for R&D and production is a challenge for the 
company, as it must find a solution to ensuring interactivity between these 
operations (see Ketokivi 2006). One solution is to transfer R&D close to 
production units. In many cases, this has been one of the reasons for offshoring 
R&D (see lower part of Figure 2.6). Often, the customer wants minor changes to 
the product, and the easiest solution to this is to combine it with the production 
phase. Sometimes, the difference between product development and sales-
related customer-specific customisation is minimal. In some sectors, local 
manufacturing therefore requires local product development or product 
customisation. A larger macroeconomic concern is that, alongside 
manufacturing, process expertise related to manufacturing may disappear from 
Finland. When manufacturing is essentially offshored, the development work of 
manufacturing processes will follow sooner or later. Another concern relates to 
whether R&D offshored from Finland will include long-term technology 
development. In such a case, offshoring would no longer mean adjusting 
products or technology to local markets, but transferring fundamental expertise 
from Finland. 
SPECIAL FOCUS: A COMPANY’S GROWTH INTO A MULTINATIONAL PLAYER – PEIKKO 
GROUP CASE STUDY 
Peikko Group, established in 1965 and formerly called Teräspeikko Oy, manufactures 
fastening products made from steel for concrete structures. Its turnover for 2006 is 
estimated at EUR 55–60 million, of which nearly half will come from foreign countries. 
The group employs around 450 employees. Roughly a third of the group employees work 
outside Finland. Currently, there are foreign subsidiaries in 13 countries. Its products are 
manufactured in four locations: Finland, Germany, Slovakia and Lithuania.
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For the first 20 years, the company operated solely in Finland. In the second half of the 
1980s, the company also started to export minor quantities of its products. However, 
these exports were unsystematic, rather than representing a determined search for 
international markets. Then, the recession at the beginning of 1990s created a slump in 
Finnish demand. The volume of construction and hence demand for construction supplies 
decreased significantly. At the same time, Peikko reduced its operations by almost half. 
As the economy began to recover from the recession, the company began seeking a new 
direction. Alongside European integration, the EU markets began to seem attractive. 
International success, however, required better products. The chosen solution was to rely 
on product development, aiming to develop new, further refined products and to improve 
the characteristics of old products. In the 1990s, the company’s internationalisation 
strategy was to manufacture products in Finland and serve other countries through 
export activities. In 1997, Peikko established its first foreign subsidiary. The German 
subsidiary first functioned as a simple sales company, as did the foreign subsidiaries 
established or bought during the next 6 or 7 years. Originally, part of international sales 
in certain countries was assigned to local representatives. Later, the decision was taken 
that it was best to keep the distribution chain in the company’s own hands.
As the mid-2000s approached, demand for Peikko Group’s products was rapidly 
increasing. More capacity was thus required. Simultaneously, there was growing demand 
for customer specific customisation. This, together with the short delivery times desired 
by some customers, meant that production operations centralised in Finland could not 
provide a sufficient level of service. A local presence was required.
Moving into Eastern Central Europe 
A new product line based on clear, existing demand in Central Europe represented a 
stepping-stone for setting up new manufacturing operations in Eastern Central Europe. 
The challenge was to meet the customers’ requirements for very short delivery times. In 
addition, manufacturing the product required considerable amounts of manual work. 
Production had to be located near the markets in order to be able to keep delivery times 
to customers short. In addition, competitive prices required lower manufacturing costs. 
Poland and the Czech Republic were potential locations for the factory in the short run, 
but the company presumed that their cost level would rise swiftly. Hungary was also an 
option, but it was rejected, since the transport time required to the German markets 
would have been too long.
At the same time, Peikko was involved in another project related to manufacturing 
cooperation with a design office located in Slovakia. This generated the idea of locating 
the new factory in Slovakia. Among Slovakia’s benefits was a short distance to other 
Central European countries. In addition, labour costs were approximately a sixth of the 
Finnish level and it was assumed that they would not rise as rapidly as in Poland and the 
Czech Republic. A decision on starting up production in Slovakia was made towards the 
end of 2004, and operations began during the autumn of 2005. Investment in the first 
phase amounted to approximately EUR 0.5 million. 
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Current production in the Slovakian factory is labour-intensive. Its products are mainly 
sold to Central and Southern European markets. During the autumn of 2006 further 
investments were being carried out in order to extend the production capacity for current 
products. At the same time, the product range for the Slovakian factory will be further 
extended, especially in product groups for which the Finnish production costs are not 
competitive. In the third phase, the automation level of Slovakian production will be 
increased in order to strengthen international competitiveness.
In the autumn of 2006, Peikko Group considered another investment in a new factory. 
The future factory’s distance from Central European countries, and thus the transport 
time of the finished products, had to be short. Manufacturing costs also played a role, 
and the unit will be established in one of the Eastern Central European countries. Several 
criteria are being considered in the evaluation of potential locations, including traffic 
connections, the area’s infrastructure (the availability of electricity and water, waste 
water treatment), the price and availability of land required for the factory, labour 
availability, salary levels and investment and other support provided by the area.
In the forthcoming years, Peikko Group plans to continue the internationalisation of its 
operations. In addition to Europe, the search for further markets will be targeted at both 
East and West. The company will probably also operate in Northern America and the 
Middle East.
Activities extended within Finland 
In addition to foreign operations, production capacity has also been increasing in Finland. 
During 2005–2007, domestic investments will amount to EUR 6–7 million. These 
investments will be targeted at a new factory, new production equipment and robots, the 
expansion of final assembly and storage space and increasing office space. Since the 
beginning of 2004, the number of staff in Finland has grown by over a hundred. One of 
the central factors pertaining to the growth in the company’s domestic operations was an 
order related to the construction of a new nuclear plant in Olkiluoto. The value of the 
contract, including fastening products made from steel, is over EUR 9 million. The 
received order will open up new territory for various other projects concerning power 
plants that will be built in Europe in the near future.
Alongside the internationalisation of its production activity, the company’s product 
development has been extended outside Finland. To some extent, these operations 
include customer specific customisation that is best carried out at the same location as 
production. On the other hand, some of the foreign units will also take part in the 
development of entirely new products. Product development engineers with knowledge of 
local conditions are also needed for managing local technical assistance and transmitting 
customer needs from different countries to the product development team.
With regard to the manufacturability of the products, it is essential that the new product 
development be carried out in the proximity of the manufacturing unit. In order to ensure 
competitiveness, the product design process takes account of the product’s 
manufacturability. This allows the optimisation of the product’s manufacturing process. At 
the same time the new product’s manufacturing costs can be identified and this, in turn, 
will enable the estimation of the end product’s potential price. 
71 
Outsourcing centralised in service tasks 
Outsourcing carried out by Peikko has almost entirely concerned various service tasks. 
Outsourced tasks include the operations of a personnel restaurant, healthcare, cleaning, 
real estate management, transport and part of machinery maintenance. The development 
of computing software and some product development related activities have also been 
outsourced from the group. On the other hand, production has remained almost 
untouched by outsourcing. Manufacturing and production are the core expertise of the 
company and the intention is to keep these operations mainly internal. 
Summary
On the whole, the EU’s internal markets have been a key driver in transforming Peikko 
Group from a domestic market company into a multinational. European integration and 
the abolition of customs duties and tariffs that followed have transformed Central Europe 
into an attractive market for the company’s products. Moreover, the company has 
launched export efforts and created foreign units specialising mainly in sales and 
marketing. The EU’s enlargement to the East in May 2004 created a new situation. 
Numerous countries neighbouring large Central European countries with a significantly 
lower cost level than the old EU countries became part of the internal market. The 
Eastern Central European countries offered for an excellent logistics location for Peikko 
Group’s operations, enabling the delivery of products to Central European end customers 
within short delivery times. In addition, low cost levels enable the company to encompass 
product ranges which would otherwise not be profitable, given domestic manufacturing 
and transport cost levels.
2.3 Effects of outsourcing and offshoring in Finland 
Decisions on outsourcing and offshoring are made for commercial reasons. The 
objective is to improve the company’s potential for success within a certain time 
frame. From companies’ point of view, success in achieving this goal means 
improved profitability and securing the continuity of operations. 
At the macroeconomic or sector level, the effects of outsourcing and offshoring 
are different than at company level. Both outsourcing and offshoring indicate 
the specialisation of an economy. Outsourcing dissociates the various parts of 
value chains into different companies. Instead of one company taking care of 
everything all the way from processing raw materials to manufacturing 
components and assembling the final product, the various parts of the 
processing chain are decentralised to different companies that form networks 
and clusters. Outsourcing is also reflected in sectoral statistics. For example, the 
service tasks that industrial companies outsource to specialised companies 
appear as strong growth of the business activities sector. From a 
macroeconomic perspective, the growth of this particular service sector becomes 
apparent in the areas corresponding to existing tasks that were previously 
included in industrial sector figures. 
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Offshoring and outsourcing manufacturing tasks form part of a development 
where most value added is created elsewhere than in manufacturing. Previously, 
manufacturing expertise was the main source of competitiveness for industrial 
companies. Nowadays, manufacturing expertise is widely distributed and 
increasingly available in the leading developing countries, such as China. As a 
consequence, the success of the leading industrial companies is based on 
factors other than manufacturing. 
Table 2.3 gives an estimate of outsourcing and offshoring by companies 
operating in Finland. 
Table 2.3 Outsourcing and offshoring by Finnish companies, from 
January 2000 to July 2006. 
 Quantity in person years Share of labour in 
corporate sector 
Domestic outsourcing 46,000–84,000 3.5–6.0% 
Offshore outsourcing 5,000–9,000 0.4–0.6% 
In-house offshoring 5,000–14,000 0.4–1.0% 
Source: Survey by Etlatieto Oy, for further information see Ali-Yrkkö (2006).
Outsourcing conducted by companies is mainly domestic. In other words, these 
tasks have remained in Finland, but have been transferred to another company. 
A similar phenomenon can also be seen in Italy. There, outsourcing is mainly 
domestic (Cusmano et al. 2006). Table 2.3 indicates that domestic outsourcing 
concerned 46,000–84,000 employees in Finland in the 2000s. With regard to 
employment in the entire corporate sector, these figures correspond to some 
3.5–6 per cent. 
Offshore outsourcing has resulted in the loss of 5,000–9,000 jobs from Finland. 
In-house offshoring within corporate groups has affected 5,000–
14,000 employees, corresponding to 0.4–1 per cent of labour in the entire 
corporate sector. In all, internal reorganisations and outsourcing conducted 
within corporate groups during the 2000s have caused the offshoring of a total 
of 10,000–23,000 jobs from Finland. This equals 1.0–1.5 per cent of the total 
gross employment in the corporate sector. It is interesting to compare the 
Finnish figures to those of other countries. Proportioned to total gross 
employment, 0.3 per cent of German jobs have been offshored to Eastern 
Central Europe; the corresponding share in Austria being approximately 
0.7 per cent (Marin 2004). If tasks offshored to other countries – such as to 
Asian countries – were also taken into account, their shares would most likely be 
near the Finnish figures. Falk & Wolfmayr (2005) also suggest a similar 
magnitude in estimating the effects of outsourcing on employment in seven EU 
countries. According to them, the average annual decrease in employment 
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imputed to offshore outsourcing was 0.25 per cent in these seven countries. 
During the six-year period of 2000–2005 the total decrease in jobs would have 
thus been approximately 1.5 per cent. 
In relation to the continuous creation and extinction of jobs in the Finnish 
economy, the quantity of offshored jobs is minor. During six years (from 
January 2000 until July 2006), outsourcing and reorganisation within corporate 
groups caused the offshoring of 10,000–23,000 jobs from Finland, 
corresponding to 1,500–3,500 jobs annually. This amounts to approximately 
1.0–2.5 per cent of the jobs that annually disappear (or are created) in Finland. 
2.4 Demand for production inputs is changing 
Both offshoring and outsourcing changes the demand for production inputs, 
namely investments, intermediate products, R&D and labour. 
The relocation of production activities, offshore outsourcing and building new 
production capacity, mainly in foreign locations, all reduce the need to carry out 
domestic fixed investments. Instead, domestic outsourcing does not affect 
investing in fixed assets at macroeconomic level. In lieu of fixed investments, 
domestic efforts will be increasingly targeted at the development of expertise, 
software, brand building and R&D. In the future, companies will probably have 
to augment their investments in staff training. For staff, an even larger 
proportion of working time will be spent acquiring and absorbing the latest 
information. 
As processing chains become fragmented, using intermediate products as 
production factors will be intensified. The use of not only product parts and 
components but also of immaterial intermediary products will become more 
customary. For example, part of the development work of products or 
production processes will be purchased from outside the company. 
Offshoring a task directly diminishes the work input in Finland. Long term effects 
will be determined by the kind of activity which replaces offshored tasks. The 
following figure (Figure 2.7) illustrates expected growth in domestic employees 
in companies which have offshored tasks compared to those which have not. 
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Figure 2.7  Expected change in number of staff over the next 3 years, 
balance figure.  
 
 
 
Note: Results are shown in balance figures. The balance figure represents the proportion of companies 
expecting growth from which the share of companies expecting a decrease has been subtracted. When, 
for example, 21% of the companies having relocated tasks intend to increase their total number of staff 
in Finland, 54% intend to conserve the current number of staff and 24% intend to reduce it, the balance 
figure is 21 – 24 = -3. 
Source: Survey by Etlatieto Oy, for further information see Ali-Yrkkö (2006).
It seems that most of the offshoring companies will cut their total number of 
staff in Finland over the next three years. In other companies, intentions are 
usually the opposite as they plan to increase their labour in Finland. 
However, changes in the number of staff vary greatly depending on the staff’s 
level of education. The number of staff with a low level of education will be 
downsized, especially in companies that have already offshored tasks. Over the 
next three years, over half of these companies intent to cut their number of staff 
in Finland with a low level of education. Only six per cent of offshoring 
companies plan to increase their number of staff in Finland with a low level of 
education. 
In contrast, the number of staff with college or higher vocational level degrees 
will grow. Both offshoring and other companies envisage hiring more staff with a 
secondary education. In addition, the number of staff with a university level 
education will be augmented in both company groups. In the offshoring 
companies, the prospects for increasing staff with a high education are 
somewhat greater than in other companies. 
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For offshoring companies, the tasks carried out in Finland will therefore 
essentially be tasks that require a high level of education. This is supported by 
the fact that nearly half of companies which have offshored some of their 
manufacturing plan to increase their number of R&D staff in Finland. For other 
industrial companies, the corresponding share remains at 17 per cent. 
At the macroeconomic level, a remarkable decrease in manufacturing activities 
may bring about major challenges. Manufacturing affects its environment and 
creates a need for people with different skill levels. Production requires 
warehouse employees, lorry drivers as well as machinery and equipment 
maintenance staff. As production activity reduces, the demand for these 
vocational groups will decrease. 
Which Finnish sectors will see an increase in jobs? 
Evidence from a survey directed at a large group of companies shows that the 
outlook on staff changes is, on the whole, very positive. The number of jobs in 
Finland will increase in many sectors (see upper half of Figure 2.8). However, 
there are also many sectors in the economy that intend to decrease their 
domestic staff (lower half of the figure). 
Figure 2.8  Increase (%) in number of jobs in the beginning of the 2000s and 
expected growth sectors for 2006–2009 (balance figure).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The responses have been weighted by the domestic staff of companies. See also the footnote for 
Figure 2.7. 
Source: Survey by Etlatieto Oy, for further information see Ali-Yrkkö (2006). 
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Many of the companies providing business services will continue to increase 
their staff in Finland (see the right upper corner of the four-fold table). In 
particular, companies providing data processing and R&D services will further 
increase their domestic staff. Despite the fact that both software development 
and hardware maintenance are increasingly carried out in low cost countries, 
tasks related to data processing seem also to be augmenting in Finland. Vehicle 
manufacturing and other business services will also require more staff over the 
forthcoming years. 
Many sectors that reduced their staff in the beginning of the 2000s are positive 
about the forthcoming years and intend to increase their domestic staff (upper 
left corner in the figure). In industry, these sectors include the basic metal 
industry and engineering industry. In addition, the electrical engineering and 
chemical industries plan to hire new staff in Finland. 
Nevertheless, there are important sectors in Finland where downsizing staff will 
continue (lower left corner in the figure). Jobs will particularly be lost in the 
forest industry, publishing and printing and the food industry. In the service 
sectors, the number of staff will be reduced, to some extent, in transport and in 
financing and insurance. 
A simple examination of the need to decrease or increase labour at sector level 
is not sufficient to illustrate major structural changes on the labour market. Jobs 
requiring a low level of education will decrease while companies require more 
highly educated staff (Figure 2.9). 
Figure 2.9 Change in staff over the next 3 years in different sectors, balance 
figure.
Note: See footnote for figure 2.8. 
Source: Survey by Etlatieto Oy, for further information see Ali-Yrkkö (2006). 
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As an example, the intentions in the forest industry to reduce staff will especially 
concern staff with a low level of education, while more staff with a higher level 
of education will be hired in the sector. However, increases in highly educated 
staff will be minor compared to reductions of staff with a low level of education. 
A similar change is occurring in other sectors where the trend is to reduce staff, 
such as in the food industry, finance and insurance. It is probable that in the 
future Finland there will be both labour shortages and unemployment – a 
significant proportion of workers losing their jobs do not have the know-how 
required to qualify for vacancies. Finding a job will necessitate either major 
further training or transferring to a sector where the level of education is not an 
obstacle to finding a job (cf. Figure 2.10). 
Figure 2.10 Change in demand for work and nature of competition. 
Finland is facing the same situation as other traditional, industrialised countries. 
Low cost countries more often represent an alternative location for those tasks 
that are currently still located in the industrialised countries. From this, the 
question arises as to which types of tasks will be reduced in the industrialised 
countries and which will eventually experience growth (Figure 2.10). The vertical 
axis represents the skill level required for a task. The horizontal axis represents 
a task’s vulnerability to international competition or potential offshorability, 
meaning that the work can be carried out in a different country (location) and 
the output consumed in another. The border between international and local 
competition is continuously changing. The development of transport technology 
and, especially, of information and communication technology is rendering ever 
more tasks subject to international competition (cf. Blinder 2006 and Baldwin 
2006). ICT has enabled information, knowledge and ideas (see also Grossman & 
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Rossi-Hansberg 2006) to be spread rapidly around the world, and both 
developing and developed countries are seeking to take advantage of this 
phenomenon. 
The lower left corner shows low-skilled tasks subject to international 
competition. In the industry sector, these tasks include many manufacturing and 
assembly jobs and in the service sector, telephone services and typing services. 
These tasks will be reduced in the industrialised countries and, to a large extent, 
offshored to developing countries. For Finland, language has been a barrier and 
a delaying factor for offshoring certain services. Offshoring to India, for 
example, has not been possible, because there the supply of Finnish-speaking 
staff is insufficient. However, Estonian is closely related to Finnish, and therefore 
these tasks have been offshored to some extent from Finland to Estonia. 
The nature of some low-skilled tasks requires carrying them out on site (lower 
right corner of the four-fold table). For example, the maintenance of real estate 
and equipment or nursing tasks require a local presence and cannot be entirely 
carried out from a distance. It is likely that the use of local services (such as 
services related to health and wellbeing or to real estate management) will 
increase, entailing a demand for additional labour in these sectors. 
From a small country’s perspective, the left upper corner of the figure contains 
the tasks offering the best possibilities for future economic growth. Developing 
countries offering potential locations for high-skilled tasks (cf. Baldwin 2006) 
constitutes a challenge. China and India are the often-cited examples of 
countries that compete with industrialised countries for high-skilled tasks, and 
Hungary and the Czech Republic have a similar position with respect to certain 
sectors and tasks. It is therefore far from certain that more jobs will be created 
in relation to the tasks located in the left upper corner of the above figure. This 
will require success in competition against both developing countries and other 
developed countries. 
The tasks located in the upper right corner of the figure require high skill levels, 
and their potential offshorability is weak. This quarter typically includes doctors 
and lawyers. Many design services have so far demanded a local presence, but 
now the significance of distance is losing its importance. 
2.5 Offshoring potential of services 
Given the developments of recent years, offshoring from Finland has been quite 
limited. Most of this has been realised within the manufacturing sector, whereas 
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offshoring of services has been scarce.2 Similarly, estimates for the near future 
indicate a distinctly moderate development. These observations are in harmony 
with calculations and estimates concerning developments in other countries. 
There is reason to believe, however, that offshoring service tasks may be 
surprisingly extensive and rapid, when certain costs related to co-ordinating 
production in different locations decline below certain threshold levels (Baldwin 
2006). Nevertheless, all service activities do not have an equal potential for 
offshoring, or such potential is nonexistent. It would therefore be useful to be 
able to estimate just how great a part of services and which types of service 
jobs in Finland are potentially at risk of offshoring. The research offers two main 
options for this type of study. 
The nature of tasks can be examined by classifying them, e.g. according to 
Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) or to Spitz (2004), by capabilities required in 
different tasks. This is not directly possible using the Finnish data. A similar, 
although slightly rougher, classification has been conducted by van Welsum and 
Vickery (2006). Their estimate suggests that approximately 19 per cent of jobs 
in the EU-25 countries are potential targets for offshoring. Their estimate for 
Finland is of an equal order, approximately 20 per cent. 
An alternative method of assessment is offered by the review by Jensen and 
Kletzer (2005). This method aims at estimating offshoring potential and its 
allocation by starting with the idea that the most vulnerable targets are services 
already produced in a geographically concentrated manner and thus located at a 
distance from some of their customers within a country. If a service can be 
produced far from where it is consumed, it can also be assumed to be tradable 
to another country. Essentially, this method, applied to the United States by 
Jensen and Kletzer, compares the regional distribution of service sector demand 
with the regional distribution of service sector jobs. 
Naturally, geographical concentration within national boundaries does not 
necessarily indicate potential for offshoring.3 Many transport services are a good 
example of this. Language requirements and eventual administrative limitations 
pertaining to services can in practice prevent offshoring. Taking these limitations 
                                               
2  Furthermore, the service export data do not indicate significant offshoring. If the offshoring of 
service production were strong, it would be seen in the foreign trade of services. According to 
the latest statistics, during the past five years, trade in most service items has been in surplus, 
and the level of the surpluses has not been subject to significant fluctuations. Only the foreign 
trade balance for legal, accounting, administration and PR services has been negative and 
distinctly deteriorating. 
3  Local services are also concentrated if their demand is concentrated. 
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into account, it would prove interesting to estimate offshorability on the basis of 
concentration. This type of calculation is presented below.4
Method
The starting point is to calculate local demand for all service sectors from data 
obtained from their input/output tables and employment statistics. This 
input/output table data provides information on the structure of demand in each 
sector; on which sectors use the service sectors’ output; and on how large a 
part of it is destined for household consumption. By combining sector-specific 
demand data and data from employment and population statistics, the demand 
for different service sectors in each region can be calculated as follows: 
IDSi,p=ƶj(Yi,j/Yi * Ej,p/Ej)
where Yi,j/Yi = the output of sector i used by industry j (private households are 
also considered a “sector”), calculated from the input/output tables, and 
Ej,p/Ej = share of region p in the output of sector j (employment statistics and 
households/population). 
In the second phase, indicators for the geographic location of production, 
adjusted by regional demand, are calculated for the service sectors. The 
regional distribution of service sectors differs from their regional demand, if the 
geographic concentration of these sectors deviates from the geographic 
concentration of their demand. Geographic concentration is examined using a 
centralisation indicator of the type used by Ellison-Glaeser (1997), comparing a 
region’s share of a sector’s employment and its share of the sector’s demand: 
ECi = ƶp(si,p - IDSi,p)2 ,
where si,p = the share of region p of sector i employment. 
An alternative measure of geographic concentration, the Gini coefficient, is 
calculated as follows: 
Gi = |1- ƶp(ıYi,p +ıYi,p-1)*( ıIDSi,p - ıIDSi,p-1) |, 
where ı refers to the cumulative share and p refers to the region. Regions have 
been ranked by the region’s share of employment in the related sector. 
The data is calculated for the years 1995 and 2003, the first and last years in 
the input/output tables. Sectoral division is the most disaggregated division used 
that is common to both input/output data and the employment statistics. 
                                               
4  The calculations were performed by Raija Volk and Janne Huovari (Pellervo Economic Research 
Institute, PTT), but the interpretations are attributed to the Secretariat of the Economic Council 
of Finland.  
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Results
The results from the indicators for geographic location of production are intuitive 
and both measures suggest an almost identical sectoral ranking (Figure 2.11). 
Social and health services, the activities of membership organisations and 
industrial cleaning are examples of services with a low potential for offshoring 
and low tradability. Instead, activities auxiliary to financial intermediation, 
computer and related activities, research and product development are highly 
concentrated and also offshorable. There was distinct growth in geographical 
concentration in activities auxiliary to financial intermediation and in data 
processing from 1995 to 2003. Water transport and air transport are highly 
concentrated, but this is due to special reasons. Below, they are grouped 
together and not interpreted as offshorable. The EC coefficient and the Gini 
coefficient show the most difference for rail transport5. Rail transport has been 
grouped together with air transport and land transport. 
When assessing the effects that potentially offshorable service tasks have on 
employment, an essential phase involves identifying the geographic 
concentration indicator value that indicates that a sector is tradable. Jensen and 
Kletzer (2005) divide production sectors into three groups. The same principle is 
adhered to here and the sectors have been classified as nontradable, partly 
tradable and easily tradable. 
For the geographic concentration indicator, there is no self-evident threshold 
value which would determine an activity as tradable.6 Kletzer and Jensen divide 
services into three groups: for nontradable services the Gini coefficient is less 
than 0.1, for partly tradable services the coefficient is 0.1–0.3, and for easily 
tradable ones it is greater than 0.3. This classification gives a largely similar 
result for the Finnish material as for the United States, and the sectors are 
divided into three, quantitatively and approximately equal groups. The limits, 
however, were not entirely natural, since public administration, postal activity 
and motor vehicle trade and fuel sale are located in partly tradable sectors. This 
is why the maximum limit for the nontradable sector is set in the following 
review at 0.14. This classification determines nearly all manufacturing sectors in 
Finland as tradable. The average Gini coefficient for 22 manufacturing sectors is 
0.61.7
                                               
5  The Gini coefficient is attributed a large value, since railway transport does not exist everywhere. 
This can be illustrated with the so called Lorenz curve that is horizontal in the beginning.  
6  For illustrative reasons, suggestive classification values are used in the following. 
7  It was interesting to discover that the export share of manufacturing sectors and the Gini 
coefficient used as a geographic concentration index correlate positively; the correlation 
coefficient is in the order of 0.4 depending on whether the export share is calculated from gross 
value or added value. Geographic concentration is therefore related, at least in manufacturing, 
to the scale of foreign trade. 
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Figure 2.11 Geographic concentration indicators by sector, Gini coefficient 
and EC coefficient in 2003.
 
 
 
 
Note: The scales of the EC coefficient and the Gini coefficient are different, and therefore these 
coefficients cannot be compared to each other, for example by concluding that the EC coefficient results 
would systematically indicate less offshorability for different sectors. 
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Jobs with a high potential for offshoring 
According to the selected threshold of geographic concentration index, 
approximately 230,000 employees, or 15 per cent of total employment in all 
service sectors, are involved in easily tradable tasks (Table 2.4). Similarly, 
sectors classified as partly tradable employ 15 per cent of service sector 
employees. Most of these employees, 68 per cent, work in sectors classified as 
nontradable. On average, the easily tradable sectors employ more staff with a 
high education and, correspondingly, fewer staff with only a primary and 
secondary education. 
Table 2.4 Tradability of jobs and their educational distribution, 2003. 
 Service jobs Persons employed, by educational level, % 
Tradability of sectors Persons Share, % Comprehensive
Upper 
secondary
Lowest 
level 
tertiary
Lower 
degree-
level 
tertiary 
Higher-
degree 
tertiary and 
doctorate 
level 
Air and water transport 21,860 2 22 49 18 8 4 
Easily tradable 234,432 15 16 33 23 12 15 
Partly tradable 226,677 15  19 39 20 12 10 
Nontradable 1,046,130 68 19 44 18 8 12 
Total 1,529,099 100 18 41 19 9 12 
The sectors with different tradability are not evenly located around Finland. 
Potential relocation concerns the Helsinki region in particular, since 25 per cent 
of the services in the Helsinki region are classified as easily tradable.8 Since 
approximately a third of all services are located in the Helsinki area, this means 
that over half of easily tradable services are located in the Helsinki region 
(Table 2.5). Over half of nontradable services are located in central areas in 
provinces, or in smaller sub-regional areas. 
Table 2.5 Tradability and location of jobs. 
 Helsinki sub-
regional area 
Other large 
university towns 
Other provincial 
centres 
Other sub-
regional areas 
Country 
 number % number % number % number % number % 
Air, water and 
rail transport 9,600 
 
2 3,600 
 
1 6,100 
 
2 2,600 
 
1 21,800 2 
Easily tradable 132,300 25 39,000 13 33,800 10 29,300 8 234,400 15 
Partly tradable 91,700 18 46,200 16 46,800 13 42,000 12 226,700 15 
Nontradable 288,300 55 207,000 70 262,300 75 288,400 80 1,046,100 68 
Services total 521,900 100 295,800 100 349,000 100 362,300 100 1,529,000 100 
                                               
8  On the other hand, the share of those industrial sectors within the Helsinki region that are 
vulnerable to outsourcing is minor. 
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The growth of employment in easily tradable services during the period of 
1993–2003 has been clearly more rapid than in services classified as partly 
tradable or nontradable (Figure 2.12). First, this means that at least for this 
period, offshorability as defined above has not been harmful to employment. 
Second, it indicates that the structural change in the economy seems to be 
continuously increasing jobs for which offshoring will be an interesting option in 
the future. 
Figure 2.12  Employment growth during 1995–2003.  
What conclusions can be drawn from these potentiality calculations? 
Of services, as measured according to employment and by using the method 
selected here, 15 per cent or 230,000 jobs are classified as easily tradable from 
their current region or to another country, and therefore also vulnerable to 
offshoring. For these sectors, the educational level is higher on average, and 
they are often located in the Helsinki region and other university towns. 
This estimate represents only one figure and is based on strong assumptions. 
Interestingly, the obtained share of employment under the threat of offshoring 
is, however, of nearly the same magnitude as the estimate of 20 per cent by 
van Welsum mentioned previously. Also, some figures related to the United 
States are of the same order (Blinder 2005). 
Naturally, tradability according to this calculation does not mean that these tasks 
or even a considerable part of them will necessarily be offshored to countries 
with lower labour costs. In a similar way to industry subjected to global 
competition already, exchange will probably increase in services, i.e. services 
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will be exported and imported more than now. Different regions and countries 
can also try to specialise in those tasks in which they have acquired a 
competitive advantage. Nevertheless, the estimates of 15–20 per cent, obtained 
using different methods, indicate that a substantial proportion of service tasks 
will be subject to international competition. 
2.6 Conclusions 
Offshoring in Finland has been small compared to the overall turnover in jobs. 
Furthermore, companies’ estimates of this type of offshoring do not suggest a 
major change in the short term. The motives expressed for offshoring include 
cost savings, increasing flexibility and the need to take advantage of the target 
country’s favourable location (logistics location, customers and partners). 
It seems that companies that have offshored tasks from Finland intend to focus 
their domestic operations on tasks requiring a higher level of skills. At best, this 
type of structural change is advantageous at company and macroeconomic 
level. Higher-skilled tasks may lead to higher value added and productivity levels 
in Finland, which will allow a higher salary level for staff. On the other hand, for 
an individual worker or region, this change can be extremely difficult: it is far 
from certain that new tasks with a higher value added level will be created in 
the same areas as the old tasks, or that workers who have lost their jobs can 
easily adapt to new and more demanding jobs. 
The evolution of globalisation and technical development may, however, 
radically change the scale and structure of offshoring already realised or 
expected to happen. Various methods give an estimate that up to 15–
20 per cent of service sector jobs may be at risk of offshoring. At the same time, 
the affected group of jobs may change significantly, and a large number of tasks 
requiring a higher level of education will also be at risk. Adaptation is, however, 
facilitated by the fact that this new type of competition will most likely affect 
tasks located in employment areas that are large and versatile in terms of their 
number of jobs. 
It should be emphasised, though, that high potential for offshoring does not 
entail that such a large number of jobs will actually be offshored. Nor does it 
mean that the total number of service jobs will decrease due to competition. 
Just as in manufacturing, the comparative advantages of different countries will 
play a critical role in the selection of locations for services open to competition. 
If Finland manages to be a competitive location for such services, it will also be 
able to create more jobs in service activities subject to international competition. 
Furthermore, the jobs that will be created will, at best, be better than those lost.
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3  EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENTS AND LABOUR 
SUPPLY 
How have the restructuring of production in the Finnish economy described 
above and the internationalisation of various operations been reflected in the 
Finnish labour market? How have changes in demand for labour manifested 
themselves in recent years’ developments in employment? The following sub-
chapters discuss the supply of labour and major developments in the Finnish 
labour market since the early 1990s, as well as the employment situation in 
Finland vis-à-vis the European average. Chapter 3 concludes with a 
consideration of future challenges in the labour market. 
3.1 Economic crisis of the early 1990s 
In 1990, at the end of the rapid economic growth of the 1980s, the Finnish 
unemployment rate stood at 3.2 per cent and the employment rate at 74.1 per 
cent. However, in 1991 gross national product (GDP) fell by 6.2 per cent and the 
unemployment rate began to increase swiftly. When the Finnish economy 
plunged into a deep slump, unemployment grew more drastically in Finland than 
in any other OECD country after the Second World War (Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1  Unemployment rate (January 1988–July 2006, seasonally 
adjusted) in Finland, Euro area and EU-15.  
Source: Eurostat and Statistics Finland.
The Finnish unemployment rate reached its peak, 16.6 per cent as an annual 
average, in 1994, with the number of jobless exceeding 400,000. At the same 
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time, the employment rate declined to 59.9 per cent. During the economic 
slump, the number of employed people fell by 18 per cent, or by 450,000. 
Around five per cent of labour became economically inactive in the labour 
market.
During the slump, several industries saw a drastic fall in employment – the 
construction sector by half and the manufacturing, trade and hotel and 
restaurant sectors by a quarter. In relative terms, men were harder hit by 
unemployment than women because male-dominated industries, such as 
manufacturing industry and construction, were more dramatically affected by 
the slump. In terms of the level of education, employment decreased and 
unemployment increased the most among those with a lower secondary 
education only.  
3.2  Finnish labour market developments in 1995–2005 
The economic slump bottomed out in 1993 or 1994, depending on the indicator 
used, followed by seven years of rapid growth. Between 1994 and 2000, GDP 
grew by an annual average of 4.5 per cent and employment rose by a total of 
313,000 people. A markedly slower period of growth was followed by the 
bursting in 2001 of the so-called technology bubble. Between 2001 and 2003, 
GDP rose by an annual average of only 2 per cent, resulting in a slight fall in 
employment in 2003. However, unemployment did not worsen, since some 
labour became economically inactive in the labour market due, for example, to 
the pursuit of studies. With GDP growing by 3.5 per cent, employment 
rebounded in 2004, since when it has improved at a fairly rapid rate while 
unemployment has come down to close to the EU-15 average. 
During 1994–2005, the unemployment rate decreased by a total of 8.2 
percentage points while the employment rate rose from 59.9 per cent to 68.0 
per cent. The employment rate gauging full-time employment1 improved from 
56.5 per cent in 1995 to 64.8 per cent in 2004. In 2004, the Finnish full-time 
employment rate was 6.3 percentage points higher than the EU-15 average, 
while the Finnish unemployment rate was 4.6 percentage points higher (Table 
3.1).
                                               
1  The full-time employment rate derives from converting part-time jobs into full-time ones. This 
reduces the employment rate most in countries where part-time employment is common 
practice. 
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Table 3.1  Employment rate and full-time employment rate in Finland, 
Sweden, Denmark and the EU-15 average in 1995, 2000 and 
2004.
 Employment rate Full-time employment rate 
 1995 2000 2004 1995 2000 2004 
Finland 61.6 67.2 67.6 56.5 64.9 64.8 
Sweden 70.9 73.0 72.1 63.9 65.1 66.2 
Denmark 73.4 76.3 75.7 66.8 69.3 68.6 
EU-15  60.1 63.4 64.7 55.6 58.0 58.5 
Figure 3.2 shows that changes in employment are quite closely related to 
changes in GDP. Maintaining employment unchanged has required an average 
economic growth rate of around 2.4 per cent. One-percentage-point growth (or 
a fall) in employment pertains to one-percentage-point growth in GDP above (or 
below) the rate of 2.4 per cent. Employment underwent an exceptionally sharp 
fall in 1993, whereas it experienced a particularly vigorous increase in 1999. 
Figure 3.2  Interrelation between changes in GDP and employment in Finland 
in 1977–2005. 
Source: Statistics Finland.
Patterns of employment growth 
During the post-slump economic recovery, employment improved in high-
technology and knowledge-based industries in particular, such as the electrical 
engineering industry and the business services sector. The broad information 
sector, covering the production of goods, services and content, employed over 
44,000 more people in 1999 than in 1995. However, other sectors, primarily the 
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services sector, were behind the majority of jobs created, with public-service 
providers hiring more people, in addition to providers in the private sector. 
Strong export-led growth was reflected in seven years of a marked increase in 
manufacturing jobs lasting until 2000, as opposed to the typical trend in other 
developed countries during the same period. If we take account of 
manufacturing industry’s simultaneous outsourcing of jobs to domestic service 
providers, the use of labour input closely related to manufacturing industry can 
be said to have risen to its pre-slump level during the early years of the current 
decade (Figure 3.3). 
During the years of recovery from the economic slump, economic restructuring 
was reflected in a significant reduction in the number of jobs within some 
industries. Employment in agriculture and forestry continued its steady 
downward trend. As a result of banking-sector restructuring caused by the 
banking crisis, the sector’s employment diminished from the pre-slump level of 
56,000 jobs to around half of this towards the late 1990s. The number of public-
sector jobs shrank as a result of streamlining the operations of, and 
corporatising, government institutions. 
Figure 3.3  Manufacturing employment and manufacturing employment 
supplemented with contracted-out services in Finland during 
1975–2004.
Source: The Confederation of Finnish Industries.
Manufacturing employment has varied during the current decade. Export-
industry employment weakened at the decade’s beginning before perking up to 
the extent that the number of manufacturing jobs has increased since 2005, 
whereas employment in the service sector has risen throughout the decade. The 
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healthcare and social services sector and the business services sector have 
experienced the largest relative increases in employment. The retail and whole 
trade sector and the hotel and restaurant sector have also considerably 
increased their number of jobs (Figure 3.4).  
During 2006 in particular, a pick-up in manufacturing production has been 
reflected in employment growth. This has also resulted in a swift rise in 
employment within technical and business services for industry as well as 
transport services. Among manufacturing industries, buoyancy in the metal 
industry has stimulated demand for the industry’s labour, whereas the number 
of employed has declined in the consumer goods industry. Social services and 
construction have also made a good contribution to employment. 
Figure 3.4  Employment by sector in 2000–2006, change on a year earlier.  
Source: Labour Force Survey by Statistics Finland.
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3.3 Finnish employment and unemployment – European 
comparison 
On the whole, Finnish employment has improved significantly since the 
economic slump, despite its deterioration at the beginning of the current 
decade. In a European comparison, Finnish employment rate is rather typical, 
markedly exceeding the EU-15 weighted average. The difference from the EU-15 
average rate stems primarily from females’ major participation in the Finnish 
labour market. The employment rate among older people has also risen higher 
than average, thanks to favourable developments in recent years (Table 3.2).  
Table 3.2  Employment indicators in EU-15 and Norway in 20052.
 Employment rate  
 
15–64 yrs 15–24 yrs 55–64 yrs Women 
Full-time 
(2004) 
Part-time, 
share 
Temporary 
employment 
share 
Unemploy-
ment rate 
Long-term 
unemploy-
ment* 
EU-15  65.2 
Ra
nk
 
39.8 
Ra
nk
 
58.5 
Ra
nk
 
57.4
Ra
nk
 
58.5 
Ra
nk
 
20.3
Ra
nk
 
14.3 
Ra
nk
 
7.9 
Ra
nk
 
41.3 
Ra
nk
 
Finland 68.4 7. 40.5 8. 64.8 4. 66.5 4. 64.8 4. 13.7 11. 16.5 3. 8.4 5. 25.8 10. 
Sweden 72.5 4. 38.7 9. 66.2 2. 70.4 3. 66.2 2. 24.7 4. 16.0 4. 7.8 7. 15.8 16. 
Denmark 75.9 1. 62.3 2. 68.6 1. 71.9 1. 68.6 1. 22.1 6. 9.8 11. 4.8 10. 23.4 13. 
Norway 74.8 2. 53.4 3. - - 71.7 2. - - 28.2 2. 14.3 6. 4.6 13. 18.7 15. 
Belgium 61.1 14. 27.5 13. 55.8 13. 53.8 12. 55.8 13. 22.0 7. 8.9 13. 8.4 5. 51.7 3. 
Germany 65.4 10. 42.0 7. 56.6 14. 59.6 9. 56.6 14. 24.0 5. 14.2 7. 9.5 4. 53.0 1. 
Greece 60.1 15. 25.0 15. 58.8 8. 46.1 15. 58.8 8. 5.0 15. 11.8 10. 9.8 1. 52.2 2. 
Spain 63.3 12. 38.3 10. 58.3 10. 51.2 14. 58.3 10. 12.4 13. 33.3 1. 9.2 3. 24.5 12. 
France 63.1 13. 30.1 12. 58.7 9. 57.6 11. 58.7 9. 17.2 10. 13.3 8. 9.7 2. 41.2 6. 
Ireland 67.6 8. 48.7 6. 61.0 7. 58.3 10. 61.0 7.   -   - 3.7 16. 4.3 14. 33.4 8. 
Italy 57.6 16. 25.7 14. 54.3 15. 45.3 16. 54.3 15. 12.8 12. 12.3 9. 7.7 8. 49.9 4. 
Luxembourg 63.6 11. 24.9 16. 56.9 11. 53.7 13. 56.9 11. 17.4 9. 5.3 15. 4.0 15. 26.4 9. 
Netherlands 73.2 3. 65.2 1. 56.5 12. 66.4 5. 56.5 12. 46.1 1. 15.5 5. 4.7 11. 40.2 7. 
Austria 68.6 6. 53.1 5. 61.6 5. 62.0 7. 61.6 5. 21.1 8. 9.1 12. 5.2 9. 25.3 11. 
Portugal 67.5 9. 36.1 11. 66.3 3. 61.7 8. 66.3 3. 11.2 14. 19.5 2. 7.6 8. 48.2 5. 
United 
Kingdom 
71.7 5. 54.0 4. 61.6 5. 65.9 6. 61.6 5. 25.4 3. 5.7 14. 4.7 11. 21.1 14. 
*As proportion of unemployed. 
Source: LFS by Eurostat.
                                               
2  The broad unemployment rate shown in Table 3.1 above was calculated as a proportion of the 
working-age (16–64 years) population which, in examining broad unemployment, is actually 
more meaningful and the most widely-used unemployment rate with respect to that shown in 
this table calculated as a proportion of the labour force. 
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However, the employment rate is markedly lower in Finland than in the other 
Nordic countries resembling Finland with respect to female labour market 
participation, especially in Denmark and Norway. On the other hand, part-time 
employment is still at a low level in Finland despite its growth throughout the 
post-slump years. Finland also differs from the other Nordic countries in this 
respect. As a result, its full-time employment rate being the highest in Europe 
after the other Nordic countries.  
It is interesting to note that while Finnish part-time employment is at a relatively 
low level, temporary employment accounts for a higher share in Finland than in 
the rest of Europe on average. This phenomenon originates from the slump 
years and the first few post-slump years; the proportion of temporary 
employees has remained steady during the current decade. Temporary 
employment is more common among women than men. 
The Finnish unemployment rate has dropped close to the EU-15 average 
although it is markedly higher than in the best-performing countries, Denmark, 
Norway and Ireland, and somewhat higher than in Sweden. Considering that the 
EU-15 is rated a region of high unemployment among the OECD countries, it is 
questionable to regard the region’s average unemployment rate as a good 
achievement, even from a broader perspective. 
An eye-catching feature of Finnish unemployment pertains to its high 
dependence on the level of education. Among the EU-15, Finland ranks second 
after Germany with respect to the widest gap in unemployment rates between 
the least educated (below upper secondary vocational education and training) 
and the most educated (higher education) (Table 3.3). Prevailing in all of the 
surveyed countries to some extent, this gap widened dramatically during the 
slump years although all educational levels were affected by a substantial 
increase in unemployment (Figure 3.5). The slump destroyed the largest 
number of jobs requiring a low level of education, in relative terms, whereas 
post-slump employment growth has focused on high-skilled jobs, as noted in 
Chapter 1. Then again, the educational level of the working-age population has 
simultaneously improved apace: 43 per cent of the working-age population 
lacked post-basic-education in 1994 whereas the proportion came to 33 per cent 
in 2004. Similarly, the same period saw an increase in the proportion of higher 
education qualifications from 21 per cent to 27 per cent. Thanks to this, the 
educational gap in unemployment has narrowed although it has not returned to 
anywhere near the pre-slump situation and is, as stated above, still wide by 
European standards. 
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The extent of the slump’s shock effect can make understandable that the 
abovementioned polarisation between the low-educated and higher-educated in 
the labour market has not worsened but rather diminished over the last 10–15 
years when global competition has had its most profound effect on developed 
countries’ manufacturing industries using low-educated labour. In Finland, the 
economic slump meant an end to a large amount of production, which in many 
other countries has only gradually had to face adjustment pressures caused by 
global competition.3
Table 3.3  Gap in unemployment between the lowest and highest 
educational levels among those between 25–64 years of age in 
certain OECD countries in 1995, 2000 and 2004. 
Source: OECD (2006a).
                                               
3  The literature on the labour market highlights labour-market institutions’ role in how changes in 
technology and competition affect. A general view is that in countries with flexible wage 
formation both change drivers have widened pay differentials whereas less flexible wage 
formation (typical in Continental European countries) has resulted in a proportionately higher 
rate of unemployment among low-educated people (see e.g. Alesina & Zeira 2006). This 
simplification does not, however, provide an exhaustive description of the situation. Pekkarinen 
and Taimio (2004), for example, criticise ‘the transatlantic consensus’. 
 1995 2000 2004 
Netherlands 3.8 1.7 2.9 
Australia 4.5 3.9 3.4 
Belgium 9.8 7.1 6.8 
Spain 6.1 4.2 3.7 
Ireland 12.2 4.9 4.3 
United Kingdom 8.5 6.8 4.4 
Italy 2.8 4.1 3.0 
Austria 3.7 4.7 4.9 
Canada 6.5 6.1 5.2 
Greece –1.8 0.7 1.5 
Norway 4.1 0.3 1.2 
Portugal 3.0 0.8 2.0 
France 7.5 8.8 5.9 
Sweden 5.6 5.0 2.2 
Germany 8.4 9.7 15.0 
Finland 14.0 7.4 7.3 
Switzerland 3.9 3.7 4.4 
Denmark 10.0 3.7 3.9 
New Zealand 3.5 4.2 1.8 
United States 7.3 6.1 7.2 
EU-15  7.9 6.3 4.7 
OECD 8.1 4.4 6.4 
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Figure 3.5 Finnish unemployment rate by educational level in 1990–2004.  
Source: Statistics Finland.
The economic crisis and the resultant structural change in demand for labour 
are undoubtedly partly to blame for Finland’s persistently high unemployment 
rate. The slump eliminated a host of so-called ordinary jobs: employment 
weakened due to a collapse of Eastern trade, particularly in the consumer goods 
industry. This was accompanied by an investment slump in the construction 
sector and construction-material production, budget cuts in the public sector, a 
crisis in the banking sector and the resulting multiplier effects on private-sector 
services and domestic manufacturing across the board. 
During the post-slump years of economic recovery, it was not easy for the 
unemployed to find a job corresponding to their previous experience, the 
resulting prolonged period of unemployment eroding their capabilities and skills. 
Employment has grown most vigorously among those at the best working age, 
25–54 year-old people, followed by young people. However, employment has 
remained weak among youngsters with only a basic education. Employment 
among older people, over 55 years of age, began to grow much later but has 
grown faster than among other age brackets during the first few years of this 
decade. Finding a job has been most difficult for older unemployed people with 
only a basic education. 
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However, none of this answers the question as to why, after 15 years from the 
beginning of the economic slump, the employment rate remains clearly lower 
and the unemployment rate higher than before the slump. A large number of 
new people having joined the ranks of the chronically unemployed (long-term 
and repeatedly unemployed people) throughout the years of recovery suggests 
that this is not solely a question of the non-recurring exclusion of workers from 
the labour market caused by the slump, see Aho (2004). 
There is no consensus on the reasons for the persistent, problematically high 
Finnish unemployment rate. Some researchers underline macroeconomic 
factors. For example, Kiander (2001 and 2005) holds the view that the overly 
austere fiscal policy during and after the economic slump played an important 
role in explaining sustained unemployment. A number of structural factors have 
also been stated as reasons for unemployment in Finland, as follows: heavy 
labour income taxation, inadequate incentives for labour supply created by 
unemployment benefits and other social security, the level of employment 
protection, wage rigidities and insufficient efforts to conduct active labour 
market policies, not to mention ineffective competition in the product market 
coupled with ineffective housing markets, see e.g. OECD (2006d).  
For a variety of reasons, it is difficult to evaluate the significance of single 
structural factors, given that their effects are hardly independent of other 
institutional characteristics. Some labour market institution indicators show that 
Finland is not a particularly exceptional EU member state (Table 3.4). From this 
perspective, an approximate average employment and unemployment 
performance is not perhaps very surprising, despite the economy’s strong 
competitiveness based on a variety of measurements.  
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Table 3.4  Some indicators of labour market institutions in EU-15 and 
Norway in 2004. 
 Benefit 
replace-
ment 
ratio, early 
stage of  
unemploy-
ment 
Benefit 
replace-
ment 
ratio, 5-
year 
unemploy-
ment 
average 
Unemploy-
ment 
benefit 
duration, 
month 
Entitle-
ment to 
unemploy-
ment 
benefit 
Employ-
ment 
protection 
index, 
permanent 
employ-
ment 
Active 
labour 
market 
policy 
expenditure 
in 
proportion 
to GDP 
Real wage 
rigidity 
Tax wedge 
 
Va
lu
e 
Ra
nk
 
Va
lu
e 
Ra
nk
 
Va
lu
e 
Ra
nk
 
Va
lu
e 
Ra
nk
 
Va
lu
e 
Ra
nk
 
Va
lu
e 
Ra
nk
 
Va
lu
e 
Ra
nk
 
Va
lu
e 
Ra
nk
 
Finland 70 5. 65 5. 23 7. 3.0 7. 2.17 6. 0.87 6. 0.50 2. 36.66 6. 
Sweden 75 2. 63 7. 28 4. 2.9 9. 2.86 12. 1.09 3. 0.52 1. 42.04 1. 
Denmark 70 5. 70 1. . . 3.2 5. 1.47 2. 1.56 1. 0.13 11. 33.57 9. 
Norway 68 8. 58 9. 36 36 3.7 2. 2.25 7. 0.66 8. 0.22 9. 29.81 12. 
Belgium 61 11. 61 8.   1. 2.7 12. 1.73 4. 0.95 5. 0.28 5. 39.70 2. 
Germany 69 7. 66 3. 12 10. 2.8 10. 2.68 11. 0.97 4. 0.12 13. 37.75 5. 
Greece 55 12. 35 14. 12 10. . . 2.41 9. . . 0.03 14. 34.80 8. 
Spain 67 9. 49 13. 21 8. 3.0 9. 2.92 13. 0.67 7. . . 33.53 10. 
France 75 2. 57 10. 30 3. 3.1 6. 2.47 10. 0.88 5. 0.50 2. 38.10 4. 
Ireland 49 15. 64 6. 15 9. 2.6 13. 1.60 3. 0.54 11. 0.26 7. 10.18 15. 
Italy 54 13. 22 15. 6 13. 2.8 10. 1.77 5. 0.55 10. 0.16 9. 38.76 3. 
Netherlands 74 4. 66 3. 24 5. 4.4 1. 3.05 14. 1.20 2. 0.11 12. 35.57 7. 
Austria 63 10. 57 10. 9 12. 3.5 3. 2.37 8. 0.50 . 0.27 6. 31.03 11. 
Portugal 83 1. 68 2. 24 5. 3.5 3. 4.33 1. 0.58 9. 0.31 4. 24.29 13. 
United 
Kingdom 
 
54 
 
13. 
 
53 
 
12. 
 
6 
 
13. 
 
2.4 
 
14.
 
1.12 
 
15. 
 
0.43 
 
12. 
 
0.23 
 
8. 
 
20.66 
 
14. 
Sources: The employment benefit ratio represents the proportion of unemployment 
benefits, averaged over family type of recipient, of average earnings before tax. For more 
detailed information, see OECD (2006c, p. 60). Entitlement to unemployment benefit is 
an index derived from taking account of several components, such as occupation mobility 
requirements, geographical mobility requirements, participation in active labour market 
programmes, valid reasons for the refusal of job offers etc. Employment protection 
(OECD 2006b) applies to workers employed on a permanent basis. Active labour market 
policy is defined as follows: OECD (2006c), expenditure on active labour market policies, 
excluding employment benefit administration. Real wage rigidity: Dickens et al. (2006), 
an index including averages over several years. Real wage rigidity is in relation to the 
consumer price index. 
3.4  Wage formation 
Wage formation understandably plays an important role in labour market 
adjustment. Table 3.4 above shows that Finland is an exception in this respect. 
As shown in the table, Finland ranks second in the degree of its labour-market 
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real wage rigidity. This may partly explain its exceptionally high rate of 
unemployment concentrating on low-educated people, as stated above. 
Inflexible wages may also partly explain the major differences in unemployment 
rates between regions to be discussed in Chapter 6. In the context of strong real 
wage rigidity, various types (by educational level and region) of wage do not 
adapt to the extent required for maintaining sufficient demand for all labour 
groups.
With respect to wage rigidity, it is necessary to make a difference between the 
general wage level’s weak response to unemployment, on the one hand, and 
real-wage rigidity at individual level. Real wage rigidity in Table 3.4 refers to the 
latter. On the level of the aggregate economy, there is no reason to regard real 
wages as unusually rigid in Finland, as evidenced by a major fall in the 
proportion of wages to national income due to higher unemployment resulting 
from the economic slump. However, this implies no necessary incompatibility 
with respect to individual-level wage rigidity. In fact, it is plausible that the latter 
has been instrumental in achieving the former.  
Wages in Finland are largely determined by a centralised income policy 
agreement and in the last 15 years general pay increases have chiefly been 
small in view of productivity growth. Consequently, nominal wages reach the 
EU-15 average whereas real wages are among the lowest, due to Finland’s fairly 
heavy taxation and high price levels. However, one condition set for small pay 
increases has been that all wage earners have enjoyed similar pay increases 
throughout wage brackets, except for supplements for low-wage earners. There 
is evidence that while aggregate wage developments have come to support 
demand for labour during the post-slump years, wages in the lowest bracket 
have risen to high levels in relation to the general wage level, Johansson (2006). 
3.5  Labour mobility 
In addition to wage formation, labour mobility is a major determinant of labour 
market efficiency. Labour mobility refers to labour’s propensity to move from 
one job, workplace, industry or region to another.  
In certain respects, Finland boasts a very mobile labour market. Flows into and 
out of employment are considerably large, every year seeing more than 900,000 
periods of unemployment begin and end. Finland ranks third after Denmark and 
the United Kingdom in job-to-job mobility as a percentage of its labour force 
(Memo 05/229). At the same time, the average duration of employment with the 
same employer seems to be shorter than the EU average. Surveys also suggest 
that Finnish employees show a considerably higher degree of willingness to 
change their jobs on average (EU 2006).  
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Inter-industry labour mobility, for its part, appears to be approximately at the 
same level in Finland as in the rest of Europe but below the US level, for 
instance (Elmeskov 2006). This type of labour mobility increased throughout the 
1990s but seems to have diminished somewhat during the current decade (Virjo 
et al. 2006), with young people and the highly-educated proving the most 
mobile between industries.
The extent of geographical mobility is difficult to assess between countries, 
since the territorial units used in the study vary considerably in size. Based on 
an OECD comparison, geographical mobility in Finland was markedly lower than 
on the average in the OECD countries in the beginning of this decade (Elmeskov 
2006). However, this OECD study probably underestimates Finnish labour’s 
geographical mobility4. The underestimation hypothesis is supported by the 
abovementioned survey suggesting that Finland ranks third after Sweden and 
Denmark in terms of often people have moved from one area to another. 
Similarly, Finns’ willingness to move in the future is near the top of the 
European table (EU 2006). Moving has also clearly increased since the early 
1990s and inter-municipal migration, for example, is at its highest level ever. 
Commuting outside the domicile has seen a steady upward trend since the early 
1990s, as well. 
3.6  Conclusions and future challenges 
The situation in the Finnish labour market has improved, measured in terms of 
both employment and unemployment rates, throughout the post-slump years, 
save a few years at the beginning of the current decade. Quickening economic 
growth since 2004 has resulted in a marked upward trend in employment and a 
downward trend in unemployment. 
The past few years’ rapid improvement in employment has led to a shortage of 
labour in some industries and regions, reflected for example in the larger 
number of vacancies and longer recruitment periods. However, survey data of 
various kinds do not yet suggest a general dearth of labour (VNK 2005b), a 
conclusion borne out by the fact that pay increases have remained moderate up 
to the present day. 
                                               
4   The OECD’s analysis is based on NUTS 2 regions of which Finland has 5, Sweden 8 and Germany 
over 40. Because of Finland’s large size, this type of mobility analysis ignores intra-region 
migration, a major part of which actually relates to that between commuting areas. The inter-
region migration figure used in the OECD’s analysis comes to around 50,000 per year, while the 
number of people migrating between counties has annually totalled over 120,000 and that 
between economic regions around 160,000 during the current decade. 
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It is, however, certain that if the economy continues to grow at a relatively rapid 
rate and productivity growth does not speed up, labour will become increasingly 
scarce. This is due to faster ageing of labour in Finland than in many other 
European countries. The baby-boom generation, born during the post-war 
years, is approaching the age when labour market participation wanes rapidly, 
the younger generation entering the labour market being markedly smaller than 
the older generation leaving it. 
The ageing of labour will alleviate the exceptional polarisation in the 
unemployment rate between highly-educated and low-educated people. The 
level of education among those leaving the labour market is relatively low, 
whereas that among the younger generation is at a good level by international 
standards. 
At the same time, the average age of labour will continue to rise for a while, 
presenting a problem for productivity in two ways. First, older workers’ 
productivity lags behind that of those at the best working age. Second, older 
people are less willing to change job and domicile than young people, as such 
undermining the economy’s opportunities to re-allocate labour in a way that 
improves productivity. Bearing in mind that the average age of labour will, 
however, begin to fall again from the turn of the current decade, the 
unfavourable effect of this factor will be mitigated until the favourable turn 
during the 2010s. 
While the supply and quality of labour will change, demand for it may also be 
expected to change substantially in the future. There is no reason to expect any 
slowdown in technological progress. Moreover, we can postulate that, in many 
respects, the application of information and communications technology to 
production is only in its infancy, see e.g. Pohjola (2005). Consequently, 
technological progress will continue to directly transform the pattern of demand 
for various types of job during the next decade. The underlying trend is obvious: 
routine, well-definable functions will become automated. As a result of 
technological progress and learning by organisations, automation will cover a 
wider range of functions on an ongoing basis. 
Then again, technological progress will affect labour demand in Finland through 
globalisation. On the basis of the evidence presented in earlier chapters, 
globalisation has so far mainly had a favourable effect on employment. Finland 
has been able to export an increasing number of goods to expanded markets 
and, through its specialisation in high technology, improve labour productivity 
while experiencing a low level of job migration abroad (offshoring) in view of 
employment developments as a whole. 
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The analyses discussed suggest that globalisation will probably continue to have 
major effects on demand for labour in Finland. It is likely that a more extensive 
range of jobs of various skill levels will be exposed to competition. At the same 
time, these changes may become less predictable and more rapid. Although the 
extent of offshoring has so far remained limited, it may broaden considerably in 
the future and extend to cover service-sector jobs on a widespread basis. 
All of these factors highlight a dual challenge presented to the labour market. 
On the one hand, it is important to ensure the availability of labour for which 
there is a strong demand in a country like Finland with respect to the ever-
changing international division of labour. On the other hand, one needs to be 
able to ensure that a larger proportion of the working population becomes 
employed as productively as possible while so-called conventional jobs continue 
to disappear not only in manufacturing but also the services sector. 
These challenges set requirements for labour-market effectiveness in three 
respects. First, it will be necessary to increase the supply of labour from the 
current level while the ageing of labour proceeds.  
Second, labour should move as flexibly as possible from one job to another even 
if this requires changing the occupation or the workplace’s location. Although 
certain indicators show that labour mobility is rather high in Finland, raising it 
further would be important. 
Third, we should be able to adjust wage formation in such a way that wages 
would be increasingly determined by productivity at employee or employee-
category level. This will require wage determination shifting to a larger extent 
than currently to company level based on local agreements. Moreover, at the 
same time one should ensure that the benefits of economy-level wage co-
ordination, of which Finland has good experiences, are not lost. 
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4  ENERGY MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
An examination of the impacts of globalisation on Finland’s economy highlights 
certain special issues more distinctly than previously. A key issue is energy 
market development. Growing global demand for energy in particular, impacting 
on the Finnish economy via rising energy prices, is a major influence. Global 
energy market developments and their effects on the Finnish economy are 
examined in the following. The comparative development of various forms of 
energy is highly significant when considering the options available to Finland. 
Finnish industry is among the most energy-intensive in OECD countries, which 
means that climate policy and energy prices and availability have a considerable 
bearing on its competitive status, constituting the reason for the current 
emphasis on the ability of domestic energy production to adjust and renew 
itself.
4.1 World energy market 
After the oil crises, energy markets continued to operate in relative calm for a 
long period. However, the energy market has undergone several changes in the 
last few years, with new factors emerging to transform it permanently. 
Energy demand continues to grow intensely, although at a slower pace. The 
International Energy Agency, IEA’s, long-term energy scenario projects that 
world energy demand will expand by as much as 60 per cent between 2002 and 
2030, with the majority of growth originating in the developing countries. In all, 
primary energy demand is predicted to grow by an average 1.7 per cent per 
year.
Rapid structural change has spurred energy demand growth in Asia, China and 
India in particular, where industry’s share of the economy has grown, increasing 
the share of energy-intensive processes. To a certain extent, the decreasing 
share of industry in the OECD countries accounts for this trend, but the growth 
of the industrial sector in rapidly developing and growing economies has 
undoubtedly also had a major impact in this respect. Increasing traffic volumes 
are contributing to the rapid increase in energy consumption in Asia, while in the 
OECD countries, the service sectors account for an increasing share of energy 
consumption. 
The vigorous growth of Asian economies in particular has been reflected 
intensively in the energy market in recent years. Demand for oil should grow by 
1.8 million barrels a day in 2006, with China accounting for some 27 per cent of 
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this growth1. In China, energy demand has increased as intensively as the 
nation’s GDP. In the old industrial countries, energy demand is growing at a 
distinctly slower pace than GDP, and in fact the growth in demand in China can 
be expected to level off in time, but based on the experiences gained from 
certain other rapidly-growing Asian countries, this may yet be some way off, 
whereas the OECD countries’ share of primary energy consumption has clearly 
been declining. In the early 1970s, the OECD countries accounted for over 60 
per cent of total world consumption, but by 2003 their share had declined to 
approximately one half of the total, and in 2030 the OECD countries are 
predicted to account for a mere 40 per cent of total world consumption. The 
OECD’s share is expected to decrease even more sharply in the oil market, from 
70 to 47 per cent. 
In addition to the focus of primary energy demand being transferred to Asia, the 
structure of demand is also changing. Although oil will remain the single most 
important source of primary energy (with a 34 per cent share projected for 
2030), natural gas will overtake coal as the second-largest primary energy 
source. The IEA scenario projects fossil fuels to retain their position as the most 
important primary energy sources in the future, meeting 85 per cent of the 
increase in primary energy demand. Traffic and power generation will continue 
as major energy consumers, with an increasing share. In the longer term, 
however, it is possible that as a consequence of rising fossil fuel prices, the use 
of renewable energy sources will increase and energy intensity decline as 
businesses and private citizens invest in new and more efficient energy systems. 
4.1.1 Factors influencing energy supply 
The IEA predicts that the primary energy supply will be able to meet growing 
energy needs, providing a sustainable basis for the growing energy demand in 
this respect. However, growth will require significant additional investments in 
energy production. The introduction of new production areas will facilitate 
increases in production, which will alter the focus of production and emphasise 
the significance of global energy trade, since the majority of the increasing 
energy need will actually be met with energy originating in non-OECD countries. 
Particularly in terms of oil, the OECD countries will grow more dependent on 
imports, which will make the world economy more sensitive to price shocks 
caused by disruptions in supply. More natural gas will be imported from the 
Middle East and transition economies, particularly to Europe and North America, 
with Russia remaining the world’s largest producer of natural gas until the 
2030s.
                                               
1  At the turn of the 1990s, China was still exporting oil. 
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The IEA projects that power generation and transmission in particular will 
require major additional investments, and that oil production cannot be 
increased without considerable investments in production, distribution and 
refining. In fact, the IEA views refining capacity as forming one of the most 
significant bottlenecks at present. Today, much heavy crude oil, which is harder 
to handle, cannot be brought to the world market due to restricted refinery 
capacity. Therefore, the OECD countries’ insufficient refinery capacity is an 
important factor in high oil prices. The IEA projects that the investments needed 
will amount to almost 600 million dollars annually, with major uncertainty 
related to implementing these investments influencing energy prices and 
availability. 
Fossil fuel prices have surged in the last few years, enhancing the profitability of 
alternative energy sources in principle. However, for the time being price levels 
have not resulted in an extensive transition to renewable energy sources, due 
perhaps partly to the OECD countries’ considerably lower current energy 
intensity than at the time of the 1970s oil crises. Hence, the share of renewable 
energy sources of primary energy is not likely to increase in any significant way 
in the next decade, but in the long term the significance of renewable energy 
sources may be emphasised, for instance in levelling out price peaks. 
4.2 Energy market development in Europe 
The European energy market is undergoing radical change in terms of 
liberalisation and integration, with many environmental and energy policy 
objectives, which influence both demand and supply, applying to the market. 
Although the economic growth that drives energy demand is expected to pick up 
in Europe, growth has been modest over the past few years. Differences in 
growth between the new and former member countries will remain marked in 
the next few years, but in the long term, both the EU Commission and the OECD 
are expecting the pace of growth to converge. 
The EU has enacted several directives influencing the energy market and energy 
demand, including the regulation of energy markets at national level. Directives 
primarily influencing market performance and energy prices include those on the 
electricity and gas markets and energy services. In compliance with these 
directives, consumers must be able to shop around for gas and electricity 
suppliers by 2007, which will enhance competition in the electricity market. The 
directives will also boost competition by separating distribution from production, 
and will include stipulations on the regulation of the electricity market and 
opening it up to competition. EU-wide regulations can be expected to facilitate 
competition and, in the long term, boost investments in energy production, in 
principle at least. This development will also influence energy prices. In 
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integrated market areas, electricity prices can be expected to converge in 
various countries, and enhanced competition can be assumed to lower prices in 
many. However, integration of the gas and electricity markets is limited by the 
restrictions set by transmission networks and links. 
The active energy policy pursued by the EU, and its relatively moderate 
economic growth, are also mirrored in anticipated energy consumption. From 
2002 to 2030, the IEA projects that primary energy consumption in the EU will 
increase by only 0.7 per cent annually, and the consumption structure is also 
expected to change markedly. Consumption of coal will decrease by 10 per cent, 
with its share of energy consumption dropping from 18 to 13 per cent, whereas 
the share of natural gas will increase from 23 per cent to 32 per cent. The share 
of nuclear power is estimated to fall to 7 per cent, i.e. to one half of the current 
level, while demand for natural gas will increase first and foremost as it replaces 
coal. Simultaneously, the EU’s own oil and natural gas production will peak, 
which will render it more dependent on imports. The share of renewable energy 
sources is projected to grow primarily in power generation. 
4.3 Energy market development in Finland’s neighbouring areas 
The Finnish energy market is closely connected to those of its neighbouring 
areas. Its electricity market is pooled with that of other Nordic countries, in 
addition to which Finland imports a significant amount of electricity from Russia. 
With respect to fossil fuels, Russia is in a key position as a supplier of both oil 
and natural gas. 
The inter-Nordic electricity market has influenced energy costs in Finland both 
positively and negatively. When the common market was first created in the 
1990s, competition increased and the efficiency of electricity production 
improved in the Nordic area, as a consequence of which price levels clearly fell 
at first. In the last few years, concerns have been expressed about a 
competitive market producing too few incentives to invest in new production 
capacity. In comparison with the 1990s, production capacity is indeed being 
exploited more fully and electricity prices have increased throughout the 2000s. 
The Nordic market is also gradually being linked with the North European 
electricity market, bringing Nordpool prices closer to European ones, which in 
practice means that prices will rise. 
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Over 10 per cent of the electricity consumed in Finland is imported from 
Nordpool and Russia. For natural gas, the country is totally dependent on 
Russia, although gas procurement has been based on long term contracts until 
now. In future, demand for gas from Russia will increase in Europe and 
elsewhere. With a major part of oil also originating in Russia, production 
developments in Russia involve significant uncertainties for Finland. 
Income from exported energy is extremely important to the Russian economy, 
but major investments are required in order to increase exports. The IEA 
estimates that such investments will total USD 900 billion by 2030. The changing 
structure of energy exports will increase the need for investments, the IEA 
forecasting that Russian oil production will increase from 8.5 million barrels a 
day in 2003 to 10.4 million in 2010, but after 2010 Russia’s share of world oil 
exports will begin to decline. Hence natural gas export volumes must increase in 
order to gain more export revenues. Contrary to oil production, where private oil 
companies have been responsible for additional investments, gas production has 
not been opened up to competition. Both natural gas production and distribution 
rely largely on Gazprom, which is unlikely to be able to bear sole responsibility 
for increasing production and transmission links. Therefore, liberalisation of the 
gas market is emerging as a key factor creating uncertainty in natural gas price 
formation. 
4.4  Energy in the Finnish economy 
4.4.1 Energy demand in Finland 
The Finnish economy is dependent on imported energy, and with Finland being 
one of the most energy intensive nations in the OECD, energy supply plays a 
key role in economic development. A systematic energy policy has been used as 
a tool for compensating for the nation’s dependence on imports, one of the key 
goals being the securing of energy availability through a diverse production 
structure. Hence, the demand structure for primary energy is diverse, as shown 
in Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1  Primary energy demand structure in Finland in 2002. 
Source: VATT (Government Institute for Economic Research).
The National Energy and Climate Strategy outlines energy demand development 
in the next few years, estimating total electricity consumption to increase from 
85.2 TWh in 2003 to over 95 TWh by 2010, and to approximately 108 TWh by 
2025. In addition to increasing energy consumption, greenhouse gas emissions, 
which Finland has committed itself to reducing, have emerged as a major factor. 
The Climate Strategy projects that emissions will exceed the Kyoto Protocol 
target level unless measures are taken, and reducing emissions by influencing 
the use of energy and enhancing its efficiency, and through flexible 
mechanisms, is becoming a key energy policy challenge. According to the 
Strategy’s basic scenario, carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels and 
industrial processes in 2010 would (unless measures are taken) amount to 
approximately 67 million tonnes, while the target level is around 55 million 
tonnes. The objective set for the Kyoto Protocol period can be achieved 
primarily by reducing emissions from fossil fuels and processes, but other 
measures could contribute to achieving reductions of some two million tonnes. It 
is estimated that in order to achieve the Kyoto Protocol objectives, carbon 
dioxide emissions within emissions trading should be reduced by approximately 
14 per cent through national economic steering and flexible mechanisms. There 
is no international agreement on the need for reductions in the longer term. 
However, the EU is committed to implementing higher reductions after 2012. At 
present, it seems clear that reduction objectives will also be set after the Kyoto 
Protocol period, besides which meeting the Kyoto Protocol objectives could 
hardly be justified without further objectives. 
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Industry’s share of energy demand has been relatively higher in Finland than in 
most other OECD countries where, in turn, housing and traffic account for a 
higher share. Although the energy efficiency of Finnish industry is among the 
best in the world, Finland ranks clearly above the OECD average in terms of 
energy intensity. Figure 4.2 compares the energy intensity of various countries. 
Figure 4.2  Energy intensity in Finland and certain OECD countries in 1993–
2004.
Source: Eurostat.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the structural change in Finnish industry, revealing a 
distinct shift of focus from consumables to electronics. The Energy Strategy 
expects Finnish industry to continue its relatively rapid growth in the first few 
decades of the 2000s due to comparatively rapid increases in productivity, 
particularly in industry. These will release production factors for services, 
resulting in the economy becoming more service-dominated as the demand for 
services increases due to aging of the population. Therefore, the energy 
intensity of the economy is probably decreasing. However, this would require a 
more service-dominated society to manage with less consumption than the 
prior, industry-oriented one. Such growth poses challenges to the economy, 
since in Finland the focus of growth in productivity lies mostly in the electronics 
industry, according to the OECD, in addition to which it is also based on 
innovations by the electronics industry. In other industrial sectors, productivity 
has increased more modestly and, in certain service sectors, it has even 
decreased.
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Figure 4.3  Key industrial sectors’ share of added value in 1975 and 2002. 
Source: VATT. 
4.4.2  Climate policy impacts on the energy sector 
In the next few years, the key energy policy challenges will be linked to meeting 
the emissions reduction objectives of the Kyoto Protocol by reducing the use of 
fossil fuels, using flexible mechanisms, and increasing the use of renewable 
energy sources. Above all, the EU Emissions Trading Directive regulates the 
steering methods to be used, in addition to which several other directives set 
additional objectives, for instance on promoting the use of renewable energy 
sources and the use of biofuels. 
It is obvious that climate policy will influence the structure of energy production 
and change the status of various forms of energy, with the impact of EU 
emissions trading on the costs of fossil fuel use playing a key role, and the most 
significant impact of emissions trading evident in electricity prices. Table 4.1 
shows the aggregate change in electricity production costs based on certain 
production technologies (Honkatukia et al. 2003). 
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Table 4.1  Increase in direct electricity production costs due to emission 
allowance prices, EUR/MWh based on various production 
methods. 
Production method                     Price of emission allowance EUR/tCO2 
 Efficiency % 10 20 
Coal condensing 38 8.8 18.0 
Peat condensing 38 10.0 20.0 
Oil condensing 40 6.9 14.0 
Natural gas condensing 51 3.9 7.9 
Coal co-generation 90 3.7 7.4 
Peat co-generation 88 4.2 8.5 
Natural gas co-generation 92 2.2 4.4 
The table indicates a very clear increase in the costs of the most expensive 
production methods, which would be reflected throughout the Nordic electricity 
market area as increasing electricity prices. The costs of the marginal production 
method determine the price of electricity, which means that with emission 
allowance prices of €20, the market price would increase at an almost equal 
pace in situations in which there was such high demand for electricity that even 
coal condensing production was in use. Electricity prices did take this kind of a 
leap – a higher one in fact – when emissions trading began. 
As regards domestic energy policy, the significant issue in the face of increasing 
electricity prices is that the Nordic market price can be determined on the basis 
of production in Denmark or, increasingly, Germany, not Finland. Hence, it is 
extremely difficult to influence the energy sector through national measures in 
what is currently an integrated market. In fact, emissions trading increases the 
pressure to harmonise the taxation of sectors involved in emissions trading, at 
least as far as emissions are concerned. Because emissions trading as such is a 
method for restricting emissions that enhances cost-efficiency, it is questionable 
whether energy taxation should be applied to the emissions trading sector at all. 
Taxation is not necessary in terms of climate policy cost efficiency, and may not 
be desirable in terms of cost efficiency either. On the other hand, the aims of 
energy taxation have not concerned climate policy alone. For instance, Finland 
has levied carbon dioxide tax for a long time, but has allowed exceptions for 
various purposes, for instance in order to influence the relative status of 
production methods or certain fuels. Such exceptions have entailed the 
exclusion of separate electricity production from carbon dioxide taxation while 
allowing more lenient taxation of peat and natural gas than of coal. Electricity 
taxation provides more examples, such as favouring the use of wood, as does 
the taxation of transportation fuels, where diesel fuel taxes have been lower 
than those of gasoline in order to provide genuine support for heavy goods 
vehicles.
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However, it is clear that if taxes and exceptions are applied in energy 
production, they can steer production structure in a different direction than 
emissions trading alone. Emissions trading as such would increase the share of 
cogeneration and renewable energy sources in electricity and heat production, 
and the use of wood for instance would become even more profitable in relative 
terms if sectors involved in emissions trading applied fuel taxes on fossil fuels. 
In this case, however, the costs of reducing emissions would rise. Then again, if 
the emissions trading sector were made exempt from energy taxes, tax 
revenues would be lost, and the method for compensating such losses may have 
negative consequences throughout the tax system. 
Finland differs from most EU countries in that the cogeneration of heat and 
electricity, and district heating, account for a major part of the entire energy 
sector. Hence, in this country enhancing the efficiency of energy production by 
increasing the share of district heating is only possible to a limited extent, 
because the need for heat sets a limit on district heat production. District heat 
and co-generation also differ from electricity in that their market is local and 
they thus allow the implementation of solutions based on local circumstances. 
There are therefore several examples of local energy system integration in 
Finland, where the exploitation of local special characteristics of the industrial 
and energy sector has facilitated the enhancement of the efficiency of energy 
utilisation and increasing the use of biofuels, for instance. 
4.4.3 The status of renewable energy 
Steering environmental policy via economic steering methods always creates 
incentives for the development of technology and the introduction of new 
technologies. However, the EU has proposed several incentives in an attempt to 
create clearer technology-related incentives. Such incentives are hard to justify 
from mere environmental perspectives, but other reasons for an active 
environmental technology policy can be found. The most apparent is the 
possibility that the financial markets will adopt an excessively prudent approach 
to the financing of technological innovations offering very uncertain profits, 
which may slow down technological development. In such cases, the 
appropriate economic steering could have an impact on gaining sufficient 
financing. However, it must be noted that this steering works best if performed 
using nationally distinct steering methods. 
For instance, emissions trading creates an incentive for reducing the use of fossil 
fuels and increasing the use of renewable energy sources. Honkatukia et al. 
(2003) have estimated that the use of biofuels and windpower will clearly 
increase if the price of emission allowances settles at €20 per tonne of carbon 
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dioxide. However, the EU directive on renewable energy sources sets additional 
targets for the use of renewable energy sources. 
Finnish energy policy has attempted to support the use of renewable energy 
sources via favourable taxation policies. This is possible in an integrated market, 
but many countries have separated energy taxation from other objectives and 
introduced new steering methods to promote goals other than those related to 
emissions trading. The renewable energy source programme sets the goal of 
increasing the use of renewable energy sources by 50 per cent from 1995 to 
2010, which is equivalent to 3 Mtoe in energy consumption. The EU biofuel 
directive requires, as a voluntary objective for biofuels, a 5.75 per cent share (as 
energy) of fuels sold for road traffic use in 2010. All in all, renewable energy 
should exceed 20 per cent of the use of primary energy by 2010. 
For Finland, the key source of renewable energy that can be increased is 
bioenergy. VTT, the Technical Research Centre of Finland, estimates that the 
use of bioenergy can be increased in current and new community and industrial 
plants and heating by 1.2 Mtoe over its use in 1999, which would be divided 
almost equally between industry, real-estate and district heating. This 
constitutes a significant increase, corresponding to a reduction of 2.8–3.7 million 
tonnes of carbon dioxide in comparison to an equal amount of energy being 
produced with fossil fuels. The VTT considers a considerably higher increase in 
the use of biofuel possible if the use of bioenergy increases considerably in 
district heat production. Increasing the use of bioenergy is also possible in 
traffic, but the production of transportation fuels based on bioenergy still seems 
questionable in economic terms, even though many operators have already 
decided to invest in this, which would indicate a change in the current situation.2
Biofuel is primarily produced as a by-product of the forest industry, and in the 
form of logging waste. The waste flows of communities and industry suitable for 
energy production form another source of biofuels. With respect to forest 
industry by-products, black lye generated in chemical pulp production is the 
most important, accounting for approximately two thirds. Forest processed chips 
are produced in both regeneration cutting and intermediate felling, with an 
estimated realistic potential of 9.5 TWh per year, and almost double at its most 
extensive volume. 
It is obvious that the use of wood as a raw material is, for the time being, its 
most important application in Finland, but with changing price relations other 
uses may become more interesting than before. According to VTT, wood chips 
produced as a forest industry by-product and other side flows are, however, 
clearly the most profitable form of wood fuel. Therefore, scenarios on biofuel 
                                               
2  E.g. St1, NesteOil 
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use are strongly based on growth predictions for forest industry production – 
increasing the use of wood fuels at the expense of forest industry raw material 
use would also reduce side flows. Instead, further processing of by-products 
may constitute a future option worth considering. Here we refer to biorefineries, 
which would process wood into several products, including biofuel. 
The use of biofuels in traffic has attracted wide international attention, which is 
perhaps understandable considering the fact that traffic emissions can constitute 
a visible local problem and that in many EU countries they are the fastest 
growing type of emissions. Globally, however, traffic emissions only account for 
slightly over ten per cent of all emissions. Biofuel production is increasing 
globally, too, but according to the Economist, biofuel costs are still 20 per cent 
higher than those of oil-based fuels, which means that without tax subsidies 
they cannot compete with oil. 
With respect to transportation fuels, the mapping out of biofuel possibilities is in 
its initial stages in Finland. The VTT has prepared a preliminary comparison of 
the production costs of various biofuels in Nordic conditions. At present, 
biological raw material is processed into vegetable oil-based biodiesel, ethanol 
and biogases, while the production of methanol and synthetic fuels based on 
biomass and the production of ethanol from lignocellulose-based biomass 
(straw, wood) are under development. Research is also underway into refining 
tall, oil-based products based on bio-oil produced via pyrolysis technology. 
These new technologies offer lower cost production possibilities in comparison 
with current products grown in fields. The comparison indicates that of biodiesel 
products, the production costs of rapeseed-based biodiesel would be highest, 
whereas the production costs of diesel produced with new technologies based 
on the reprocessing of forest industry by-products would be lower. As for 
gasoline, methanol would involve the lowest production costs, while those of 
grain-based ethanol would equal those of rapeseed-based biodiesel. Since costs 
depend on the size of production plants, very large plants could decrease cost 
levels significantly. However, the VTT estimates that Finland would not be able 
to achieve such a scale without importing raw timber. A comparison of domestic 
bioenergy sources indicates that cellulose-based solutions would be more 
promising in the long term than solutions based on grain. 
According to VTT estimates, current biofuel alternatives would not be 
commercially viable without government subsidies, particularly in terms of 
taxation but, for now, the fuel tax on biofuels equals that of oil-based products. 
Engine technology sets special restrictions on the use of biofuels since engine 
emission control equipment in particular would not be able to handle poor-
quality biofuel. The VTT projects that the share of transport biofuels based on 
domestic raw materials could rise to three per cent by 2010 in Finland. However, 
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the possibilities of biofuel use extend beyond domestic production, and for the 
time being, it remains profitable for Finland to import biofuels. 
4.5  Impacts of changes in energy prices and availability on 
industry 
Several factors, some of them conflicting, will influence energy prices in the 
future. In addition to increasing world energy market prices, integrating markets 
are transferring various price fluctuations to the Finnish market. Securing energy 
supply has characterised Finland’s energy policy, and the significance of this will 
probably not decrease in the future. Diversified use of primary energy will not, 
however, isolate the Finnish market from energy market price fluctuations. 
Instead, sufficient indigenous production capacity can help diminish, for 
instance, the risks involved in electricity supply, which could be of major 
importance to the energy-intensive process industry. 
Until now, electricity prices in Finland have enhanced competitiveness rather 
than weakening it. Figure 4.4 shows a comparison of the electricity prices paid 
by industry in various countries. 
Figure 4.4  Average electricity prices for industry 1997–2005.  
Source: Eurostat.
It is obvious that climate policy will influence economic structures and economic 
growth significantly, but the cost efficiency of climate policy can be enhanced 
through economic steering methods. Emissions trading is another method for 
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enhancing cost efficiency, although the first experiences of the system have 
been contradictory. Emission allowance prices have increased to a considerably 
higher level than anticipated, and electricity consumers in particular are paying 
higher energy prices. However, such price signals are necessary in order to 
reduce energy consumption and generate investments in enhancing energy 
efficiency and cleaner production. Higher energy prices hamper the 
competitiveness of energy-intensive industries in comparison with countries that 
do not restrict emissions. For instance, a considerable share of competition for 
the Finnish steel industry originates in such non-EU countries. 
Several studies assess the costs of climate policy in Finland. The estimated need 
for reductions in Finland in 2010 is 15–20 per cent in comparison with ordinary 
development. In order to achieve this objective, investments in energy 
production and energy savings are necessary in addition to emissions trading. 
National energy taxation is also striving to incentivise such investments. It is 
estimated that GDP will decrease by 0.5–0.9 per cent in comparison with the 
basic scenario, if the price of emission allowances is assumed to settle at €10–
20 per tonne of carbon dioxide (see also Honkatukia ym. 2005). Higher prices 
are possible, however, which will raise costs. GDP will decline, above all because 
of lower consumer demand, due not only to the direct impact of rising energy 
prices but also to the income effect – consumers will spend a relatively high 
share of their income on energy – and lower income as a result of slower 
economic growth. 
With regards to industry, energy intensity is the driver of climate policy impacts. 
In sectors with energy accounting for a high share of total costs, rising energy 
prices will weaken competitiveness and profitability, resulting in lower 
production. The impact will be greatest in metal production, where emissions 
trading will significantly increase the volume of emissions controlled. 
The position of the paper industry will also suffer, albeit for a different reason 
than the metal industry. Fossil fuels account for a distinctly smaller share of 
paper industry energy consumption than that of the metal industry, but because 
the paper industry is a major electricity consumer, rising electricity prices will 
raise paper industry costs and its competitiveness will suffer. 
The emissions trading system compensates for lower profitability due to weaker 
industrial competitiveness with the initial allocation of free emissions allowances. 
This can influence profitability as such, but the system creates uncertainty and 
expectations of higher impacts in the future. However, European competitors 
are all in the same position, and competitiveness should suffer less due to more 
countries joining the UN Climate Convention and emissions trading system. On 
the other hand, the Finnish economy is more open than average in the EU 
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countries, making the impact of price competition higher than average within 
the EU. 
In the long term, changes in domestic competitiveness depend on the 
commitments formed after the Kyoto Protocol period. EU Ministers of the 
Environment have proclaimed that the Community goal could be as high as a 15 
per cent reduction over the level of 1990 by 2010. If this commitment still 
applies to Europe only, Community competitiveness will naturally suffer. 
However, to prevent climate change, the aim should be to establish a system 
enabling as many countries as possible to join. 
The Kyoto Process has only defined one way of reducing emissions, but there 
are many contractual arrangements that can provide more positive incentives 
than the Kyoto Protocol for developing countries and rapidly growing new 
industrial countries to join the Climate Convention. Since an objective applicable 
to European countries alone cannot suffice in curbing climate change, it would 
be very important both in terms of the environment and economy to examine all 
options available. 
4.6  Conclusions 
The IEA predicts that energy demand will continue increasing, but over the next 
few years the energy market will undergo several changes. According to the 
IEA, new sources of primary energy will be located in new areas, and most 
energy will originate in non-OECD countries. With respect to oil in particular, 
OECD countries will grow more dependent on imports, and the import of natural 
gas from the Middle East and transition economies will increase, particularly to 
Europe and North America, with Russia remaining the world’s largest producer 
of natural gas until the 2030s. Hence, the world economy will become more 
sensitive to price shocks caused by disturbances in supply. In terms of 
disturbances in supply, the need for additional electricity production and 
transmission capacity in particular will contribute to uncertainty, as will oil 
refinery capacity in OECD countries and production capacity in certain producing 
countries. The European energy market is undergoing liberalisation and 
integration and, furthermore, many environmental and energy policy objectives, 
influencing both supply and demand, apply to the market and cause 
complexities in predicting the future of the energy market. 
The Finnish energy market is closely linked to international markets, the other 
Nordic countries and Russia in particular, with electricity imported via Nordpool 
and directly from Russia accounting for a significant share of the total electricity 
supply. Regarding fossil fuels, Russia holds a major position as a supplier of 
both oil and natural gas. The inter-Nordic electricity market has raised electricity 
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prices in Finland over the past few years, and linking the Nordic market to the 
North European electricity market will enhance this trend. Growing demand both 
at home and in other parts of Europe is influencing import prices from Russia. 
Energy price increases will weaken the competitiveness of Finnish industry if 
competitors’ energy costs increase less than national costs. Rising energy costs 
due to EU emissions trading will undoubtedly raise prices in comparison with 
competitors outside Europe. The Finnish economy is more open than the EU 
average, and Finnish industry is more energy-intensive than average, which 
makes price competitiveness more significant here than on average in the EU. 
In the current integrated energy market, the methods available for domestic 
energy policy are limited. Future electricity prices can be determined on the 
basis of production in Denmark or, increasingly, Germany, but not Finland. 
However, domestic energy policy can eliminate uncertainties related to energy 
supply. For the purposes of climate policy, energy policy could also be managed 
in such a way as to avoid multiple steering, which would require new steering 
methods for promoting goals other than those related to energy policy. 
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5 AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THE 
FOOD SECTOR 
Agriculture is probably the Finnish industry that faces the greatest challenges in 
terms of pressure to adapt to expanding international trade. Due to Finland’s 
natural circumstances, the nation’s preconditions for agricultural production are 
less promising than in other EU countries, not to mention major producer 
countries outside Europe. Moreover, due to the small average farm size, average 
productivity is low. For these reasons, the operating preconditions of this sector 
depend critically on the European Union’s agricultural policy which, in turn, is 
being influenced fundamentally by the liberalising process in world trade. The 
following is a review of the development prospects of Finnish agriculture, and 
partly of those of the food sector on a wider basis, based on the assumption 
that the WTO negotiations will proceed in line with the objectives set by the EU.
5.1 The starting point 
EU agricultural policy primarily determines the conditions for agricultural 
operations in Finland, and the main impact of global development comes 
through this: the implications of WTO negotiations on the liberalisation of world 
trade on EU agricultural policy. In addition to pressures for change due to the 
WTO, the pressures to reallocate resources for other purposes within the EU 
budget are influencing the Union’s agricultural policy.
Negotiations aiming at the liberalisation of world agricultural trade are covering 
three key topics: facilitating access to the market (lowering of tariffs), the 
reduction of domestic support and the lowering of export subsidies. Domestic 
support is divided into three categories: the so-called amber, blue and green 
boxes, of which reduction commitments only apply to subsidies in the amber 
box, classified as trade-distorting subsidies. Subsidies in the blue box are also 
classified as trade-distorting.
The previous negotiation round, the so-called Uruguay Round, concluded with 
an agreement to lower tariffs by an average of 36 per cent in developed 
countries and by an average of 24 per cent in developing countries, to reduce 
domestic trade-distorting support by 20 per cent in developed countries and 13 
per cent in developing countries, and to lower the volume of subsidised exports 
by 21 per cent in developed countries and 14 per cent in developing countries, 
alongside reducing monetary export subsidies by 36 per cent in developed 
countries and 24 per cent in developing countries. The developed countries 
implemented these cuts by the end of 2000, and the developing countries did so 
by the end of 2004. 
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These negotiations formed the aforementioned blue box for domestic support, 
including the European Union’s key agricultural support under CAP. Both LFA 
and environmental subsidies fall into the so-called green box, i.e. subsidies that 
do not distort trade. As for Finland’s domestic support, some (milk-price 
support) are viewed as distorting competition most (so-called amber box), but 
because the amount of this support paid by the EU is already lower than the 
reduction commitment, Finland has not had to make any cuts here.
The objective is to continue the liberalisation of trade, but the WTO negotiating 
round that began in 2001, named the Doha Round, remains far from complete 
at the end of 2006. In fact, at the end of July 2006 the negotiating parties 
disagreed so profoundly that the negotiations were suspended.
In these negotiations, the EU aims to continue the liberalisation of agricultural 
trade, but wants to implement this in a manner that is fair from the European 
perspective and which observes, for instance, the principles of sustainable 
development. According to the original EU offer for the negotiations, issued in 
2003, tariffs would be reduced by an average of 36 per cent, similar to the 
Uruguay Round, while export subsidies would be cut by 45 per cent and 
domestic trade-distorting support by 55 per cent. However, as negotiations 
proceeded, the EU was prepared to facilitate market access somewhat further. 
Similarly, the EU was prepared to negotiate on reducing domestic support. 
Furthermore, had an agreement been reached, export subsidies would have 
been abandoned entirely by the end of 2013.
The EU offer was largely based on the reform of its own agricultural policy, 
based on a decision made in 2003. The fundamental change in the policy was to 
decouple CAP support from production in order to make it more suitable for the 
support category (subsidies not distorting trade) that need not be reduced. The 
reform also contributed to cuts in domestic support by lowering the intervention 
prices of dairy products and beef. Similarly, the sugar sector reform, adopted in 
2005, facilitated the EU’s preparations for the WTO offer.
5.2 Change prospects for the agricultural produce and food 
market 
The WTO scenario 
At present, it seems possible that a multilateral WTO agreement will not be 
reached in the near future - in fact, it seems that the odds favour delays in 
negotiations or their being broken off altogether. The latter option would put the 
entire credibility of the WTO to the test and, in the worst scenario, the 
consequence could be trade wars instead of freedom of world trade. This can 
hardly be the objective of any negotiating party. 
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The outcome outlined in the following is based on the assumption that the 
negotiations can achieve a multilateral result within a certain time span, based 
on a solution of the type that the EU has been prepared to accept for the time 
being, given the limits of its CAP reform. Even if a WTO solution could not be 
reached, liberalisation of trade is inevitable in the future, but in this case it 
would proceed via bilateral and regional agreements.
As concerns market access, the assumption is that the reduction of tariffs will be 
agreed on a product-specific basis, with tariffs cut more intensively the higher 
tariffs are levied on products now. The average tariff cut would, at a minimum, 
be on a par with the one implemented after the Uruguay Round, i.e. over 36 per 
cent. In fact, the latest EU offer promised to cut the highest tariffs by 60 per 
cent. The developing countries will again be allocated lower tariff cuts than 
developed countries. However, the fact that all countries will be allowed to 
name products that are important to them, i.e. so-called sensitive products, for 
which tariffs can be cut considerably less than for other products, will diminish 
the actual impacts of tariff cuts. Developing countries will be allowed to name 
more products important from their own perspective, so-called special products,
than developed countries. No tariff cuts are required for special products. 
Moreover, so-called bound tariffs will be the target of cuts, which means that 
tariffs will not actually decrease correspondingly, because the tariffs applied in 
real terms are much lower. For instance, EU bound tariffs averaged some 20 per 
cent in 2001, but the actual level was around 12 per cent (Jean et al. 2005).
The assumption is that domestic support will be decreased similarly to tariffs so 
that those who pay out more trade-distorting, so-called amber box support, 
would have to cut tariffs most. In addition to reducing amber box support, there 
is pressure for imposing reduction requirements on other forms of support 
remaining outside the green box, i.e. the blue box and de minimis support which 
remained outside reduction requirements after the Uruguay Round. For any 
reduction of the aggregate volume of these and amber box support measures, a 
system involving most cuts for those paying out most support would apply.
Moreover, blue box terms will be stricter for domestic support, the major change 
being to set a ceiling for the blue box support measures at 2.5 per cent of the 
value of production, no later than at the end of the implementation period. 
Green box conditions will also be made clearer, but that will not affect the 
conditions set for support decoupled from production in any substantial way.
As a whole, the European Union will be committed to reducing support outside 
the green box by over 70 per cent during the agreement implementation period, 
while the figure applicable to the United States will be over 50 per cent. This will 
exert pressure favouring the alteration of the structure of support so that a 
larger portion of this is support decoupled from production. The 2003 reform of 
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EU’s Common Agricultural Policy anticipated this need, which means that were 
the WTO agreement reached, the need for cutting support coupled with 
production from its current level would hardly increase.
A gradual reduction of export subsidies is expected to lead to no export 
subsidies being paid for agricultural products in developed countries by the end 
of 2013. The annual reduction commitments for export subsidies are set so that 
they will be cut considerably in the first years of the implementation period. 
Developing countries will also eliminate export subsidies gradually, but will be 
allocated a longer transitional period. Various kinds of export credits, state 
trading enterprises, food aid and other measures parallel to export subsidies 
must be eliminated or altered so that their effect is not comparable with export 
subsidies.
Impacts around the world 
Reductions of export subsidies and tariffs will cause changes in EU trading and 
agricultural policy. No analysis exactly in line with the current EU offer is 
available, but several other scenarios on how liberalisation of trade would 
influence world trade flows (see e.g. Kerkelä et al. 2005) have been prepared. 
These provide a sound basis for assessing the impacts of the EU offer. In most 
cases, the result is clear for EU agriculture: trade liberalisation would lower 
internal market prices, production and export volumes.
According to Kerkelä et al. (2006a), for instance the elimination of export 
subsidies would decrease producer prices at a maximum of one per cent only, 
and production at a maximum of six per cent, but exports would decline by as 
much as 20 per cent. Kerkelä et al. (2006b) have also prepared an alternative 
scenario involving not only the elimination of export subsidies but also a 
considerable reduction of tariffs (approximately corresponding to the EU offer). 
This indicates only slightly higher impacts, but they would vary considerably by 
country.
So-called developing countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, many ASEAN 
countries, South Africa and South American countries would be the most 
obvious winners if agricultural trade were liberated, while China, almost all 
African countries, Mexico, Vietnam, India and Bangladesh would suffer most. 
This is the conclusion that, for instance, Polaski (2006) came to in an extensive 
analysis covering several alternative scenarios with respect to the Doha Round’s 
final result. Welfare analyses indicate that rich nations, too, would benefit from 
the liberalisation of world trade, even though the producers in these countries 
would suffer.
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Contrary to popular belief, world trade in agricultural products and foodstuffs 
would decline in several cases, partly due to lower volumes of subsidised 
exports, but also due to the fact that rising world market prices would result in 
many foodstuffs-importing countries cutting down import volumes.
According to Bouët et al. (2006), developed countries would gain almost 60 per 
cent and middle-income countries almost 40 per cent of the additional income 
resulting from market access changes and the elimination of export subsidies in 
line with the probable WTO agreement (approximate to the EU offer), which 
would leave only less than two per cent of the additional income to the least 
developed countries. If the WTO were to reach an agreement in line with the EU 
proposal, entailing the totally free import of agricultural products by the least 
developed countries to the OECD countries (according to the previously 
described scenario, 97 per cent of developing countries’ agricultural product 
exports to the OECD countries would be exempt from tariffs), developing 
countries would gain substantially more, i.e. approximately 10 per cent of the 
additional income.
Therefore, at least in the short term, world trade liberalisation would affect the 
welfare of the poorest nations negatively in the worst scenario. For instance, the 
welfare analysis results by Kerkelä et al. (2006b) indicate clearly that this would 
be the case. Without special arrangements for the least developed countries, it 
seems that those who should gain from world trade liberalisation would not.
Table 5.1 illustrates the welfare effects of further liberalisation of agricultural 
produce trade, and their trends and volume in relation to other operators. The 
estimates are mainly based on the abovementioned studies. A plus sign in the 
table indicates a positive impact, while a minus sign indicates a negative one. 
The number of signs illustrates the magnitude of change (the more signs the 
higher the impacts on welfare). In spite of the fact that the scenarios of the 
abovementioned studies involve many uncertain factors, which the researchers 
themselves have pointed out, the forecast changes listed can be considered 
indicative.
Table 5.1  Welfare impacts of agricultural produce trade liberalisation.
 Producers Consumers Taxpayers Total 
Finland --- + + + 
EU -- + ++ ++ 
USA - + + + 
Major exporting countries +++ - + ++ 
The poorest countries - -- - --- 
Total +/- + + + 
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However, in the long term the position of the poorest countries may be better 
than illustrated above, provided that they are able to develop their own 
production and make it competitive in the world market. 
5.3 Changes in the position of Finnish agriculture in a changing 
operating environment 
The higher than EU average negative impact of world trade liberalisation on 
Finland’s agriculture, as established above, is crucially based on Finland’s natural 
circumstances, which are more disadvantageous to agriculture than, for 
instance, those of the nearby Sweden and Denmark, not to mention the major 
agricultural countries in the EU and, especially, large agricultural producers 
outside Europe. Therefore, in a free trade environment, Finnish agriculture is 
more dependent on support than European agriculture in general. In addition to 
this, the average size of farms is smaller (and the farmland structure 
fragmented), which is certain to raise costs and hamper the competitiveness of 
production (table 5.2).
Table 5.2  Structural data from selected EU countries in 2003. 
 Finland Sweden Denmark France 
Efficient heat summation ˚C of the growing 
season in the main agricultural area 800–1,300 1,000–1,600 1,400–1,600 2,000–2,600 
Crop of wheat kg/ha (2000–2005 average) 3,474 5,996 7,237 6,999 
Average farm size / area under cultivation, 
ha 29.9 36.6 54.1 42.5 
Share of farms with over 50 hectares of 
area under cultivation 17% 29% 38% 44% 
Number of dairy cows per dairy farm 17.2 41.4 75.0 35.6 
Dairy farms with over 50 cows, share of 
production 6% 51% 87% 39% 
Number of meat pigs per pig farm 214 342 691 171 
Pig farms with over 1,000 pigs, share of 
production 20% 52% 64% 39% 
Sources: Eurostat, Finnish Meteorological Institute.
Lower profitability is reflected in farmers’ income levels, which over time 
decreases employment and production in agriculture. However, changes in both 
employment and production could remain minor in the short term, because 
farmers usually cease production as investment needs arise, in other words old 
capital stock is often used up despite poor profitability. Hence, with a WTO 
negotiation scenario corresponding to the EU offer, employment in agriculture 
would probably continue its relatively even declining trend, highly dependent on 
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the aging process of agricultural producers. Correspondingly, production would 
undergo relatively minor changes as productivity continued to increase.
A more radical change in the EU support policy would potentially have 
major impacts 
However, the situation could be fundamentally different if, either in connection 
with the WTO solution, or due to other reasons, the EU were to revise its 
support policy to a clearly greater extent than the outlined WTO scenario would 
require.
Lower domestic support in particular would influence the extent of Finnish 
agriculture, because Finland’s natural circumstances render its profitability much 
more dependent on subsidies than is usual in the EU countries. The EU 
Commission has continuously advocated that Finland should decrease its 
domestic support (domestic support to Southern Finland in particular), and that 
support or a larger portion of it should be decoupled from production. At 
present, the majority of domestic support is directly coupled with production, 
either in the form of price support (milk) or animal unit-based support 
(production of meat and eggs). Also, CAP support is still partly coupled with 
production. In Finland, support coupled with production and support in general 
constitute the highest portion of agricultural income within the EU (Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1  Agricultural income structure in selected EU countries in 2005.   
Source: Eurostat, EAA.
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Following the complete implementation of the CAP reform in all EU member 
countries in 2006, the share of support coupled with production has fallen both 
in the EU and in Finland, so that on the EU level only some 10 per cent of CAP 
support remains coupled with production. The share of CAP support coupled 
with production is highest in France, where it accounts for around 26 per cent 
(Agra Europe 2006), while in Finland, having accounted for over one third of all 
support in Finland in 2005, its share has fallen to approximately one fifth. Due to 
Finland’s natural circumstances and high unit costs, the share of income gained 
from the market, even including support coupled with production, is so low for 
many products that it does not even cover variable costs. Against this 
background, the incentives for enhancing the efficiency of production are not 
necessarily very high, particularly with respect to cereal production.
Decoupling support from livestock production would probably change the 
production structure considerably. If support were decoupled from production in 
a manner similar to the EU’s CAP reform, and converted to a hectare basis, the 
relative profitability of crop farming and livestock production would change 
markedly. On the one hand, this would accelerate the abandonment of livestock 
production and decrease production, and on the other it would probably 
enhance the concentration of production and lead to quests for efficiency in 
larger production units in domestic animal farming. Decoupling support from 
production would probably also influence the regional structure of production 
considerably, by concentrating production in certain areas faster than otherwise.
Factors enhancing competitiveness 
The European Union’s agricultural policy has so far been based on the principle 
that all member countries must be able to practice agriculture in the form in 
which it has been practiced there previously, and in order to adhere to this 
principle, the inevitable prerequisite is that Finnish agriculture will be allowed to 
enjoy higher aggregate levels of support than the European average.
This principle is obviously based on the presumption that practicing agriculture 
in various countries yields benefits beyond the actual foodstuffs produced, such 
as ensuring food security in various crisis situations, supporting economic 
activity and income generation in the countryside, preserving the landscape, 
ensuring the prerequisites for so-called organic production, adhering to ethical 
and sustainable development principles related to the treatment of animals etc. 
In addition, factors related to food quality can support domestic production.1
1 For one reason or another, domestic foodstuffs are considered better than those of foreign 
origin in most countries. This may be due to greater certainty of good hygienic practices at 
various stages of the production chain. In Finland’s case, the standard of hygiene is undeniably 
high, there are few animal diseases and levels of pesticide residues are extremely low in 
comparison with other European countries. 
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Many of these factors are partly linked to family farms as the predominant form 
of agricultural enterprise. 
The aforementioned factors may, to a certain extent, influence consumers’ 
readiness to pay more for foodstuffs produced in Finland under certain 
conditions than for other foodstuffs, but primarily this is a question of the 
aforementioned factors partly justifying subsidies to domestic agriculture.
Certain aspects of the pressure to revise the EU support policy may also support 
Finnish agriculture. This concerns the relationship between the so-called first 
and second pillars of the CAP, with first pillar subsidies comprising pure 
agricultural support, or CAP support, while second pillar support comprises rural 
development support, of which environmental support to agriculture and LFA 
support are the most crucial for Finland. Finland’s share of first pillar support is 
very low today, because this support is based on the former reference crops, on 
the basis of which countries with high harvest levels, such as France, gain more 
support than countries with low crop yield levels. Although the present EU 
support is decoupled from production, its historical background has ensured that 
the situation has remained unchanged. The pressure to cut the EU’s agricultural 
budgets may result in enhancing the significance of second pillar subsidies, and 
with Finland’s share of these second pillar supports being higher than that of 
first pillar supports, Finland’s relative position as a receiver of EU agricultural 
support would improve.
Bioenergy crops represent a new form of agricultural production which has 
emerged lately as a significant option in addition to traditional food production. 
The increasing production of bioenergy around the world is changing the 
situation in the international food markets. New, alternative uses of raw material 
are raising the world market prices of certain agricultural products, particularly 
cereals and sugar plants. This is evident on a more general basis in the 
bioenergy market, where demand for fuel wood has already increased markedly 
and prices have risen both in Finland and particularly in other parts of Europe.
Bioenergy is also creating new opportunities in Finland. According to the 
bioenergy scenario of the national cereals strategy, production of bioethanol 
would require 15 per cent of Finland’s area currently under cereals, and 
production of biodiesel could double its current area under oil plants. As fields 
facilitate the production of thermal energy (reed canary grass in particular), in 
principle up to one fourth of Finland’s arable area could be harnessed for energy 
production purposes.
In practice, such a structural change in production is hardly likely to occur at a 
rapid pace, because with the existing technology the costs of agricultural 
bioenergy production, particularly fuel production, are in most cases far too high 
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in comparison with fossil fuels, given current prices. In most cases, domestic 
bioenergy production is also clearly more expensive than production based on 
foreign raw materials. 
However, the current technology would already seem adequate for the 
profitable production of biofuels, provided that the biomass can be utilised 
effectively in full. Altia’s decision to invest in the production of ethanol is 
probably based on this, and NesteOil’s decision on biodiesel production is an 
indication of the possibilities of profitable biofuel production in Finland with 
existing technology.
However, the use of biomass for the cogeneration of heat, and heat and 
electricity, probably offers greater immediate potential than liquid fuels, because 
transportation fuel processing as such requires the use of fossil energy. 
Emissions trading is motivating large power plants in particular to utilise 
renewable energy sources in power and heat generation, but for the time being, 
wood-based biomass is less expensive than agricultural biomass.
Advancing technology, the price trends of fossil fuels and the demands of 
climate policy may, however, change this scenario rapidly, which may entail 
more extensive opportunities for utilising bioenergy in Finland than those in view 
now.
5.4 Structural development of agriculture in various regions 
Finnish agriculture has been subject to an uninterrupted, powerful trend of 
structural change for over 40 years, with the number of farms and labour input 
declining in line with the changing industrial structure in all developed countries. 
The number of farms was highest in the early 1960s, at over 300,000 after the 
after-war settlement policy, but the present number of farms is slightly under 
70,000.
In the past ten years, i.e. during Finland’s EU membership, the number of farms 
receiving subsidies has declined by some 25,000, which means that over one 
fourth of farms have gone out of production. This entails an average annual 
reduction of around 3.5 per cent. However, structural development does not 
involve a change in the number of farms alone, but changes in the production 
structure and regional location of farms too. In recent years, the predominant 
trend has been to increase the size of farms faster than before, with investment 
subsidies directed more towards large investments, and with subsidies 
accounting for a distinctly larger share of investment financing.
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The following presents an initial basic scenario on structural development until 
2013, based on actual developments within the previous ten-year period. The 
assessment is based on a study by Lehtonen and Pyykkönen (2005). Following 
our presentation of the basic scenario, we will predict the pressures for change 
affecting the basic scenario based on globalisation.
Basic scenario until 2013 
Lehtonen and Pyykkönen (2005) forecast that the number of farms will decline 
to some 50,000 by 2013. Farmer surveys indicate a similar trend, linked with 
regional concentration of production. Livestock production in particular has 
grown in traditionally strong production areas, with certain milk regions in 
Ostrobothnia and Northern Savo producing an increasingly higher share of 
Finnish milk. The revised price ratio of cereals and green fodder is evident in the 
decreasing area under grass and the increasing share of cereals outside the 
traditional grain-growing regions. The number of farms has also declined 
differently in different parts of the country, with more remote regions 
experiencing a more intensive structural change than the national average (see 
Figure 5.2).
Figure 5.2  Change in the number of farms 2004–2013, based on two 
different methods.
Source: Lehtonen and Pyykkönen 2005.
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Due to the declining number of farms, less labour is needed. In 2005, 
agriculture employed a total of some 153,000 people, as statistics by the 
Information Centre of the Finnish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry indicate. 
With the majority of farms operating on a part-time basis, according to Statistics 
Finland, in terms of man-work-years agriculture employed around 91,000 
persons, or 3.9 per cent of all those employed in Finland. The number of 
employees has fallen by some 4 per cent a year and no change is in view with 
respect to this trend. Work is being replaced by capital on a continuous basis, 
and by 2013 the number of employed should fall clearly below 70,000, in which 
case the share of agriculture with respect to the aggregate workforce would 
only be some 2.5 per cent.
Hence, productivity has clearly increased, with an annual increase of over 3 per 
cent in agriculture in the past ten years, the corresponding figure for the entire 
national economy being 2.4 per cent. The development of capital productivity 
has not been equally positive (Suomen maatalous 2006, Myyrä & Pihamaa 
2006), but in livestock farming, where large investments have been made, 
overall productivity has clearly increased.
Pressures for change affecting the basic scenario as a consequence of 
globalisation 
If the above estimate is updated with the described globalisation pressures, the 
conclusions are obvious. First of all, the number of farms will decline at a 
somewhat faster pace than projected in the basic scenario, with the number of 
farms and production declining more rapidly than estimated, particularly in milk 
production. However, the adaptation process would still be slow because farms 
would use up their existing capital stock, and demography would be the 
predominant factor determining the pace of giving up farming.
Globalisation pressures will be more obvious in terms of generational change 
activity and production decisions. Therefore, a more intensive focus on livestock 
production is probable with respect to the basic scenario, particularly due to the 
lower competitiveness of agriculture in remote areas within the country.
On the other hand, the centralisation of production will create opportunities for 
the specialisation of farms in a new way, and for revising their operating 
methods in other respects. In practical terms, large livestock farms will focus 
more on indoor production and outsource the cultivation of fields. The use of 
contracting services in field farming will increase on smaller farms, because 
investments in machinery will no longer be profitable for them. Therefore, this 
development may also create jobs in rural areas. However, the possibilities for 
outsourcing vary in different parts of the country.
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According to Lehtonen and Pyykkönen (2005), lower domestic subsidies for 
livestock production would contribute to faster termination of production on 
small farms in particular, where production costs per unit produced are higher 
than in larger farms, and where the possibilities to invest profitably decline to a 
relatively greater extent alongside falling product-specific profits than on large 
farms. However, there would be a delay in this becoming evident in structural 
development. The differentiation of producer prices, either regionally or based 
on farm size, would speed up this type of change. Due to the competitive 
situation in industry, the pressure for such a change in pricing exists in that 
sector. 
Correspondingly, the number of employed would decline somewhat faster than 
the basic scenario indicates, with still larger investments, which would also 
result in higher increases in the productivity of labour as a consequence of 
specialisation and outsourcing.
5.5 Challenges to the food industry 
Traditionally, Finnish agriculture has been closely linked to the Finnish food 
industry: the majority of food industry raw material is of domestic origin and 
producers own a considerable share of the industry. This link will probably 
weaken due to competitive pressures caused by globalisation in the food 
industry, but hardly decisively. The majority of the food industry will continue to 
require domestic raw materials, and agriculture cannot become a significant 
exporter of raw material.
The links between national agricultural production and the food industry are 
tight in other countries too, because the majority of production is consumed in 
the home country. As a rule, less than 20 per cent of aggregate production is 
exported. However, trade in livestock products in particular has increased both 
in absolute and relative terms in the last two decades (Figure 5.3). 
Internationalisation of trade is a key factor in transferring the impacts of 
globalisation both to the food industry and through it to agriculture. Retailers 
are purchasing goods on a more international basis, and their negotiating power 
with suppliers is constantly increasing. This will inevitably intensify competition 
in the home market even if no more foreign retail chains enter the Finnish 
retailing sector. However, it is possible that more international chains will launch 
operations in this country.
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Figure 5.3  The share of world trade of certain agricultural products.   
Source: FAO.
Increasing competition in imports puts pressure on enhancing exports. Given 
increasingly intensive competition, particularly in the EU internal market, Finland 
cannot export any products with a low degree of upgrading. Instead, the degree 
of upgrading must become higher, especially in terms of enhancing the quality 
of products. Functional foods are a potential sector, where thanks to the heavy 
focus on research in some sectors, the Finnish food industry could be highly 
competitive. Its high level of hygiene in raw material production, its relatively 
few problems in terms of animal diseases, and low pesticide residues support 
the possibility of enhancing added value. Correspondingly, an increasing share 
of “bulk product” consumption is targeted at imports.
Since domestic consumption volumes of foodstuffs cannot increase very 
intensively, companies must seek growth either through increasing their market 
share, or by going international. Then again, market shares cannot be increased 
without major structural arrangements both in Finland and beyond. Since 
production volumes are not increasing, production plants are being closed and 
production is focusing even more than before in Southern Finland, closer to 
consumers and the export market. There is obvious pressure in this direction, 
with the current capacity utilisation rate of the food industry at only slightly over 
75 per cent, clearly lower than in many other industries.
Competition pressures can also be reflected in the region-specific or production 
unit size specific differentiation of producer prices, as procurement costs 
become a competitive asset. The food industry is largely controlled by farmers 
and, until now, one of the basic principles of the Finnish co-operative system 
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has been to ensure equal prices for all producers. However, under the growing 
pressure of globalisation this principle will be put to the test.
One way the industry can respond to the internationalisation of trade is to 
become international itself. Finnish companies have a history of success in terms 
of establishing themselves abroad and operating there, which means that the 
liberalisation of trade is opening up opportunities for the Finnish food industry. 
The internationalisation of industry is also facilitating the flexible transfer of 
production from one country to another. Certain industrial sectors are 
dependent on local raw materials (such as the dairy industry to a large extent), 
but others are fairly free to choose what to produce and where. Consumer 
tastes and habits are highly local in part, which ties industries to each country. 
On the other hand, the production of different product varieties does not 
necessarily require local production.
The intensive growth in consumption in the emerging economies of Russia and 
Asia (including China and India) provides a regionally significant opportunity for 
the food industry. Purchasing power is still growing clearly in these countries 
and their markets are substantial. This contributes to increasing demand in the 
world market, which provides a reason to expect rising prices. In such a case, 
competition between imports from non-EU countries would not intensify this 
process greatly, resulting in a more stable situation in the EU internal market. 
From the Finnish perspective, growing demand in Russia in particular represents 
major opportunities.
5.6 Conclusions 
The structural change in agriculture will continue under all future scenarios 
currently on offer, entailing a lower number of farms and declining labour force 
participation rates in agriculture, with production concentrating not only on 
larger units but regionally within some sectors. Production will vanish in 
particular from remote rural areas. According to the basic scenario, the number 
of farms will decrease from approximately 70,000 in 2005 to some 50,000 in 
2013 and employment, in terms of man-years, from 91,000 to fewer than 
70,000, i.e. around 2.5 per cent of those employed. As a result of the adaptation 
process, productivity will increase, which will enhance the price competitiveness 
of the industry.
Liberalisation of agricultural trade in the projected way, closely linked to 
globalisation, will speed up the process in comparison with a situation where 
trade did not undergo liberalisation. However, as a whole, the change will not be 
dramatic as such because the EU agricultural policy has largely adapted to the 
projected WTO solution already.
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The pressure for further change will be considerably higher if subsidies to 
Finnish agriculture, particularly its share of domestic support, are cut beyond the 
level required by the anticipated WTO solution, and changed further in a 
direction independent of production. The direction of changes will be similar to 
the abovementioned. Although it is difficult to produce accurate estimates, the 
changes may be markedly greater, particularly if cuts in subsidies coupled with 
livestock production lead to marginal costs exceeding marginal income from the 
market and subsidies in large production areas.
However, global development entails features tailor-made for supporting the 
retention of agricultural production in Finland. One of these factors, which has 
already materialised to a certain extent, is the increasing use of bioenergy. In 
the near future, this will be based primarily on wood-based biomass in heat and, 
to a certain extent, power generation. This will help to create not only full-time 
entrepreneurship in rural areas, but also to provide those engaged in agriculture 
with income opportunities based on part-time work. Later on, as technology 
advances and the prices of fossil fuels increase, agricultural biomass will 
probably provide opportunities for profitable production. However, the utilisation 
of new opportunities will require extensive research and product development.
In addition to this, values related to food safety, health aspects and widely 
accepted ethical production methods may become significant in a manner that 
supports the competitiveness of Finnish agriculture in conditions where 
agricultural trade is more liberalised than today. In this respect, the utilisation of 
new opportunities requires substantial investments in research and 
development, and solid marketing competencies.
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6 GLOBALISATION AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN 
FINLAND 
An important consequence of globalisation has been the pressure on production 
to cluster in areas of high market potential, both globally and within Europe. For 
the remote and sparsely populated Finland, this may mean an extensive regional 
structural change. The following is an account of recent regional development 
within Finland and the role of globalisation in this process. This is followed by a 
discussion of future trends and challenges in regional development. 
6.1 Forces behind regional development 
In the long run, the liberalisation of economies and increasing integration have 
benefited the countries concerned. Nevertheless, different economic sectors and 
regions within a country are capable of utilising various aspects of globalisation 
in different ways. For certain regions, the disadvantages may outweigh the 
advantages, at least in the short run. Some other regions, on the other hand, 
may be able to derive the maximum benefit from globalisation. 
A flexible economic environment helps regions adapt to the situation, by means 
of regional wage flexibility and labour mobility. In Finland, regional wage 
differences are small, and experience so far indicates that labour mobility has 
failed to reduce regional disparities. Regional economies have adjusted to 
various region-specific employment shocks through changes in labour force 
participation and unemployment (Böckerman 1998, Pekkala & Kangasharju 
2002). In so far as the shocks caused by globalisation are region-specific, it is 
likely that they will be dealt with correspondingly. 
The most prominent phenomenon related to regional development is 
agglomeration, which takes place both at national and regional level. There are 
several factors behind agglomeration, and it is not easy to determine the 
corresponding cause-effect relations empirically. It is possible that 
agglomeration is triggered by various localisation benefits related to 
concentration within a single sector, or by more universal urbanisation 
economies which are related to the size and nearness of the market, as well as 
to the external effects caused by a number of companies located close to each 
other. If companies are clustered close to each other, the corresponding 
markets are likely to become deeper. In such a case, both customers and 
intermediate product suppliers are located close by, which has a positive effect 
on all the companies in the region, generating so-called external scale 
economies. Knowledge-intensive sectors and workers are likely to benefit from 
agglomeration, because they are often capable of utilising the externalities 
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associated with this phenomenon. Geographical clusters can also be assumed to 
reduce business-related search costs, whether it is suppliers, services or 
employees that are needed. Similarly, clusters and the resulting co-operation 
may promote information and knowledge transfer. 
Different operations, sectors and jobs are vulnerable to agglomeration in 
different ways. Agglomeration is typical for sectors with production scale 
economies, market power, close relations with intermediate product suppliers, a 
high proportion of mobile production factors (capital or skilled labour instead of 
e.g. land or unskilled labour), rapidly changing production processes and tasks 
(e.g. ICT sectors), and high value added (see e.g. Ottaviano & Pinelli 2004). 
However, agglomeration can also be caused simply by the concentration of 
natural resources in a certain geographical area, or internal production scale 
economies. It is for these reasons that a number of sectors within traditional 
industry, such as the forest industry in Finland, keep clustering in certain 
regions.
6.2 Globalisation and the location of production 
The same factors that cause global reallocation of production and differentiated 
growth patterns across countries are also important at regional level, within 
countries. Of special significance are “transportation costs” which are related to 
the transportation of goods, people and ideas, and which have been cut down 
by technological development and the tendency to deregulate administrative 
procedures. These costs have their impact on the concentration of production 
and the cost-effectiveness of the location. However, there is no linear 
relationship between these parameters. 
In economic geography, several theoretical models describe the process of 
agglomeration as a spiral. The starting point is the classic article by Krugman 
(1991), in which it is pointed out that low transportation costs result in 
agglomerated production, while high transportation costs lead to decentralised 
production. Ottaviano and Pinelli (2004) distinguish between five effect types 
with respect to regional structure caused by “transportation costs”, on the basis 
of the forces behind the agglomeration and decentralisation of production:  
1) Easier communication and lower communication costs change the level 
of search and matching costs in business. In particular, various rapidly 
developing knowledge-intensive sectors typically have rapidly changing 
needs to find e.g. customers, new employees or partner companies. In 
this respect, decreases in communication costs diminish the need for 
agglomeration and decrease its positive effects. On the other hand, it 
has also been argued that these are actually made more powerful, as 
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the management of close, face-to-face contacts becomes faster and 
more efficient. 
2) Lower trade costs and lower institutional barriers decrease costs in the 
trade of products and services. This may decrease the importance of 
nearness in trade and thus decrease agglomeration economies. It also 
increases competition in the sense that due to the growing role of the 
markets outside the region, the intensity of competition is no longer 
dependent on local markets. 
3) Lower trade costs, lower institutional barriers and lower communication 
costs combined make it easier for companies to split and transfer 
production between units in different regions. Among other things, this 
facilitates specialisation within different company units and reduces 
offshoring costs. 
4) Lower communication costs foster personal interaction and knowledge 
transfer, and decrease the importance of nearness. This may decrease 
agglomeration economies. 
5) Lower trade costs, lower institutional barriers and lower communication 
costs also facilitate the relocation of companies, which makes them 
more footloose. According to Ottaviano and Pinelli, to a certain extent 
this applies to educated workers as well. In itself, this has no clear 
effect on agglomeration economies. 
The forces behind globalisation thus affect the regional localisation of production 
in different ways, depending on the case. However, as far as “transportation 
costs” are concerned, these effects can be assumed to be non-linear, due to the 
fact that while lower trade costs, lower institutional barriers and lower 
communication costs first increase or accelerate agglomeration, they will later, 
while still falling, decrease the significance of agglomeration economies. 
However, theories say nothing precise about the number or size of 
concentrations or clusters, or about the level of “transportation costs” at which 
agglomeration economies actually become decentralisation economies. 
In any case, in principle, the process of globalisation will at a certain point 
reduce agglomeration economies. On the other hand, globalisation is connected 
to the rapid development of knowledge-intensive sectors such as information 
technology, which tend to reap benefits from agglomeration. Indeed, in the 
1990s the development of communication technology together with reduced 
costs prompted a discussion on whether the improvement of information 
technology would facilitate the increasing decentralisation of production, due to 
its diminishing effect on the significance of geographical distances (see e.g. 
Gillespie et al. 2001, Mariussen 2004). 
In economic geography, there is also an ongoing discussion about the 
importance of nearness in the transfer of so-called silent or empirical knowledge 
and the extent to which it can be regarded as a precondition for the success of 
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e.g. innovation activities (see Boschma 2005). The exchange of empirical 
knowledge presupposes face-to-face interaction and, according to the 
classification by Autor-Levy-Murnane (2003), the related tasks are non-routine, 
which makes them difficult to decentralise within a country or offshore abroad.  
6.3 Regional development in Finland and globalisation 
Regional development in Finland has been influenced by a long-term and 
permanent tendency towards the agglomeration of both economic activities and 
populations into bigger clusters. However, there is a clear variation in the speed 
and precise nature of agglomeration. In the 1980s, regions with lower 
production and a lower income level on average grew faster than regions with a 
high income level (see e.g. Ottaviano & Pinelli 2004). The recession in the 1990s 
marked an end to a long period of regional economic convergence, and in the 
late 1990s the gaps between production levels per capita began to grow again. 
On the other hand, in the 2000s regional income disparities seem to have 
narrowed. In 2000–2004, the level of household primary income1 increased 
more in low-income regions than in high-income regions (see Figures 6.1 and 
6.2.). As far as the value added is concerned, this turn is not as clear, but there 
is still a clear indication that regional divergence has stopped. When analysed 
more closely, this would seem to be caused by smaller disparities in productivity. 
It seems that employment rates have continued to improve slightly more in 
regions (NUTS4) with a high GDP/capita ratio. 
The economic boom in the 1990s was accompanied by a structural change that 
involved the rise of the electronics industry to a dominant position, and various 
measures to rationalise production in other sectors. This raises the question of 
the extent to which regional development was also connected to the rise of ICT 
sectors and therefore to globalisation, or whether it was a reflection of the 
recession of the 1990s, or whether it reflected the interruption and subsequent 
temporary, post-recession acceleration of the “normal” agglomeration process of 
a production structure that had been subject to decentralisation during the 
recession. 
                                               
1  Primary income refers to income that is received by households in return for their contribution to 
production, e.g. wages, capital income and forestry income. In this case, assignment profits and 
losses as well as employee option income have been included, since they have a significant 
impact on regional income disparities. 
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Figure 6.1  Relationship between household income growth and regional 
(NUTS4) income level in 1995–2000.  
Figure 6.2  Relationship between household income growth and regional 
(NUTS4) income level in 2000–2004.  
Industrial production and, to a certain extent, service sectors were concentrating 
heavily the 1990s. According to the Herfindahl index2, however, the process of 
concentration ceased (Figure 6.3.) in the early 2000s, while migration was 
decreasing and the rate of employment improvement was slowing down and 
                                               
2  The Hehrfindah index is the region-specific sum of the squares of the value added share of the 
sectors, i.e. H = ƶ ni (xi/X)2, n = number of regions, xi denotes sector-specific production located 
in region i, while X denotes the total production in the country. The closer the index value is to 
1, the more concentrated the sector, or the more specialised the region. 
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finally stopped. The concentration process slowed down or ceased in nearly all 
sectors that had developed remarkably in the 1990s: real estate and business 
services, wholesale and retail trade, traffic and telecommunications as well as 
catering and accommodation services. Compared to these, the development of 
most other sectors has been stable. Finance and insurance services are a clear 
exception, since the concentration process in these sectors was still intense in 
the 2000s.
Figure 6.3  Regional (NUTS4) concentration of production in 1980–2005.   
6.3.1 Which regions have succeeded? 
In the 1990s, when Finland became remarkably specialised in the production of 
high technology products, production growth was most intense in the Helsinki 
Metropolitan Area as well as in other major university cities. Furthermore, 
several regions dominated by a single industrial sector showed high growth. 
Thus, in addition to electronic industry clusters such as Salo, a number of 
municipalities with paper industry production became stronger. The fact that the 
highest production growth rates were limited to only a few regions is not just 
something peculiar to the ICT era of the 1990s, but this phenomenon was 
observable as early as in the 1980s when the Helsinki Metropolitan Area served 
as the growth engine. In the longer run, regions with a diversified production 
structure have been capable of utilising market demand in particular during 
rapid economic growth (Huovari et al. 2006). This can be regarded as some kind 
of proof of the existence of general urbanisation economies. 
Even though some regions with a specialised production structure showed rapid 
growth in total production in the 1990s, the results by Tohmo (2005) suggest 
that in 1995–2001 there was little interaction between specialisation and the 
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growth of production at regional level. On the other hand, the regions growing 
fastest in the 2000s do not constitute a uniform group, and the Helsinki 
Metropolitan Area, for example, does not belong to it. The results by Piekkola 
(2006) suggest that the factors facilitating growth in the 2000s do not differ 
remarkably from those in the late 1990s.
The growth competitiveness index by Piekkola emphasises the know-how of the 
region’s top companies, various factors related to regional innovativeness 
(research and development expenditures, patents, proportion of innovative work 
positions, share of value added in high technology) and the accessibility of the 
region (airport connections, industry’s connections abroad). However, growth 
competitiveness explained only about 30 per cent of the growth disparities in 
2003–2004, taking into account the size of the region (Piekkola 2006). This may 
be partly due to the shortness of the period, since annual variation in production 
growth tends to be high. Piekkola’s results, however, correspond to the 
observation made by Huovari et al. (2006) that a high fraction of Finnish regions 
develop roughly at the same uniform rate of growing production, while a small 
number of regions with a diversified production structure or a strong industrial 
base tend to outperform average regions, in particular during economic booms. 
In the 1990s, the idea emerged from discussions on regional development that 
the change in information technology would decrease agglomeration economies 
and facilitate the decentralisation of knowledge work as well as the promotion of 
remote work. This has not happened in Finland. Remote work has not increased 
significantly, even though routine call centre type work has been decentralised 
to a certain extent (Ministry of Labour 2004). Most remote work is done in urban 
areas. As a matter of fact, it is probable that the change in communication 
technology will not promote the decentralisation of production within the 
borders of developed countries such as Finland to the extent that was originally 
thought. 
The role of remoteness has perhaps too often been regarded as the most 
significant barrier to the development of remote regions. Gillespie et al. (2001) 
refer to the possibility that instead of remoteness, the real problem is the weak 
competitiveness of companies located in remote regions. This is due to the fact 
that they are not subject to competitive pressure in the local market, such 
pressure being typical to companies located in agglomerated regions. If 
distances in themselves do not constitute the main barrier to development, the 
development of communication technology alone will not provide a boost 
sufficient to change the direction of these regions. On the other hand, in a study 
on the efficiency of the production of municipal services in Finland, it was 
pointed out that distance to big population clusters is an important explanatory 
variable for municipal inefficiency, unlike e.g. the population size of the 
municipality (see Loikkanen & Susiluoto 2005). 
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It is clear that the agglomeration economies brought about by urbanisation are 
not the only force behind the agglomeration of high technology production, as 
proved by the formation of production clusters in Salo and to some extent in 
Oulu. According to Mariussen (2004), current ICT production in Finland and 
Sweden is located in cities that have been homes to the electronics industry 
from the beginning. This development was promoted by the existence of various 
education and research organisations in such areas. Since the formation of 
clusters is due to historical reasons, it is not easy to create a corresponding 
universal development model. However, the appropriate development efforts 
with a view to technology and market development may provide regions with an 
unfavourable location and size with a significant and long-term boost. Oulu is an 
excellent example of this as well. 
Studies on the regional impact of higher education institutions have pointed out 
that short geographical distances promote knowledge transfer from universities 
to companies (see e.g. Mansfield & Lee, 1996; Lievonen & Lemola 2004). 
Universities provide companies, even in small towns, with highly-educated 
employees as well as opportunities to participate in research co-operation and 
utilise the information produced and disseminated by universities. A higher 
education institution, or a cluster formed around it, is thus capable of creating 
new business in the region and attracting new companies to it.  
In Finland, there such effects have been strived at by an extensive regional 
network of universities, polytechnics and research institutions, which has been 
supported by Regional Centre and Centre of Expertise Programmes in the 
implementation of regional innovation policies (Figure 6.4). At the same time, 
the extensive network of higher education institutions has served well to bring 
students to higher education institutions. The proportion of those starting 
university studies (at any university) is lowest in counties without university 
places (Figure 6.5). The extensive network of higher education institutions has 
thus succeeded in supporting the extensive utilisation of talent reserves, in 
addition to promoting social mobility and equality. 
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Figure 6.4  The network of universities, polytechnics, public research 
institutions and technology centres in Finland. 
Source: Tekes.
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Figure 6.5 University admissions and available university places per region.     
Source: Ministry of Education. 
6.3.2 Regional disparities exist in productivity as well 
From the viewpoint of production growth and concentration, it seems plausible 
to draw the conclusion that while a few big, diverse centres and some of the 
most vital university regions have managed to benefit from the opportunities 
brought about by globalisation and the related technological development and 
reduced communication costs, these have not affected more remote regions. 
Production in such regions has not changed remarkably when compared to 
average ones. 
Indeed, production in Finland is clustering in areas with higher productivity than 
average. Higher productivity in big cities may result from urbanisation 
economies, i.e. the fact that companies are able to utilise a wide service 
selection and diverse markets (external economies), as well as from localisation 
economies, i.e. the concentration of production within a single sector in a given 
location. In accordance with most international studies, the study by Huovari, 
Kiander and Volk (2006) suggests that in Finland also, big regions and units are 
more productive than small ones. In Finland, doubling the area means a 4 per 
cent increase in productivity, whereas doubling the average size of regional 
plants increases productivity by 3 per cent. The trend is clear, but size is still not 
very significant, as the annual increase in overall productivity is of a similar 
magnitude.
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In Finland, regional disparities in productivity are significant, and they are larger 
in manufacturing than in the service sector (Huovari ym. 2006). Regional 
disparities cannot be explained by different production structures, for most of 
the disparities stem from productivity differences within sectors. 
6.3.3 Does globalisation affect the labour market? 
In rapidly developing sectors, production focuses and also locations can change 
quickly and flexibly on a global basis. In developed countries, globalisation is 
associated with the reduction of the share of manufacturing employment, and it 
is possible that service production may be offshored at an increasing pace. 
Indeed, whole plants in Finland have been offshored to lower-cost countries in 
the 2000s. There is no extensive information available on the regional 
distribution of the offshored jobs within the country. Manufacturing plants are 
often located outside big cities. This raises the question of whether globalisation 
is contributing to the loss of jobs and increased unemployment in peripheral 
areas and manufacturing-based regions, due to the fact that new knowledge-
intensive jobs are located in centres. In the 1990s, when the ICT sector was 
expanding and the economy was recovering from the recession, a high degree 
of industrialisation correlated strongly with increased employment. Due to the 
development of information technology and the liberalisation of markets, jobs in 
sectors such as finance and telecommunications were vanishing everywhere 
outside big cities in the 1990s (Huovari & Volk 2004). 
In the early 2000s, this correlation turned, and the growth of employment in 
manufacturing-based towns has been slower than average. However, this 
correlation is not too strong, and due to the slow process of data compilation, 
the observation period is only four years. On the other hand, it seems that there 
is no correlation at all between changes in the unemployment rate and the 
share of manufacturing jobs. This may be explained by the fact that the size of 
the labour force has decreased in several regions, due to migration and the 
ageing of the population.
The development of some individual towns is insufficient to prove that there is a 
clear correlation between offshored jobs and regional unemployment. It seems 
that during the economic boom, some of the jobs lost have been replaceable by 
other sector jobs, especially in towns located close to a larger labour market 
area. 
Working areas have expanded, and commuting to another area has increased 
markedly, especially around big city areas (Nivalainen 2006, Myrskylä 2006). 
While the share of workers commuting to another municipality was 25 per cent 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, this figure rose to 33 per cent in 2004. There 
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are a total of 750,000 workers commuting to another municipality and 140,000 
to another county (NUTS3), which is a relatively large number compared to the 
annual number of those migrating to another municipality (290,000) and to 
another county (120,000). Of the latter, around 50 per cent are employed and 
unemployed.
In the more remote regions, jobs have been disappearing in such sectors as 
agriculture, telecommunications and financing, due to the constant rise in 
productivity. This stems from general technological development and it has 
affected almost all regions. Furthermore, certain towns have been subject to the 
offshoring of production. In remote regions, the unemployment rate has been 
counterbalanced by migration out of the region and partly also by the decrease 
in the size of the labour force resulting from the ageing of the population. For 
example, in 2004 alone, Kemijärvi, which is located in northern Finland, lost as 
many as 260 jobs, mostly in industrial subcontracting, which amounts to 8.5 per 
cent of the total number of local jobs. However, the unemployment rate in 
Kemijärvi remained unchanged, staying at its usual high level, even though the 
total number of jobs decreased by almost 200. This accords with the results 
obtained by Pekkala and Kangasharju (2002), who suggest that region-specific 
shocks have only short-term effects on unemployment and participation rates, 
while its effects on employment are permanent. Such peripheral regions located 
far from the biggest centres are vulnerable to occasional changes. The example 
of Kemijärvi highlights the fact that during a certain phase of globalisation, a 
host of new jobs may emerge in some areas, but they may also be offshored 
quickly. The mobility of jobs may be a problem, especially for regions with a 
heavy specialisation in a single sector. 
In the 2000s, the loss of manufacturing jobs is hitting several middle-sized 
regions that can be classified as industrially strong. Such regions include 
Varkaus, Äänekoski, Heinola, Kotka-Hamina, Kemi-Tornio, Imatra, Pori and 
Rauma. Some of these are dominated by the forest industry, while some others, 
located by the sea, are characterised by e.g. port operations. This development 
may reflect the regions’ insufficient ability for renewal at least in the short run, 
in the face of sudden and dramatic changes in the main sectors. 
The basic picture of successful regions in the 2000s is similar to that in the 
1990s, i.e. it is still the case that regions in a cycle of positive development keep 
succeeding. The total picture of the evolution of employment in the 2000s, 
however, is different from that of the 1990s. Regions with the greatest increase 
in the number of jobs in the 1990s have not managed to maintain their good 
performance in employment growth. Instead, regions with poor employment 
growth in the 1990s have managed to create new jobs during this decade, due 
to the growth in domestic demand. In the 1990s, certain regions managed to 
benefit from the global market created by the technological revolution, whereas 
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the economic growth of the 2000s has been based on domestic demand, which 
has increased jobs in such sectors as wholesale and retail trade, construction 
and transportation. Regional disparities in the growth of jobs have narrowed due 
to the considerably more even distribution of such jobs throughout the country, 
compared to manufacturing and especially high-technology jobs. 
To a certain extent, developments in the 2000s can also be indirectly associated 
with the progress of globalisation. This is because global competition has 
remarkably reduced the prices of high-technology products and certain services, 
which has made increased consumption possible. This, in turn, has benefited all 
regions. Indeed, regional disparities in employment and unemployment rates 
have remained stable since the first years of the decade (Figure 6.6).  
Figure 6.6 Development of regional (NUTS4) disparities in unemployment 
and employment in 1995–2005.  
Sources: Statistics Finland, Ministry of Labour. 
6.4 Migration affects the formation of human capital 
The existence of first-mover advantages is typical of the new economy. 
Innovative and dynamic companies may identify opportunities for success earlier 
than others. In such cases, an adequate supply of skilled labour is required for 
the formation of successful regional clusters. In particular, the location of 
research-intensive services and manufacturing is determined by the supply of 
skilled personnel and the related location of universities. Correspondingly, as 
Midelfahrt-Knarvik et al. (2000) suggest, the location of non-manual, labour 
force intensive sectors is affected by the proportion of those with intermediate 
or higher education among the total labour force. 
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Migration, which has been going on in Finland for decades, has brought young 
people to university cities to obtain a higher education and has thus increased 
the growth potential of those regions. The post-recession economic boom 
increased migration to record levels, although this was partly explained by a 
change in the legislation on the place of residence, i.e. by a statistical change3.
At the same time, the population was intensively clustered in the biggest cities 
with new jobs in high technology sectors. A young, migrating labour force was a 
precondition for the emergence of the positive employment development within 
the new economy. This, however, was not itself the cause of migration, since 
the main reason for migration from rural areas to cities is still the increased 
productivity in primary production and industry, due to which fewer workers are 
needed. However, the number of new jobs in rural areas is not enough to cover 
the loss of jobs caused by increased productivity. In fact, migration has been 
ongoing since the 1950s, but in the 1980s there were many more regions with 
positive net migration compared to the 1990s or 2000s. Thus, for decades, 
migration has played a role in technological change as well as in the resulting 
change in Finland’s economic structure. 
In 2001, migration began to decrease and, in particular, the corresponding 
agglomerating effect on the population structure diminished. The total negative 
net migration of regions losing population due to migration decreased by almost 
half in two years (Figure 6.7). The number of such regions fell, and negative net 
migration decreased in other regions as well. While in the late 1990s around 10 
regions had a positive net migration, the number of such regions in the 2000s 
exceeded 20. 
Regions with negative or positive net migration in the 2000s are chiefly the 
same as in the 1990s. The amount of lost population depends on economic 
development. Every now and then, a small group of regions loses or gains 
population, and by Finnish standards, many of these can be regarded as middle-
sized urban regions. The number of migrations has again increased to the peak 
level of the 2000s, but the effect on regional populations has remained almost 
unchanged. Thus, an increasing part of migration is of two-way nature ie. cross-
hauling people between regions. For example, the total positive net migration of 
NUTS 4 regions with positive net migration amounts to only 10 per cent of the 
total migration between the same regions. This suggests that migration is 
increasingly about the reconciliation of individual location preferences with 
employers’ wishes relating to the structure of the labour force.  
                                               
3  Before 1994, students were not able to register as a resident in their student city. The change in 
the law on the place of residence increased migration, since students are more prone than most 
to move around. 
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Figure 6.7  The mobilising effect of migration on the population, migration 
departures in regions (NUTS4) and total net migration.  
Source: Statistics Finland. 
In spite of occasional swings in migration, regional disparities in population 
growth are very stable in Finland, due to remarkable regional disparities in age 
structure. Disparities in birth and death rates explain the disparities in the broad 
trends of population growth. Swings in migration thus either increase or 
decrease regional disparities in population growth. This means that current 
trends in population development will continue over the next few decades. 
More than globalisation, the direction of migration in the next few years will be 
affected by internal developments in Finland, especially by the fact that the 
large post-war age groups will reach the age of retirement. The number of 
vacancies will increase everywhere, and the direction of migration may become 
increasingly dependent on individual preferences relating to one’s living 
environment and housing quality. According to a questionnaire study, there are 
more people who would like to live outside big cities than there are people living 
in such areas at the moment. On the other hand, in addition to migration based 
on environmental preferences, there is another migration type, migration based 
on employment, which is subject to changes in the labour market. However, the 
number of regions with positive net migration is unlikely to change drastically in 
the future, for as many as over 70 per cent of jobs are located in the 20 major 
regions. Therefore, also most vacancies will be located in these regions. 
150 
6.5 Conclusions and future prospects  
Regional development in Finland has been characterised by the clustering of 
population and production for a long time, in spite of occasional changes in the 
speed, or even in the direction of the process. Post-recession regional 
development is closely connected to the technological development of the 
economy and partly also to structural change brought about by globalisation. 
Between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s, the growth of production and 
employment was to a great extent concentrating to a few big centres and some 
smaller ones outside them. At the same time, migration to these centres 
increased remarkably. These growth centres are home to the biggest 
universities and other higher education institutions as well as a number of 
research units. The growth of these centres was particularly supported by the 
boost in ICT production and the general growth of production, research and 
development based on high-level knowledge. The growth of these centres, 
which can be considered major by Finnish standards, can be interpreted as a 
sign of the utilisation of agglomeration economies, since production grew fastest 
in sectors affected most by such economies. 
At the beginning of the current decade, regional disparities in the growth of 
employment and, especially, productivity have narrowed, even to the extent that 
the gap between low-income and higher-income regions has narrowed. 
Simultaneously, internal migration has become more balanced in the sense that 
the number of regions with positive net migration has increased significantly, 
and total positive net migration has decreased remarkably, compared to the late 
1990s. Furthermore, the growth of regional disparities in unemployment has 
ceased, at least at county level. 
Does this mean that agglomeration economies are disappearing? According to 
the new economic geography theories this is possible when technological 
development has decreased the transportation costs of products, services and 
information to a sufficiently low level. This is too bold a conclusion. A more 
plausible interpretation is that balanced growth is primarily caused by balanced 
demand with a view to regional production structures. Growth based on 
domestic demand and partly on traditional export production has increased 
production more extensively than growth based on ICT production in the late 
1990s. Furthermore, the overheated housing market in the Helsinki Metropolitan 
Area has increased the attractiveness of more remote areas and other centres 
as a place of residence. 
As regards the future, it is obvious that the prevalent trend in the post-war 
development of regional structure will continue. The population will grow, 
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especially in the biggest cities and their neighbouring areas, while it will tend to 
decrease in rural areas, particularly in eastern and northern Finland. This 
prevalent trend is evident for demographic reasons alone: the population in rural 
regions and especially in eastern and northern Finland tends to be more aged 
than elsewhere, resulting in negative natural population growth. 
But economic factors also support this agglomeration trend, up to a certain 
point. The best growth prospects in employment are in service sectors that 
typically operate in big centres. In particular, the growth of knowledge-intensive 
services, including research and development activities, could be strong. The 
degree of regional clustering in this sector is very high, and big centres can best 
supply the needed labour. Furthermore, the more diverse labour markets of the 
big centres are less prone to suffer from changes in the demand structure. 
Similarly, increasing migration from outside the country is more beneficial for big 
centres, in which immigrants tend to settle. The decrease of jobs in agriculture 
will also continue, decreasing employment in rural areas. Indeed, the moderate 
agglomeration tendency typical of the last few years will continue over the next 
few, provided no unexpected changes occur in the demand structure. 
If it continues, this kind of development will enable southern and south-west 
Finland to become a diversely developing area with a high-quality infrastructure 
and ever-improving connections. Regarding other parts of the country, it is likely 
that a few regional clusters with a relatively diverse production structure will 
form around university cities. Furthermore, it can be assumed that various 
clusters specialising in one or a few strong sectors will form in different parts of 
Finland, in particular into the county centres. The success of these clusters will 
be partly based on local competitive factors that are either created or natural 
resource-based. Tourist attractions in northern Finland serve as a good example. 
But there can be room for even more unlikely success stories, similar to that of  
the village of Tuuri in the municipality of Töysä.3 Some successful regions may 
thus be very small, needing just a few successful companies. It is, however, 
most difficult to predict the number of successful regional clusters and their 
locations. 
Between the growing regions there will remain some geographically extensive 
regions with a decreasing, aged population and potentially weakening levels of 
know-how. On the basis of demography, it can be assumed that this will take 
place in eastern and northern Finland in particular. However, it should be noted 
                                               
3  A village called Tuuri (500 inhabitants) belonging to the municipality of Töysä (3,200 
inhabitants) and located over 300 kilometres north of Helsinki is hosting the second biggest 
department store in Finland with some 6 million visitors a year and an annual turnover of over € 
150 million. Thanks to the retail trade cluster, the employment self-sufficiency rate (the ratio of 
the number of jobs in the area to the number of employed people resident in the area) is over 
120 per cent. 
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that this change will not mean that rural regions will be emptied of their 
populations. This will not happen for a long time, even in regions with the worst 
population dependency ratios (Nivalainen and Volk 2004).  
Nevertheless, it is difficult to predict what will happen in a few decades. In many 
cases, even demographic developments have often turned out to be surprising. 
The fact that service sectors will be increasingly subject to international 
competition, as discussed in previous chapters, may also change regional 
development prospects in unexpected ways. For example, the exposure of 
services to competition mainly affects jobs located in major centres. Changes 
related to this kind of location competition may also be most rapid.4
The regional distribution of new vacancies due to ageing will become more even 
compared to the past few years. It is difficult to evaluate the effects of this, 
which are also complicated by the continuous development of communications 
technology as well as increasing prosperity. Since the 2010s will bring more 
employment opportunities and possibilities to work remotely, at least part-time 
due to improved communications, families will have more freedom to choose 
their place of residence according to their own preferences. On the other hand, 
it can be assumed that increased prosperity will increase the importance of 
personal preferences in the selection of one’s place of residence. It is difficult to 
predict human preferences in advance, though. 
With respect to policy, the trends mentioned above will bring two major 
challenges. First, it will be necessary to address the traditional question of the 
best way to reconcile the efficient utilisation of the resources of the economy as 
a whole with balanced regional development within the country. Although all 
realistic scenarios point to the population of Finland becoming increasingly 
agglomerated, the countryside will remain populated to a significant degree. 
This means that economic and industrial policies cannot exclusively be 
harnessed in order to improve the development of the regions with the best 
growth prospects. Since labour force can never be fully mobile, such a goal 
would result in the under-utilisation of resources in certain parts of the country. 
On the other hand, the regions with a diverse selection of jobs and a relatively 
large population have the best prospects of succeeding in global location 
competition and the growth of production. The balance between the 
improvement of the prospects of these regions and support for the growth 
prospects of the smaller, more specialised regions will remain a key issue in 
innovation, industrial and regional policies in the future. It is probable that 
                                               
4  A recent example of this kind of structural change is the announcement by UPM Kymmene that 
the group’s financial administration will be centralised in Tampere and Changshu in China 
(Helsingin Sanomat, 13 October 2006). Jobs in other parts of Europe and Northern America will 
be transferred to Tampere. The change will result in the reduction of about 100 jobs in the other 
units in Finland, while a cluster of 180 jobs will form in Tampere. 
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active networking between knowledge clusters, regardless of their location or 
size, is required to find an effective solution. 
Another major challenge concerns how to secure various welfare services in 
sparsely populated regions with a clearly worse population dependency ratio 
than average. A decreasing population base and long distances make the 
problem more difficult. It is evident that new ways of organising services as well 
as fundamental organisational reforms are required to keep unit costs 
reasonable and make services accessible to everyone in need. It also seems that 
in order to create new cost-effective methods, we need to utilise the 
opportunities provided by improving information technology widely and 
creatively.
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7 FINNISH ECONOMIC STRATEGY AND THE 
CHALLENGES OF GLOBALISATION 
7.1 Economic growth as long-term policy  
Enhancing preconditions for economic growth has for long been a defining 
feature of economic policy in Finland, with much less attention being paid to 
counter-cyclical policy. However, the content and focus of growth policies have 
varied over time. 
During the post-war decades up to the 1980s, increasing the capital stock 
constituted the primary method of promoting economic growth, with the 
particular aim of raising manufacturing capacity in such a way that industry 
could employ labour released from agriculture and forestry for higher-
productivity jobs. 
In the first place, financial market regulation and a certain type of forced saving 
were among the tools aimed at a high investment rate. The public sector mainly 
displayed a financial surplus and the resulting resources were allocated, for 
example, to industrial investment via state-owned companies. Interest-rate 
controls kept interest rates at artificially low levels and guidelines issued by 
authorities (mainly the central bank) directed credit allocation in the context of 
excess demand, typically stressing the priority of “productive investments” over 
consumer, public and housing spending. Capital movements were strictly 
regulated and capital import licences were primarily granted to industrial 
investment projects. Finnish non-financial sectors were also subject to regulation 
and restrictive trade practices on an extensive basis. 
Exchange-rate policy played a vital role in the Finnish competitiveness policy. 
Currency devaluation helped Finland restore its price competitiveness at a time 
when rapid inflation had eroded it and the current account had drifted into an 
unsustainable deficit. The devaluation policy particularly supported export-
industry investments, safeguarding their profitability. Income policy was aimed 
at maintaining price competitiveness created by currency devaluations. 
The Finnish trade policy aimed at consistently facilitating its industry’s access to 
western markets (in addition to political aims), EFTA membership in 1961 and 
the Free Trade Agreement with the EEC in 1973 representing major milestones. 
However, trade with the Soviet Union, based on bilateral trade agreements, 
played a significant role in exports and imports until the late 1980s. 
From the 1960s, Finland revised its education, science and technology policies 
with a view to enhancing the potential for economic growth in particular (Lemola 
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2001). The mid-60s saw the fundamental extension of the higher education 
system, which also involved a major extension in its geographical scope. Later in 
the same decade, the current Academy of Finland was created for research 
planning and financing, the Finnish National Fund for Research and 
Development (Sitra) was established and the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
began to channel funding for corporate product development. The early 1970s 
witnessed the establishment of the comprehensive school system and the 
extension of the general upper secondary education and vocational education 
and training systems. The Technical Research Centre of Finland (VTT) was 
reorganised and enjoyed a substantial increase in its resources in the 1970s. 
In the 1980s, technology policy strengthened its position. The year 1983 saw 
the establishment of the National Technology Agency Tekes1, which assumed a 
major role in technology-policy planning and implementation. Funding provided 
by Tekes emphasized research related to information technology. The 1980s 
marked a period of founding technology parks and technology-transfer 
companies with a view to promoting technology transfer and commercialisation. 
Public funding for research and development increased substantially in the 
1980s: its share of GDP grew from 1.2 per cent in 1981 to 1.8 per cent in 1989. 
From the 1960s, Finland also aimed to promote economic growth through its 
social and public policy measures more broadly. Social policy measures led to 
the creation of systems aimed at improving people’s ability and incentives to 
participate in the labour market. The establishment of the occupational pension 
system created extensive earnings-related pension cover for wage earners while 
that of the day-care system helped support females’ labour-market participation 
in particular. On the whole, the creation of the so-called welfare state aimed at 
narrowing income inequalities, evening out risks and increasing social cohesion. 
A special feature characterising the Finnish economic policy lay in its aim for a 
consensus throughout the society, income policy typifying one of the areas in 
which a consensus policy was conducted. By and large, the overall aim was to 
make various social strata align with the shared view on the national economic 
policy. The Economic Council of Finland sought a shared view on major 
economic policy issues among major economic policy-makers. An extensive 
range of politicians and representatives of interest groups and the media 
received training in economic policy management courses organised by Sitra. 
This strategy proved successful in many respects, resulting in a very high 
investment rate, and a rapid annual economic growth rate of around 5 per cent 
on average between 1950 and 1975. Finland made marked progress in catching 
up with the rest of Europe’s GDP per capita and clearly narrowed its income 
                                               
1  Currently the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation. 
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inequalities. Due particularly to its extensive education system, Finland 
succeeded in increasing social mobility, which is currently high by international 
standards.2
Nevertheless, the strategy was unsuccessful in creating jobs to the extent 
required to meet the baby-boomers’ employment needs in the late 1960s and 
the early 1970s. This resulted in a major emigration from rural areas to Sweden. 
Neither did the policy protect Finland against the mid-1970s recession caused by 
the oil crisis, raising unemployment to an exceptionally high level. 
Over the years, the strategy began to show other shortcomings. The growth 
rate varied substantially because regular currency devaluations triggered an 
export-led recovery, which in turn ended in competitiveness and current-account 
problems caused by accelerating inflation. Then again, the use of capital 
became inefficient as a result of an artificially high investment rate and various 
regulatory mechanisms allocating investments on the basis of criteria other than 
efficiency. As a result, high saving and investment rates did not add to 
consumption opportunities as hoped for. 
In the 1980s, Finland came to realise and acknowledge the problems caused by 
market regulations. While the increasing international exchange of goods and 
services and the advent of financial innovations weakened the possibilities of 
regulating financial markets in particular, Finland began to deregulate not only 
its financial markets but also other sectors of the economy. 
This financial market liberalisation resulted in a change in monetary policy 
orientation. In an effort to abandon continual currency devaluations, Finland 
adopted the so-called stable markka doctrine. Accordingly, it became more 
determined to fight for the external value of the Finnish markka (within a small 
range of fluctuation). In the context of free capital movements, this implied that 
Finland could not conduct monetary policy as a counter-cyclical tool to the 
previous extent. In the meantime, Finnish fiscal policy continued to focus on 
long-term structural goals (e.g. the tax structure), with no special attention 
being paid to counter-cyclical measures. 
                                               
2  High social mobility is manifested, for example, in parents’ income levels having no statistical 
effect on their children’s income or education level, especially at income levels lower than 
median income. Social mobility in Finland, as in the other Nordic countries, is higher than e.g. in 
the USA, see Bratsberg et al. (2006). 
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7.2 Post-crisis economic policy 
Finland was compelled to re-assess the basics of its economic policy lines in the 
early 1990s when its economy plunged into a deep economic crisis, see the 
special focus below. Explosive growth in unemployment naturally provoked a 
debate over the need for expansionary macroeconomic policies. 
Special focus  The economic crisis of the early 1990s 
The liberalisation of financial markets in the mid-1980s unleashed a credit boom 
supported by strong capital inflows in 1987-1989. At its peak, in 1988, bank credit grew 
by almost 30 per cent. A substantial part of borrowing by the private sector was in 
foreign currency. Monetary policy geared towards maintaining a fixed exchange rate with 
respect to a currency basket could not reign in monetary expansion, while fiscal policy 
did not restrain domestic demand markedly, either. The result was an overheating of the 
economy with booming asset prices, record high investment ratios, the unemployment 
rate coming down to just over 3 per cent and weakening cost competitiveness. 
In 1989, the first strains in the economy emerged, and asset prices started to decline. 
The already weakening economy was then hit by a series of shocks: rising European 
interest rates due to German unification in 1989, weaker economic growth in western 
export markets in general following the Gulf crisis and, finally, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, which resulted in the sudden disappearance of a major export market in 1991. 
The current account deficit increased to almost 6 per cent of GDP. Devaluation 
speculation increased domestic rates further, and in November 1991 the currency was 
devalued.
GDP started to decline as early as 1990 and a vicious spiral developed with weaker 
incomes and higher interest rates reducing domestic demand, causing unemployment, 
debt service problems for highly leveraged firms and households, bankruptcies, declines 
of asset prices, further declines in domestic demand etc. The devaluation of 1991 did not 
remove devaluation expectations and interest rates remained high, finally forcing the 
flotation of the currency in September 1992. Further depreciation took place, burdening 
companies that had borrowed in foreign currency. Bank loans turned increasingly non-
performing and had to be written off, resulting in losses that wiped out the capital of 
many banks. A significant part of the banking system was taken over by the government 
and the rest was very much dependent on various types of bank support to remain 
operative.
About 450,000 jobs or 18 per cent of all jobs disappeared, and the unemployment rate 
increased to almost 17 per cent, even if many people withdrew from the labour market. 
Public finances fell deeply into the red, with the general government deficit exceeding 10 
per cent of GDP. Central government debt increased from almost zero to over 70 per 
cent of GDP. Automatic stabilisers were clearly working but discretionary fiscal expansion 
was ruled out by increasing risk premia and problems of credit availability. Instead, 
measures were taken to consolidate public finances through expenditure cuts and some 
tax increases. From early 1993, interest rates began to come down gradually. 
Exports started to grow in 1991, but only upon the stabilisation of domestic demand did 
GDP resume growth, towards the end of 1993. Unemployment peaked in 1994. 
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The crisis resulted in a major structural change in the Finnish economy. Many low 
productivity firms which had exported to the Soviet Union and served the domestic 
market disappeared. The banking sector shed half of its labour force in the process of 
restructuring. Although all kinds of jobs were affected, in proportional terms non-skilled 
jobs suffered most. The substantial loss of corporate net worth during the crisis 
restrained fixed investment for years to come, as the firms struggled to strengthen their 
balance sheets. 
In the realm of monetary policy, the fixed exchange rate policy, which resulted 
in very high interest rates that deepened the economic slump, tipped over into 
devaluation due to market pressures in 1991, before ending in the floatation of 
the Finnish markka in 1992. Following this, interest rates began to edge down, 
contributing to the economic recovery. In the sense of automatic stalilisation, 
fiscal policy turned highly expansionary during the slump years when a fall in tax 
revenues, an increase in income transfers of various kind and financing for 
bailing out banks as required by the banking crisis led to widening public deficits 
never experienced before. 
In addition, many quarters were pushing for discretionary fiscal expansion. 
However, it soon became apparent that there was scant opportunity for such a 
policy alternative, considering that no end to widening public deficits was on the 
horizon and financing these deficits had begun to become more difficult due to 
Finland’s downgraded credit rating.3
Consequently, enhancing economic growth in the medium and long term 
actually has remained the main economic policy goal during the slump years and 
beyond. Finland has sought to fine-tune its macroeconomic policy in support of 
this approach. Finnish monetary policy adopted inflation targeting in 1993 and 
allowed the Finnish markka to float until the markka joined the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1996. Finland’s return to the fixed 
exchange rate system was clinched by its joining the third stage of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 when national currencies were 
irrevocably fixed. 
A key, post-slump fiscal policy goal in Finland relates to efforts to reduce public 
indebtedness. This required several years of spending cuts at the outset 
followed by very moderate growth in public spending. Within the framework of 
                                               
3  Finnish economists are not unanimous on the virtue of discretionary fiscal policy during the 
crisis. For instance, Kiander (2001) maintains that refraining from spending cuts and tax hikes 
between 1992 and 1993 would have substantially alleviated unemployment. However, a more 
common view is that an expansionary policy in this respect was not really an option, due to the 
lack of confidence in the financial market and the uncertainty about economic growth potential. 
Neither did a marked fall in long-term interest rates, followed by government decisions on 
public-expenditure retrenchment, advocate the effectiveness of measures to widen public 
deficits. 
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this goal, Finland has reduced labour taxes since the mid-1990s, with a view to 
supporting employment. 
The challenge posed by the population’s ageing has become an increasingly 
important economic policy consideration since the late 1990s, reflected chiefly in 
Finland’s efforts to strengthen the sustainability of its public finances. The 
abovementioned programme aimed at reducing public debt serves this purpose. 
For the same reason, Finland has started to pay increasing attention to 
improving the productivity and efficiency of public services. 
In an effort to strengthen the sustainability of public finances and increase the 
supply of labour, early 2005 saw the entry into force of a relatively extensive 
earnings-related pension reform aimed at postponing the average retirement 
age by 2–3 years. Simultaneously, increasing attention has been paid to 
improving the working capacity and capabilities of older employees. 
Finnish income policy has continued to aim at maintaining price competitiveness, 
or even improving it. Agreeing on modest pay increases was not difficult in 
circumstances of high unemployment caused by the slump. Afterwards, wage 
development has, despite improved employment, remained consistent with 
Finland’s relatively good cost competitiveness, thanks at least partially to income 
policy agreements: Reasonable growth in disposable income has been ensured 
by combining tax reductions with moderate pay increases. 
Within industrial policy, the economic slump led Finland to emphasise the basics 
of its already-adopted policy orientation. Nokia Corporation’s introduction of 
innovative, new-technology products onto the market and thereby embarking on 
the construction of a completely new base for Finnish export industry further 
confirmed the idea that an effective innovation system formed the key to higher 
productivity and competitiveness. 
This approach was reflected, for instance, in the National Industrial Strategy for 
Finland drawn up in 1993, stressing the importance of reinforcing preconditions 
for long-term economic growth and rejecting the idea of temporary support or 
more protection against competition for companies in financial straits due to the 
economic slump. Technology and education, for their part, were expressly 
identified as the key factors in long-term growth. 
The 1990s saw a new feature in the implementation of economic policy in a 
broad sense, i.e. EU membership in 1995 led certain policy sectors to fall under 
the realm of EU-level decisions, in part or in full. Accordingly, decisions on 
customs policy, competition policy, monetary policy and, to a large extent, 
agricultural policy are taken at EU level. This has understandably limited the 
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scope of national policies. However, the majority of policy decisions important to 
the promotion of economic growth are still made nationally. 
7.3 Innovation policy at the economic strategy’s core  
The 1990s marked a decade of introducing a new basic approach in the Finnish 
economic policy: innovation policy became the crux of the strategy. Raising 
national R&D spending systematically became one of the key policy goals. 
Finland showed strong commitment to the set goals, as evidenced by decisions 
made during the slump to increase public R&D expenditure in particular, despite 
the floundering economy. However, the latter half of the 1990s recorded the 
most significant growth in this expenditure. 
Combined with the high level of R&D spending in the private sector (mainly the 
ICT sector), Finnish R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP, at 3.5 per cent, 
puts the country among the world’s top performers. While fixed investment has 
steadied at a level markedly lower than before, increasing knowledge capital has 
come to play a much more significant role vis-à-vis physical capital. In 
comparison with other developed countries, Finland has switched from an 
economy based on fixed investment to one based on R&D investment (Figure 
7.1).
Figure 7.1 Fixed investment and R&D expenditure, % of GDP.  
Source: OECD.
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In addition to increasing R&D spending, changes in science and technology 
policy and, more broadly, the logic and practices of industrial policy, have 
proven essential. As early as the 1980s, technology policy had risen alongside 
science policy, paving the way for adopting the promotion of co-operation 
between private and public research and networking as a key policy goal. 
Programme-based activities also intensified markedly during the same decade. 
Experiences gained from innovation activities over the years suggested that 
innovation processes were extremely interactive in nature rather than 
proceeding in a linear fashion. This insight resulted in the adoption of a new, 
systemic approach in the 1990s. Dialogue between various actors came to play 
a pronounced role and policy measures were aimed at mending shortcomings in 
co-operation. Promoting networking between large and small companies 
became a major part of R&D project funding provided by Tekes. Finland can be 
regarded as one of the pioneers of this kind of development. The Science and 
Technology Policy Council played an important role in this re-orientation of 
innovation policy. 
Alongside the creation of knowledge and competence, Finland also began to pay 
increasing attention to the diffusion and utilisation of knowledge on an extensive 
basis. Accordingly, the major organisations implementing this policy, Tekes and 
the Academy of Finland, set out to intensify co-operation (e.g. joint 
programmes), later joined by Sitra and Finnvera, as well as the network of 
regional Employment and Economic Development Centres established in 1997 as 
part of measures to reorganise the Finnish regional administration. Innovation 
policy strengthened its role in regional policy (e.g. regional innovation systems 
and the Centres of Expertise Programme) and employment policy (e.g. 
Workplace Development Programmes). In the late 1990s, the Science and 
Technology Policy Council sought to foster co-operation between various 
administrative sectors by launching inter-sector cluster programmes. 
After the mid-1990s and spurred, for example, by Finland’s EU membership, the 
concept of internationalisation became a key science and technology policy 
theme. Finland has been determined in its efforts to intensify Finnish research 
units’ and companies’ networking activities abroad. 
As late as the early 1990s, Finland was characterised by a highly embryonic 
venture capital market. Sitra and, later on, Tekes played a significant role in the 
development of equity investment in Finland. Retail equity investors entered the 
market chiefly after the mid-1990s, during which equity investments 
experienced rapid growth not only in the ICT sector but also the biotechnology 
business. Finland, in a similar way to other countries, faced the ‘technology 
bubble’, whose bursting resulted in a stock market contraction. Since the mid-
2000s, the equity market has rebounded markedly. 
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With the advent of innovation policy, the commercial and other use of research 
results, the creation of new innovative growth companies and entrepreneurship 
have more visibly become targets for policy measures. Entrepreneurship has 
been enthroned as one of the Government’s policy inter-sectoral (horizontal) 
programmes. Furthermore, the ‘third mission’ of universities highlights their 
responsibility for passing on the fruits of public research to be used by business 
and society, as evidenced by several new financing and service programmes 
being designed for innovative start-ups. 
The idea that knowledge and modern technology play a major role as sources of 
economic growth and prosperity has also been reflected in efforts to analyse 
various policy options explicitly from the perspective of the information society. 
With a view to promoting this approach, a special inter-sectoral information 
society programme has been in place during the current term of government. 
Future challenges faced by society and public finances have increasingly 
emerged as topics in the innovation policy debate, innovation being gradually 
perceived as a key solution to these major challenges too. For instance, applying 
the latest technologies, developing and adopting new innovations and exploiting 
operating models developed by the corporate sector may prove helpful in 
significantly alleviating pressures caused by the population’s ageing on rising 
healthcare costs and the shortage of labour. 
7.4  The project “Finland in the Global Economy” and the 
implementation of its recommendations 
The slump was followed in 1994–2000 by a phase of very rapid economic 
growth and positive employment performance. During these years, GDP grew at 
an average pace of nearly five per cent and employment increased by over 
300,000 jobs. This growth was based first and foremost on the explosive 
increase of production in the ICT cluster. Finland was able to make efficient use 
of the sector’s global market growth. 
In the beginning of the current decade, the ICT sector’s growth started to 
slacken as the technology boom drew to a close. A simultaneous consequence 
of increased global competition saw Finnish companies’ production growth 
mainly occurring outside Finland and, in some cases, production carried out in 
Finland being offshored to lower cost countries located in Asia and eastern and 
central Europe. Moreover, since the level of fixed investments remained low and 
the value of foreign direct investments in Finland was systematically smaller 
than the value of Finnish investments abroad, globalisation began to be 
considered as more of a threat. 
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This perceived threat served as the background for the project, “Finland in the 
Global Economy,” instituted by the Prime Minister in 2004. The project included 
six background reports, dialogues between industrial organisations on 
strengthening industries’ competitiveness, several seminars and a final report 
published on 9 November 20044.
The final report estimated that, predominantly, globalisation has been a positive 
phenomenon for Finland and presents more opportunities for increasing 
prosperity than threats. In parallel, the report stated that globalisation also 
constitutes a significant challenge and, in responding to it, Finland has both 
weaknesses and strengths in comparison to other European countries. 
The identified Finnish weaknesses were a small population (limited market 
potential and opportunities for big investments in risky branches of industry) 
and a remote location in relation to many important markets. Finland’s 
specialisation in industries with tough global competition and in products with 
declining trends in comparative prices makes the country’s situation more 
challenging than for certain others. Among other weaknesses mentioned were 
the fact that unemployment concentrated heavily on the section of labour 
subject to increasing international competition, the country’s high level of 
taxation and its inability to attract foreign experts. 
As Finnish strengths, the report identified an effective innovation system based 
on the high level of basic education of younger citizens in particular and 
impressive R&D investments by international standards. The country’s safety 
and low levels of corruption, generally well-functioning society, equality and high 
level of public services were also seen as strengths. 
The project’s final report presented an extensive set of recommendations for 
actions in order to enhance Finnish competitiveness. Some of these over 
120 recommendations were very general in nature, whereas others were very 
detailed and concrete. In the recommendations, three aspects were 
emphasised: strengthening competences, a clearly more open economy and 
society in global terms, and the capability for renewal. These recommendations 
were largely a continuation to, and intensification of, the existing policy, even if 
some distinctively new outlines were presented. 
Regarding strengthening competences, the focus was set on amending the weak 
points in the education and innovation systems. This requires further increases 
in R&D investments and numerous measures taken throughout the education 
system. In order to realise the benefits of innovation, financing opportunities for 
                                               
4  “Finland’s competence, openness and renewability” Final report of the project, “Finland in the 
Global Economy”. Prime Minister’s Office Publication Series 26/2004. 
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start-ups and growth companies need to be improved. Particular sector-specific 
attention was paid to strengthening the service sector. 
In order for Finland to take better advantage of global product and input 
markets, the report suggested several recommendations for rendering Finland 
more attractive to foreign investors and experts. Similarly, several reforms 
promoting the transformation of Finland into an exporter of education and 
welfare services were recommended. Improving the transport and 
telecommunications infrastructure was also considered necessary. 
In relation to the economy’s capability for renewal, the report mentioned 
enhancing competitiveness in the product markets, increasing flexibility in the 
functioning of labour markets and improving the efficiency of public service 
provision as important factors. 
The implementation of the recommendations from the final report of the 
“Finland in the Global economy” project has been started on a large scale. Many 
of these recommendations have been included in the interim report of Finland’s 
National Reform Programme that forms part of the Lisbon Strategy (Ministry of 
Finance 2006). Important implemented recommendations include: 
”Expertise”
x Public R&D funding: Public funding of R&D was increased in 2005 
and 2006 by approximately five per cent. In the budget for 2007, 
expenses will grow by over five per cent, and the preliminary outlines 
for 2008–2011 in the spending limits decision 2006 imply increasing 
R&D expenses annually by approximately five per cent. This means that 
the increase will be significant but will not attain the recommended pace 
of seven per cent. Moreover, in the Finnish Government’s Strategy 
Document 2006, the target level for total R&D expenditure by the end 
of the decade was set at four per cent of GDP. However, this target is 
not feasible with the planned increase in public expenditure. If the 
Government’s official estimate of GDP is to be realised, the four per cent 
target could be attained in 2010 if the public R&D expenditures were 
annually increased by slightly over seven per cent. As regards 
recommendations on the allocation of R&D funding, some are about to 
be met and for some, new outlines are currently in the final phase of 
preparation. 
x Creation of Strategic Centres of Excellence in Science, 
Technology and Innovation: On 27 June 2006, the Science and 
Technology Policy Council of Finland adopted the report drawn up by its 
appointed steering group, concerning the development of centres of 
excellence and national infrastructures. The report proposes that 
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Strategic Centres of Excellence (SCoE) be established in Finland in fields 
crucial to the future of the Finnish business sector and society. The 
operations of the SCoEs are based on strong commitments from 
companies, universities, research institutes and funding organisations. 
The working group preparing the SCoEs has worked in close co-
operation with the National Committee for the Centres of Expertise 
programme appointed by the Ministry of the Interior and currently 
preparing the new Centres of Expertise programme period (2007–2013). 
The new operating model of the Centres of Expertise programme is 
based on regional clusters of expertise, each including two to five 
centres of expertise. On 21 August 2006, the Ministerial Working Group 
on Administration and Regional Development accepted the entry of 13 
programme candidates to the Centres of Expertise programme, 
according to their national significance and suitability to the programme.
x Attracting top researchers to Finland: The Academy of Finland and 
the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation (Tekes) 
have launched a new programme called the Finland Distinguished 
Professor Programme (FiDiPro) in order to recruit international 
professor-level top researchers, and Finnish researchers who have 
worked outside Finland for a protracted period, to Finland on a fixed 
term basis. The purpose of this funding programme is to strengthen 
scientific and technological expertise in Finland, to make the Finnish 
research system more international, to generate added value for the 
national innovation system and to support research specialisation in 
universities and research institutes. The first application period ended in 
January 2006. The Academy of Finland and Tekes have decided to fund 
a total of 24 research projects with EUR 17.5 million from the FiDiPro 
programme. This funding will enable the recruitment of 24 visiting top 
researchers to 12 Finnish universities or research institutes for a period 
of two to five years. The first of these top researchers will start work at 
the beginning of 2007.
x Innovation centre pilots and co-operation models: One 
innovation centre referred to in the recommendations, FinChi, started 
operating in Shanghai in May 2005. Based on an assignment from the 
Finnish National Fund for Research and Development (Sitra), a report on 
the tasks and operating model of an innovation centre in California was 
drawn up in the autumn of 2005. The report also compares the 
operations of innovation centres established by different countries and 
charts the inclination of other Nordic countries to co-operate with 
Finnish partners. In the summer of 2006, public actors (Tekes, the 
Technical Research Centre of Finland VTT and Finpro) settled into new, 
common facilities located in California. The new innovation centre 
FinNode will be opened in January 2007. The Ministry of Trade and 
Industry has, together with Sitra and Tekes, commissioned a preliminary 
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report from Finpro concerning a potential Finnish-Russian innovation 
centre to be located in Russia. 
”Opening”
x Mobility of foreign labour, improving flexibility of the work 
permit system, work-related immigration: Noteworthy factors 
facilitating work-related immigration include repealing the law 
concerning the transition time for new EU member countries 
(1 May 2006)5, centralising work permit related administration and 
reducing to four the number of employment offices handling work 
permit related matters. Improving the flexibility of the work permit 
system and clarifying the responsibilities of labour market organisations 
and employers was linked to the preparation of the Immigration Policy 
programme.
x Immigration Policy programme: On 19 October 2006, the 
Government adopted the Immigration Policy programme. The 
programme’s main emphasis is to promote work-related immigration. 
Other themes include developing the immigrant integration system, 
creating a guidance system for work-related immigrants and improving 
ethnic relations. The programme includes a total of 34 policy outlines 
x Tax relief system for foreign experts: Under the current legislation, 
the income of foreign experts meeting certain requirements is taxed 
using a flat tax rate of 35 per cent. This so-called key staff act will be 
applied to employment relationships beginning during 2007 at the 
latest. The Ministry of Finance is currently preparing an extension to the 
period during which this act will remain valid, to employment starting on 
31 December 2011 at the latest. 
x Facilitation of work permits for foreign students: This has been 
realised by changing the Aliens Act (34/2006) from 1 February 2006.
Currently, a foreigner with a temporary residence permit based on 
studies is granted a new temporary residence permit for six months for 
the purpose of job-seeking. A person who has completed a degree in 
Finland can now work in Finland based on an ordinary residence permit 
and no longer needs to apply for a worker’s residence permit.
x Facilitation of work permits for family members: Family members 
of managers and experts have mainly been exempted from the work 
permit obligation as of 1 May 2004. Exemption for other family 
                                               
5  After 1 May 2006, Finland did not extend the transition time applied to citizens from the new EU 
entrants under the scope of the Act on transition time. Upon the enlargement of the EU on 
1 May 2004, Finland implemented a transition time for the mobility of labour force from eight of 
the new member countries. The Act on transition time remained in force for a fixed duration of 
two years.  
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members entered into force on 1 July 2006, giving an unlimited right to 
work to everyone with a residence permit granted on the basis of family 
ties.
”Renewal”
x Development of Finland’s productivity programme into 
concrete, sector-specific objectives: The objective of the action 
plan for productivity, currently implemented within the Ministry of 
Finance, is the verifiable growth of productivity and the methodical use 
of productivity gains. Attempts to achieve this objective include 
functional and structural reforms in support and core services based on 
improving the utilisation of information and communications technology 
as well as private services in the provision of public services. This 
activity has been intensified by sector-specific productivity plans. 
x Launching a municipal and service structure project for 
improving municipal services: The Government submitted a Bill to 
Parliament on the reform of municipal and service structures and on 
amending the Act on Local Authority Boundaries on 29 September 2006. 
According to the Bill, service structures will be reinforced by aggregating 
services requiring a larger population base than an individual 
municipality, e.g. for basic healthcare. This will be achieved by 
increasing co-operation between local authorities and strengthening the 
operating preconditions in the Helsinki area and other urban areas 
subject to community structure level problems. Local authorities will 
draw up an implementation plan for municipal and service structure 
reform, including an account of the extent of the service network and a 
plan concerning the organisation of the key functions of the local 
authority. 
x Employment change security for facilitating the re-education 
and relocation of staff facing layoffs: An operational model 
called “change security” was agreed upon in the incomes policy 
agreement for 2005–2007. An Act, conforming to this agreement, on 
the operating model for finding employment and change security 
entered into force on 1 July 2005. 
x Reducing the taxation of work: Labour taxation has been reduced 
significantly during the current term of government, in the first instance 
by reducing income tax in all income brackets. The tax rate for a wage 
earner with an average income will be lowered by approximately 
two percentage points from 2003 to 2007. However, the highest 
marginal tax rate remains at over 50 per cent. The taxation of labour 
has also been eased by reducing employers’ social security contributions 
for low-wage elderly employees from the beginning of 2006.
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x Financing for companies in the start-up or growth stage: The 
reform of risk capital provision for nascent businesses has been 
launched. The State will finance a risk capital fund specialising in early 
or seed stage investments and established by Finnvera Oyj. The Seed 
Fund Vera Ltd. (Avera) began operating on 15 August 2005. The 
investment operations of Avera have been allocated approximately 
EUR 50 million from various sources. Finnvera has invested 
EUR 9 million in regional venture capital companies; the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry has invested EUR 1.5 million in seed stage projects; 
and the Finnish Industry Investment Ltd. has invested EUR 50 million in 
its seed programme. In addition to this, the mission of Sitra’s Pre Seed 
unit is to improve the investment readiness of early stage growth 
companies and organise initial investments. Investments in financing 
start-ups to a large extent correspond to both the objectives set in the 
“Finland in the Global Economy” project and the report, “Strategy for 
the Financing and Service System of Innovate Start-up Companies” 
(Paasivirta & Valtonen 2004), also published in 2004. By contrast, a 
similar development did not occur in the development of growth stage 
funding.
x Specification of overall industrial policy outlines: The Ministry of 
Trade and Industry has drawn up the Guidelines for Finnish industrial 
policy containing outlines for decision-making promoting business and 
the innovation environment. The premises of the report are based on 
making the markets more effective and emphasising a customer-
oriented approach to innovation policy. 
Many reforms are still in the preparation phase, such as the following: 
x Reform of sectoral research: On 20 January 2006, the Prime 
Minister’s Office appointed a working group on sectoral research to 
elaborate an overall plan regarding the State’s sectoral research and the 
allocation of its resources according to the changed needs of society. 
The working group will complete its report by 31 December 2006. 
x Increasing the autonomy of universities: The economic powers of 
universities are being developed through legislation, on the basis of the 
work conducted by a rapporteur ad int. The Ministry of Education will 
prepare an amendment to the Universities Act during the course of the 
current term of government. A key issue is achieving a higher adoption 
and exploitation rate of off-budget entities. On 2 November 2006, a 
proposal was presented according to which all universities would be 
given the possibility of their own, off-budget capital. A government
proposal has already been submitted to Parliament. 
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Some aspects of the recommendations have not led to changes. For example, 
raising the tax exemption limit for donations to basic research has been 
examined but no preparation of a reform has been undertaken. Preparation 
work for the right to charge non-EU citizens for university studies and for further 
studies has not begun, either. Promoting innovative public procurement has not 
attained a practical level, nor has the risk-taking ability of the Foundation of 
Finnish Inventions been increased. An R&D centre of expertise or excellence for 
the logistics sector has not been created. Finally, increasing company-level 
flexibility of wages through the development of local negotiations has not 
progressed in a substantial manner (for more details, see section 8.2.2. below). 
7.5 Re-assessment of the operating environment 
Fundamentals remain unchanged 
The essence of the analysis of globalisation and its effects presented in Part I, 
Globalisation Challenges for Europe, of this report is the same as in the analysis 
included in the “Finland in the Global Economy” report. The anticipated 
consequences for a country like Finland are therefore largely similar. 
First of all, growth in the so-called developing countries is continuing intensely 
and the weight of these economies is increasing in terms of GDP and as players 
in world trade. Simultaneously, the technological and educational levels of these 
countries are approaching those of developed countries, making productivity 
and wages rise. These countries will, however, for long remain low wage 
countries in comparison to Europe. This entails continuing high pressure for 
change in the international division of labour, and therefore also in structural 
changes in production and employment within developed countries. 
Second, the competitive edge of developed countries in production subject to 
international trade will continue to be based on high productivity, because their 
wage levels will remain higher than in developing countries. As regards 
technology, countries lagging behind are continuously catching up with 
developer countries. For production in developed countries, this necessitates 
constant innovation ability with respect to both products and production 
methods. 
Third, economies of agglomeration are important in geographical allocation of 
economic activity at various regional levels. Coincidence or informed policy can 
often have a major influence on the location of emerging concentrations or 
clusters, and such developments can lead to self-reinforcing growth. Economies 
of agglomeration depend non-linearly on the transportation and communication 
171 
costs: a small decrease in costs increases economies of agglomeration, but if 
costs sink to a low level, these economies diminish. 
Fourth, globalisation is a positive factor economically, with respect to both 
developing and developed countries. New elaborations of theories reinforce the 
concept that expanding trade is a positive phenomenon. An important empirical 
observation is that offshoring of jobs from developed countries to developing 
countries has been minor compared to the general turnover in jobs. 
New features discovered 
The analysis also highlights new features in globalisation. Due to 
communications and the related lower costs of co-ordination, competition is 
more clearly affecting different phases of production processes: production is 
being unbundled into increasingly smaller fragments that may be located in 
different parts of the world. As a consequence, competition from the developing 
countries is affecting a growing range of intermediate products and work within 
the production process rather than end products. This is augmenting the 
proportion of value added in developed countries’ production that is vulnerable 
to international competition. 
Combined with the rise in the level of education in developing countries, task 
level competition will affect all levels of education, not only the work of less 
educated workers. Furthermore, together with the direct effects of technological 
development (automation possibilities), this entails a finer division in developed 
countries’ labour markets in addition to the division between skilled and non-
skilled labour. 
A division seems to be forming between non-routine and routine work, 
rendering demanding analytic reasoning tasks subject to international 
competition or automation. Tasks requiring human interaction, and non-routine 
manual tasks, are best protected from foreign competition. 
Many so-called information society tasks with more analytic than interactive 
content will be susceptible to international competition. Setting the emphasis of 
education on these types of occupations in developed countries may prove risky, 
particularly if the education delivered is not of top quality. 
The globalisation of markets may also lead to greater differences between 
“superstars” and those with more ordinary skills, even within a given task. The 
demand for “superstars” and their remuneration may grow markedly, whereas 
more ordinary skills may lose comparative demand. 
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A major characteristic of task-level global competition comprises sudden and 
unpredictable changes in the cost-efficiency of the location for a given task. 
Changes may also be large, i.e. nearly all tasks of a specific type may be 
transferred to another location in response to a relatively small change in the 
coordition costs. 
The suddenness and magnitude of these changes suggest that the observation 
that offshoring has so far affected a relatively small proportion of jobs does not 
guarantee that these types of jobs will remain in developed countries in the 
future. Another main implication is the complication of educational planning. 
The general requirements for a successful economy are largely similar to those 
estimated previously. Most fundamental is the economy’s ability to adapt quickly 
to changes in circumstances. The usefulness of foresight in the sense of 
compiling forecasts will diminish as anticipation becomes more difficult. 
Nevertheless, in terms of discerning possible alternatives, which may radically 
differ from each other, foresight may become even more important. 
Maintaining a competitive edge through constant innovation in a situation where 
innovation environments are also developing rapidly in developing countries 
requires global top competence. In part, this calls for increased specialisation. 
Greater ability to attract and retain top experts is also necessary. 
On the other hand, prosperity increases the importance of consumer 
preferences, rendering the ability to produce products corresponding to 
preferences a major competitive advantage. This emphasises the importance of 
customer-driven innovation and the interaction skills it requires. By the same 
token, the capability to create living environments appreciated by high-skilled 
staff may become a critical means of attracting this type of labour into clusters 
of expertise both globally and nationally. 
A rise in the level of education does not provide protection from international 
competition to the extent that may have been previously believed. More 
important is the ability of education to provide, at different levels of education, 
skills that are needed at a given time. 
Environment and energy more fundamental issues in global 
development
One of the phenomena related to economic growth, particularly in developing 
countries in the future, is the increase in energy demand. No factors are in 
prospect that might cause a rapid decrease in the growing energy demand 
related to economic growth. In addition, it is evident that, at least in the short 
run, additional energy can mainly be produced only by using fossil fuels. 
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In parallel, research has been able to provide convincing evidence that human 
activities generating carbon dioxide, released in particular when using fossil 
fuels, have caused global warming. The pace and scale of climate change and, 
first and foremost, its consequences, are highly uncertain. In spite of the 
uncertainty of the estimates, the outlook is extremely disturbing. 
According to recent estimates, the Earth’s average temperature will rise without 
a radical deduction in greenhouse gas emissions, at a probability of 77–
99 per cent, over two degrees centigrade, and at a probability of over 
50 per cent, over five degrees centigrade by the end of the century (Stern 
2006). A rise of two degrees would have extensive economic and social 
consequences, directly influencing e.g. food production, water supplies, 
displacement of population from some coastal areas and causing exceptional 
weather conditions. According to one estimate, no change in policy would entail 
a permanent decrease of 5–20 per cent in consumption per capita compared to 
the level without climate change. Another factor at stake is the risk, the extent 
of which is hard to assess, that part of the ecosystem will enter an irreversible 
process of change. 
These perspectives mean that a policy curbing climate change cannot but 
become a central issue in international co-operation. Even if it is difficult to 
estimate the exact content of this future policy, it will most probably include 
both measures (taxation, emission trading) for raising fossil fuel prices as well as 
major investments in energy-saving technology and the development of 
emission-free forms of energy. 
Simultaneously, a rise in the energy demand caused by economic growth entails 
a rise in energy prices, despite the fact that the increased energy supply will 
dampen any price uptrend. Additionally, the increasing scarcity of energy 
increases the importance of issues pertaining to security of energy supply, 
especially since energy supply may be used more for political purposes than 
previously. 
The rise in fossil fuel primary energy prices will affect the Finnish economy more 
than those of typical EU countries. This is chiefly due to Finnish production’s 
emphasis on products using large amounts of energy, which cannot be 
compensated by the high energy efficiency per product unit. The country’s cold 
climate and long distances are in this respect an additional burden. 
On the other hand, attempts to reduce dependency on fossil fuels will open up 
new opportunities for Finland. Most of all, Finland has the wherewithal to use 
biomass. This creates possibilities for the development and sale of energy 
technology. As an energy intensive country, Finland may also profit more from 
new technologies than many other countries. 
174 
Globalisation increases the importance of supranational policy but 
does not nullify the centrality of national solutions
It is evident that global challenges for the environment can only be solved with 
a policy covering all essential economies. Alone, Finland can only influence 
global warming marginally. Even pan-European solutions are not sufficient, since 
the emphasis of economic activity and particularly its growth are located outside 
Europe. Moreover, the measures Finland and Europe are using for restraining 
climate change will diminish global competitiveness in many production sectors 
unless the non-European competitors will take similar measures. 
Furthermore, maximising the economic advantages of globalisation and 
minimising the social disadvantages require global responses in many respects. 
The best way of extending gains from trade liberalisation everywhere as widely 
as possible is to adopt regimes that do not discriminate against any countries or 
groups of countries. In this respect, WTO is a crucial forum, and the European 
Union cannot replace it with its bilateral arrangements. Alongside promoting the 
WTO process, free-trade agreements evidently provide benefits when a 
comprehensive multilateral agreement is not feasible. 
Especially for Finland but also more widely at European level, it is worth noting 
that securing one’s competitive position is about more than just tariffs. Of equal 
importance are various non-tariff barriers of trade such as trade-restricting 
regulations. Also trade in services, intellectual property, investments, public 
procurement and competition policy are of great importance. 
In addition to direct economic interests, security issues in their broadest sense 
are tying Finland more strongly to global phenomena. Disputes related to 
increasingly scarce non-renewable natural resources concern, through various 
mechanisms, Finland too. 
The significance of the European Union to Finland has grown for two reasons. 
First, Finland can only effectively influence the above mentioned global 
responses as part of the EU. It is in Finland’s interests to reinforce the EU’s 
functional capacity in dealing with global issues. This necessitates the EU being 
able to speak with a single voice. An efficient contribution to this could, in some 
cases, be the reorganisation of the EU’s representation in international organs, 
in particular the IMF and the World Bank 
Another reason for EU’s growing importance is that many issues affecting 
European and, indirectly, Finnish economic growth necessitate good co-
ordination within the EU. A key area is the energy policy with respect to Russia. 
Common actions for enhancing the functioning of the internal market are also 
called for as regards trade in services, financial markets and network industries. 
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Moreover, the innovation policy includes many areas requiring cross-border co-
operation, such as, once again, intellectual property, standards and the 
implementation of large scale technological development projects. 
The above statement does not mean, however, that the success of the Finnish 
economy in global competition would in the first instance depend on global or 
European level responses. The highly heterogeneous economic performance of 
different EU countries and their linkage to national structural policies show that 
ultimately, national policy is the decisive factor. 
7.6 Outlook of the Finnish economy 
The development of the Finnish economy described in the previous chapters 
strongly suggests that globalisation has predominantly been a positive 
phenomenon for Finland. Simultaneous to intensified economic integration with 
the outside world, production growth and both of its main components, namely 
growth in employment and productivity, have performed well. Offshoring of 
production has occurred in the 2000s, but it has been minor in comparison with 
the overall creation of new jobs. In addition, there are good reasons to assume 
that outsourcing has contributed to the growth of productivity in Finland. 
Nevertheless, this does not imply that the economy’s adaptation to globalisation 
and to the simultaneously advancing technological progress and population 
ageing has been painless. At individual, company, sector and regional level, 
significant difficulties have been faced in adapting to, or seizing the 
opportunities provided by extended markets. 
There is even less reason to think that the challenges constituted by 
globalisation, technological development and ageing belong in the past or have 
been solved. It is obvious that different areas of economic activity will continue 
to face significant challenges in the forthcoming years. 
Internationalisation and specialisation continue 
The proportion of Finnish sectors open to international exchange seems to be 
continuously augmenting. In sectors facing the toughest competition, the 
success of Finnish production requires top comptetence and/or a large size in 
relation to the production markets in question. Both expertise and relevant size 
can be reinforced by specialisation. Nearly all well-performing Finnish companies 
have been using this method. When these companies are even slightly larger, 
they have usually unbundled their tasks internationally according to growth 
strategies and benefits obtained from the location of various tasks. 
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At a general level, the question is whether Finland can, to a sufficient extent, 
offer a good location for core operations of businesses exploiting global markets 
and involving major added value. A special Finnish challenge in this respect is 
that support provided by its small domestic markets for the creation or 
development of such new activities is only limited or exceptional. Finland will 
palpably lose some core operations as companies continue the 
internationalisation and networking of their increasingly fragmented activities. 
Success is most probable in sectors where Finnish production is already in the 
vanguard of technological expertise and holds a strong market position. In this 
sense, the question arises of whether the Finnish sectors that are now strong at 
global level will meet the prerequisites for success in the future. The challenges 
and opportunities are multifaceted. 
Which type of production can succeed in Finland? 
Finnish industry has succeeded considerably well in recent years, 
notwithstanding the fact that extensive new production capacity has been 
created, especially in manufacturing, in developing countries which have thus 
intensified competition. In part, this success in recent years can be accounted 
for by the rapid growth of the world market related to globalisation. In 
particular, the demand for investment goods, basic metal products and various 
components and parts in the international markets has grown swiftly and in line 
with specialisation areas of Finnish production this has benefited e.g. 
shipbuilding, engineering industry and metal processing. 
Companies operating in many traditional branches of the technology industry 
and electronics industry in Finland have apparently succeeded in obtaining 
competitive advantages thanks to specialisation, product and process 
development and the flexible reorganisation of operations, and these measures 
have been sufficient to compensate for the wage level advantage in the new 
industrialised countries. However, the challenge has not been overcome. On the 
contrary, it can be assumed that the rise in competitors’ level of expertise will 
require Finnish industry to improve its efficiency and produce new products 
suitable for customer needs continuously. 
As a result of tough international competition and technological evolution, the 
price of many industrial products (e.g. mobile phones and certain grades of 
paper) has decreased or is on a decreasing trend. A huge increase in 
productivity would therefore not entail a corresponding rise in value added. This 
is why it is important that the companies in the sector are able to increase their 
high value added production in Finland. 
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The fact that traditional, technology-based R&D investments no longer have a 
direct influence on the export success of high technology products (Figure 7.2) 
emphasises customer-driven innovation as a success factor.6
Figure 7.2 R&D intensity and specialisation of trade. 
Source: Etla. 
How, then, can added value for the customer be developed? Exploitation of 
design is a way of rendering technology more “human” and finding new 
applications for technologies. The role of design in technical products is often 
emphasised when new technical features no longer provide sufficient added 
value to the average user. As unit prices fall, added value is sought elsewhere 
than technical product features: e.g. from symbolic and functional values, and 
experience-related and cultural aspects. The greater user-friendliness and 
usability of a technology-based product combined with a successful design and 
visual appearance and the company’s brand or trademark increases the 
products’ value to the customer. These methods are still, however, employed all 
too rarely by Finnish companies. 
Understanding the users’ needs and the related change in the concept of the 
customer will gain in importance as international competition intensifies. This 
also applies to the more traditional technology industries. The focus on product 
                                               
6  This is not necessarily or solely a question of companies’ market shares and competitiveness 
being decreased, because as a consequence of rapid internationalisation they are carrying out a 
larger proportion of their production offshore. As the link between technology investments and 
high technology export weakens, it is worth focussing on what kind of production may be 
profitable in Finland in the future. 
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design is shifting from technology-based product concepts towards customer, 
user or service orientated ones. The increased importance of service businesses 
in many traditional industrial sectors points in the same direction. 
For operations located in Finland, especially for sectors in the vanguard of 
technology, the key issue is the quality of the innovation environment provided 
by Finland. An essential factor is the extent to which Finland can offer key 
resources needed by companies at a competitive cost level. The level of 
competence in developing countries is continuously rising, causing the 
competition to intensify. The question for Finland, then, is whether it can 
educate sufficiently highly skilled experts and attract educated foreign staff to 
work in Finland. The education system has functioned well in many respects, but 
success in attracting experts to Finland has been modest. More highly educated 
citizens have moved from, rather than moved into, Finland, although in recent 
years the turnover has slightly improved. The competitiveness of the Finnish 
innovation environment is examined in detail under section 7.7. 
Figure 7.3 Emigration and immigration of highly educated Finns during 
1998–2004, number of persons.  
Source: Alanen (2006).
One of the factors limiting growth in production is the availability of skilled 
manufacturing staff due to the ageing of the labour force and the somewhat 
poor reputation of industrial jobs. Seizing the opportunities represented by the 
new division of labour, i.e. making more extensive use of foreign staff and 
procuring components and some work from outside Finland, may be of help, but 
updating training and increasing the sector’s attractiveness need to be improved 
as well. 
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Another prominent future challenge for the basic industry is the price of energy. 
While the energy efficiency of Finnish companies, e.g. in steel production, is 
world class, part of competing international production located elsewhere can 
profit from cheaper energy due to climate and energy policy differences. Solving 
this problem requires new solutions at international level. 
What about services – can service expertise be developed? 
It is apparent that creating new operations capable of performing in the face of 
global competition is clearly more challenging than further development of firmly 
established production. In the rapidly changing global markets, new innovations 
often have a high potential for major success. However, in sectors and 
operations that have so far been protected from international competition, for 
one reason or another, new competition may lead to dramatic adjustment 
requirements. 
Aligned with trends in other developed countries, services in Finland will also 
form an even greater proportion of production and employment. On one hand, a 
higher integration of services and actual production of goods in various ways is 
characteristic of the development of service markets. In theory, this offers good 
opportunities for high value added production in a country such as Finland, 
while goods production or the production of parts is internationally fragmenting. 
On the other hand, a greater number of services are becoming subject to 
international exchange and genuinely global markets are forming for some. 
These include scientific research, wireless communications, information systems, 
cultural, entertainment and content production services and services related to 
travelling and transport. The EU’s internal market creates an integrated scope of 
operation for other services including construction, retail and many business 
services. The fact that some services require their production to be limited 
nationally or even regionally is a factor counterbalancing internationalisation. 
Many transport, nursing and social services etc. are chiefly of this type. 
The Finnish service sector is facing a demanding challenge regarding the 
capacity to seize new opportunities and succeed in the face of intensifying 
competition. With the exception of certain sectors, productivity is modest in 
international terms. An essential contributing factor seems to be the minor 
application and implementation of possibilities provided by information 
technology, regardless of the fact that Finland is in many respects a well 
developed information society. 
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Many basic structural factors such as increases in the average life expectancy, 
level of education and leisure time, together with urbanisation, seem to be 
contributing to demand for services in the Western industrialised countries. 
Symbolic and meaning-based exchange is typical of post-industrial production. 
Images, experiences and lifestyle are now more involved in consumers’ and 
users’ decision-making. This is creating international growth opportunities for 
Finnish service providers. Internationalisation may promote productivity when 
parts of service processes can – at least for a considerable part of knowledge-
intensive services – be unbundled to different countries based on the availability 
of production factors. 
Customer-oriented operating methods can systematically be developed using 
marketing, design or business management measures, and any service sectors, 
whether public or private, can make use of consumer expertise in product 
development and creation. However, with a few exceptions, Finnish service 
companies have not been particularly successful in creating internationally 
competitive chains, concepts or brands. In this respect, the performance of e.g. 
Swedish and particularly Danish companies has been better. A partial 
explanation for this is that the most international Finnish companies almost 
always belong to producer-led processing chains (see chapter 2). The 
importance of promoting the export of services, in particular for business and 
technology-intensive services, will increase in the future. 
Growing demand for health and nursing services challenging habitual 
practices
In the future, the demand for health and nursing services will increase, and the 
related quality requirements will rise as consumers set higher standards on the 
service environment, staff competencies and long-term service orientation. In 
Finland, this pressure primarily concerns publicly produced healthcare and social 
services, but the demand for private and customised services is also 
augmenting. 
The Finnish healthcare system, which is to a great extent, although not entirely, 
based on public financing, is considered efficient in international assessments, 
see e.g. OECD (2005). However, it is not self-evident that the system can 
respond to growing demand and levels of standards. The municipal sector 
responsible for the provision of these services is facing the challenges of both 
financing the services and ensuring the supply of skilled labour as the baby 
boomers are retiring. Since many nursing tasks are by nature local, they are not 
vulnerable to foreign competition. In parallel, the possibilities to exploit foreign 
labour are thus more limited than in knowledge-intensive services. 
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In healthcare and nursing services, the application of new technology and 
operating concepts represent outstanding opportunities for improving 
productivity and enhancing the quality of services. Many projects are currently 
underway, from electric patient databases to advanced equipment for remote 
diagnostics and monitoring. Tekes, for example, is currently funding the 
FinnWell healthcare technology programme 2004–2009, based on the idea that 
technology will improve the quality and productivity of healthcare services only if 
new procedures are simultaneously developed in as innovative a manner as the 
products themselves. FinnWell is one of the most extensive technology 
programmes funded by Tekes. If successful, these projects may also create a 
basis for the export of products and service concepts. 
What is the future of agriculture? 
Due to demanding natural circumstances and small unit sizes compared to many 
other countries, the preconditions for Finnish agriculture competing in open 
markets are feeble. The profitability of agriculture and thus also its continuity 
are therefore crucially linked to support arrangements. With regard to natural 
circumstances, the competitive disadvantages are permanent, but with respect 
to unit size they are slowly improving. 
Agricultural produce trade liberalisation is weakening the position of Finnish 
agriculture more than that of other EU countries. Liberalisation of trade along 
the lines of the EU’s WTO offer will probably not, however, modify future 
agricultural development in a substantial way from that which will have to be 
faced at any rate: the size of farms will increase, the use of labour input will 
lessen and production will concentrate geographically, which will increase 
productivity and improve price competitiveness. However, it can be assumed 
that the structural change in Finnish agriculture will be considerably intensified if 
support is decreased for e.g. budgetary reasons more than required by the EU’s 
WTO offer and further decoupled from production. 
Nevertheless, other trends of change are reinforcing the operating conditions of 
Finnish agriculture. One of these trends is a growing need and interest in using 
bioenergy. In the short term, the greatest opportunities will be related to the 
use of wood-based biomass. Exploiting power generated from energy crops on a 
large scale requires technological advances and favourable developments in 
relative pricesof various bioenergy sources. 
Another trend supporting agriculture is the increased importance of the health 
characteristics of various foodstuffs. A reliably functioning supply chain, good 
hygienic practices, efficient prevention of animal diseases and the minimal use 
of plant-protective agents provides a good basis for products considered 
healthy. Transforming these factors into actual competitive advantages 
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necessitates strong marketing expertise and, for functional food, long-term 
investments in research. Research investments by the State and private sector 
are rising to a certain extent, but it remains unclear whether they will be 
sufficient to allow breakthroughs. 
The Finnish food industry cannot, on a large scale, be based on foreign raw 
materials. The abovementioned issues on the preconditions for Finnish 
agricultural production are therefore also vital to the food industry. As 
competition increases in the food markets (e.g. when new companies located in 
eastern Europe extend their operations), Finnish production must, like other 
sectors, be able to increase its added value. 
7.7 Competitiveness of the innovation system 
Globalisation, combined with the key role of innovations in the performance of 
developed economies in particular, will make the geographic location of 
innovative activity and its linkage to the surrounding society a key issue. Global 
technology leaders have traditionally located their long-term research near 
international, top universities. On the other hand, part of R&D located close to 
the markets has started to move closer to production. It can be expected that as 
globalisation advances, the most knowledge-intensive operations – such as R&D 
and innovation – will more often find their way to internationally competitive 
R&D and innovation environments. 
This challenges innovation environments to compete with each other for the 
best innovative companies and top experts. The best assets are held by regions 
and countries capable of creating special strengths. For small countries and 
regions, this may mean making strategic choices, since on a global scale it is not 
possible to be the best in everything. In addition, fundamental strengths and 
weaknesses need to be identified so that policy measures and resources, that 
are ultimately always limited, can be allocated with maximum effect. 
One of Finland’s strengths is its ability to maintain a long-term, systematic R&D 
and innovation policy and its implementation regardless of economic and 
political cycles. This has necessitated good co-operation across party political 
and interest group boundaries. The long-term commitment of the public sector 
to the innovation policy direction and to the investments it requires is facilitating 
the planning of development measures for the private sector and promoting 
commitment to investments. 
Another Finnish strength is the ability to co-operate and create networks 
between actors. Technology and research programmes have played an essential 
role in enhancing trust, co-operation and networking. A future challenge 
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includes deepening and widening the various networks and forms of co-
operation as well as simultaneous fostering of co-operation and networking 
dynamics, i.e. the ability to build new networks rapidly. Social capital, trust and 
the ability to co-operate are key strengths in the transfer to more open 
innovation environments and partner networks. 
Furthermore, in Finland the education system is highly supportive of R&D. The 
school system provides the students with sound basic skills. The higher 
education system has placed a strong emphasis on e.g. engineering sciences, 
important for technological development, in its organisation of subjects. In many 
fields, the level of post-graduate education can be considered high. 
Further strengths of the Finnish innovation environment include an effective 
infrastructure and public administration. At the same time, the public sector 
presents challenging issues to which globally interesting innovation may offer 
solutions. For example, the comprehensive public healthcare and education 
systems offer significant potential for new innovations related to healthcare and 
education. A key issue, due to Finnish geographic conditions, is how the various 
welfare services can be implemented in a cost-efficient yet high-quality manner 
in sparsely populated areas. It can be assumed that, in this field, new 
technology and practices based on innovations may also be in demand in other 
geographically large countries with an ageing population. 
Finland’s key challenge in innovation environment competition is its small size. 
In Finland, allocating significant resources in absolute terms is only possible for 
a very limited number of research and technology areas. This entails a need for 
specialisation which, in turn, will reduce the diversity of the innovation 
environment. This may be a question of significance, since many new 
innovations are created in various research area interfaces. In its extreme form, 
specialisation renders the economy highly vulnerable to focus areas that later 
prove to be misplaced. 
The best way to avoid adverse effects caused by specialisation and to support 
the level of innovation is strong international networking. This enables 
enhancing a country’s own expertise, identifying new opportunities and 
complementing expertise in fields where sufficient investment is not possible 
due to limitations in one’s own resources. 
Research conducted by universities, research institutes and companies has 
clearly become more internationalised during the last 10 years. Still, the 
situation cannot be considered good. A particular weak area related to 
internationalisation is Finland’s capacity to attract and retain foreign experts. 
More highly educated residents have continuously moved from Finland than 
have moved into the country; in this sense the turnover is negative, although 
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the situation has somewhat improved in recent years. In Finland, the proportion 
of foreigners among the highly educated population is one of the lowest in the 
OECD area (Figure 7.4). 
Figure 7.4 Proportion of foreigners among the highly educated population in 
different countries, %.  
Source: OECD.
In addition to the small size of the innovation system, the fragmentation of 
research into multiple units is a problem from the point of view of Finland’s 
international attractiveness. Good co-operation between various domestic 
participants helps, but it is not always sufficient. From this perspective, there is 
a need for even more intense networking and mergers. 
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The small size of the domestic markets can also be identified as a weakness in 
the Finnish innovation environment. It undermines the testing of innovative 
products and services in the markets and therefore their commercialisation. The 
marginal significance of innovation in public procurement is certainly not helping 
this situation. Commercialisation problems are being augmented by companies’ 
lack of ambition with respect to growth and small and underdeveloped risk 
capital markets. 
In the future, an even more important feature of the innovation system will be 
its capacity to react rapidly to changes occurring in the nature of innovation 
activity and especially in companies’ operating environments. At one level, this 
requires paying sufficient attention to the planning, implementation, evaluation 
and foresight processes of policy. The ability of administrative sectors to acquire 
strategic information needed in decision-making is of particular importance. 
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8  NEEDS TO REFINE ECONOMIC STRATEGY 
In the light of the globalisation analysis and the review of Finland’s economic 
development and development prospects, the key political challenges for Finland 
seem to pertain to three complex issues: 
- The ability to create centres of excellence fundamental to global 
competition, and simultaneously to ensure an extensive skills base and the 
education system’s ability to react quickly to new needs for knowledge and 
competencies 
- The ability of the economy and society to react rapidly to the changing 
preconditions of economic activity in general 
- The adaptation of an energy-intensive economy on a permanent basis to 
higher energy prices and potential problems in supply. 
This chapter focuses on the key issues of each of these three areas. 
8.1 Research and education system to combine excellence with 
a wide competence base 
Major investments in R&D and an innovation system which functions well in a 
variety of respects have undeniably formed the key to Finland’s ability to meet 
the challenges and take advantage of the opportunities of increasingly global 
competition. Correspondingly, education has made major contributions to the 
economic growth and enhanced productivity of Finland, among other countries. 
Various estimations show that investments in education are highly productive 
both on the individual and social level. 
There is nothing to indicate that the significance of R&D, education or the 
innovation system as a whole in determining economic success is declining – 
quite the contrary. Knowledge and competencies, and the ability to exploit 
them, form the strongest relative asset of developed countries as globalisation 
rearranges the international economic division of labour. Although no exact 
research data is available on the marginal returns of R&D investments and 
investments in education on the aggregate economy level, economies which 
have invested heavily in these sectors have succeeded better than average in 
terms of productivity and GDP growth. Similarly, extensive research proves the 
link between R&D expenses and success and higher productivity at the firm 
level. Hence, a deliberated increase in investment will most probably prove 
economically profitable in the future, but effective targeting of such investments 
is at least equally important.With respect to Finland, the analysed changes in 
the economic operating environment entail at least three requirements in terms 
of knowledge and competencies: 
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1 The need to invest heavily in relatively few areas of excellence, which 
would provide Finland with a realistic possibility to maintain its position 
at the forefront of global expertise, or to achieve that position, or which 
are otherwise crucial to the Finnish economy and society. 
2 The need to attend widely to the readiness of various sectors of the 
economy (service operations in particular) to utilise new knowledge, the 
majority of which is created outside Finland. 
3 The need to be able to develop new competencies rapidly for the 
Finnish workforce, whose expertise is becoming outdated in relation to 
demand.
Combining centres of excellence with an extensive knowledge base 
The policy of creating Strategic Centres of Excellence in science, technology 
and innovation (SCoE), as approved by the Science and Technology Council, is a 
clear and thoroughly justified response to the first need on the list in terms of 
R&D operations. In addition, the five theme areas specified so far (energy and 
environment, metal products and mechanical engineering, the forest cluster, 
health and wellbeing and information and communication industry and services) 
are natural choices, because they cover the key exporting industries, highly 
challenging environmental and energy themes, and the production of welfare 
services, which entails significant needs and opportunities. 
In addition to these, at least a food industry centre of excellence should be 
considered as a strategic focus area in the early stages, provided that operators 
in the sector are able to commit themselves to sufficiently high investments in 
R&D for their own part. Factors in favour of such a theme include both certain 
strengths related to the quality of Finnish raw materials and performance of the 
food chain, and the challenges to Finnish raw material production in the process 
of liberalising trade in agricultural products. 
A fundamental prerequisite for the success of the Centres of Excellence is that 
they aim at the global cutting edge of research. From the very beginning, this 
requires extensive international networking and, on the other hand, an ability to 
link all relevant competencies available in Finland to the development of the 
theme areas. An equally fundamental prerequisite is that the Centres of 
Excellence base their development operations on an extensive concept of 
innovation: the idea of customer focus must be parallel to the development of 
‘hard’ technologies. 
The establishment of Centres of Excellence entails certain choices in terms of 
which technologies to pursue in development, and who to co-operate with. It is 
essential that these choices avoid the unnecessary exclusion of options at 
various stages of the process. Initiatives by companies must play a key role in 
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defining Centres of Excellence. As far as possible, it must be left up to the 
market to select “winning technologies” and, in particular, “winning companies”. 
Strategic choices require a certain long-term approach and even patience in 
order to achieve results. However, it would be useful to draft an exit strategy for 
public investment in time for each Centre of Excellence to prepare for the 
possibility that inputs in a certain theme area do not yield the desired results, or 
resources are more urgently needed for other purposes. 
The creation of SCoEs calls for targeting significant intellectual and financial 
resources at selected areas. Because it is hardly likely that such investments can 
be implemented on the basis of new resources only, resources must be switched 
from other purposes to the focus areas. 
This raises the question of whether the centralisation of resources may result in 
neglecting potentially important areas of development not selected. This risk 
could be mitigated for businesses’ R&D operations by introducing a tax incentive 
on R&D expenditure in Finland, for instance applicable to SMEs, similar to the 
system already in use, one way or another, in most OECD countries. Research 
on the usefulness of such incentives is not unambiguous, but transferring the 
focus of direct public R&D funding to selected Centres of Excellence provides an 
additional reason for considering the introduction of tax-based support. 
Another issue related to the creation of Centres of Excellence is that the Finnish 
higher education system, responsible for academic research and learning at its 
highest levels, is quite dispersed, making it difficult to create focus areas. In 
fact, this is hampering the participation of higher education institutions both in 
the aforementioned Centres of Strategic Excellence and in international co-
operation. Moreover, the size of higher education institution units will diminish in 
terms of the number of students as generations become smaller. All of these 
factors will justify the structural development of the higher education system 
towards larger units and more efficient networking. 
On the other hand, another basic requirement stated above, i.e. the need for 
extensive competencies and expertise, calls for extensive educational offerings 
in various fields and in different parts of the country. A regional presence is 
necessary because companies are better able to exploit research done at higher 
education institutions and recruit graduates when such institutions are 
geographically close by. This has been very distinctly reflected in Finland’s 
regional development, levelled out by the regional expansion of the university 
system. There are also indications that it is more common to opt for higher 
education (regardless of the region of the study place) in areas hosting 
institutions of higher education. Provided that the skills distribution of young 
people of studying age does not vary accordingly, this means that a 
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geographically sparse network of higher education institutions would result in 
talent reserves left unutilised. These factors favour an extensive network of 
higher education institutions, both in terms of fields of research and regional 
distribution.
How might we integrate these seemingly contradicting requirements? One 
answer is provided by the specialisation and profiling of higher education 
institutions, and networking on that basis, i.e. based on a commonly approved 
strategy a higher level of specialisation will be required of universities. This 
would provide the opportunity to strengthen the field-specific competencies 
(“critical mass”) and hence the ability to participate in co-operation with other 
universities and research institutes, both in Finland and internationally, 
depending on where suitable partners are located. Another basic response 
would be close co-operation or a merger between units operating in the same 
locality. This would not affect regional presence, but may enhance the interfaces 
between fields of research and lower administrative costs. 
However, these solutions would not render the closing of units and/or lines of 
study unnecessary at various levels of education and in different parts of the 
country as age groups contract. Due to the population structure, the focus of 
these measures will be in eastern and northern Finland. As these closures take 
place, particular attention must be paid to the networking of companies in areas 
losing educational institutions, with higher education institutions located farther 
away, and to support measures guiding young people in the region to find 
education.  
As the specialisation of universities and polytechnics increases and their 
structure becomes more compact, it will be crucial to ensure that the 
intermediary organisations within the innovation chain reach companies located 
in various parts of the country and the centres of expertise they form. These 
can be relatively small and located outside university towns. Innovation system 
support measures must be “open” in the sense that they do not create 
hindrances to the development of innovative business ventures, which seem 
improbable from the bureaucrates’ viewpoint. 
A large number of various other organisations and programmes participate in 
the development of expertise, a key one being the special Centre of Expertise 
Programme based on expertise clusters, which is currently being reorganised. 
The expertise clusters of the Centre of Expertise Programme and Strategic 
Centres of Excellence share a similar goal: to develop internationally competitive 
and attractive centres of expertise in Finland. However, the starting points and 
measures of the projects differ. The Centre of Expertise Programme develops 
clusters on a regional basis, focussing on the immediate utilisation of expertise. 
To ensure efficient use of resources, it is essential that the operations of 
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Strategic Centres of Excellence and the Centres of Expertise complement one 
another. Unnecessary overlapping must be avoided while expertise generated at 
the SCoEs is exploited as extensively as possible by the Centres of Expertise. 
It is equally important that the organisations and programmes of economic and 
industrial policy and regional development work in parallel throughout, avoiding 
overlaps. In this respect, the situation remains unsatisfactory. In addition to 
Centres of Expertise, technology centres, Employment and Economic 
Development Centres and Tekes’ regional organisation as part of them, 
development companies, business incubators, the Regional Centre Programme, 
EU Structural Fund programmes and Regional Councils responsible for regional 
development all form a complex tangle from the viewpoint of enterprises and 
other parts of society. Finland’s current public system of business development 
services is organisation-oriented, complex and extensive, with 20 to 30 
organisations providing services via some 1,200 service outlets and the number 
of specific service products totalling around 200. The need for clarification of 
duties, responsibilities and organisations is obvious in a situation where global 
competition can cause dramatic changes in production and employment in 
highly specialised regional economies. 
As regards business development services, a service system reform named 
Enterprise Finland provides a sound basis for simplification. The Government 
took a decision in principle on Enterprise Finland in May 2006 (MTI 2006b). It is 
vital that this reform be implemented rapidly. In addition to this, re-evaluation is 
necessary as regards the organisation of regional economic and industrial policy 
and its implementation. 
Focus of education and adaptation of supply 
The abovementioned observations on the impact of globalisation and 
technological development on demand for labour and its sensitivity to change 
pose substantial challenges to the education system, which might extensively 
affect its content, quality and adaptability. Development tendencies seem to 
imply the following conclusions, among others: 
(1) Emphasis on the significance of basic abilities. It is essential that the 
entire population possess solid basic knowledge, and attitudes which promote 
continuous learning. This requires heavy investments in education providing 
general abilities from pre-school age until the end of basic education. Finland’s 
comprehensive school system, viewed as first-rate, provides a solid basis for 
this, but the transition to vocational or higher education has been identified as 
problematic in several contexts: too many are left without the basic vocational 
or professional competencies required in working life. In terms of content, the 
key areas in general education are the development of social interaction skills, 
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alongside language skills (incl. the native language), mathematical, deductive 
skills and the learning skills integral to these. These focus areas are not 
necessarily reflected in the best possible way in the current curricula. 
(2) Modularisation of education, generality and ensuring progress 
paths. Since it is very difficult to know what kind of competencies will be in 
demand in the long term, it would only be logical to ensure an adequate degree 
of generality in education and to divide the provision of vocational and 
professional qualifications into modules instead of aiming directly at a “final” 
competence portfolio. In practical terms, higher education could, for instance, 
avoid aiming automatically at a 5 to 7-year Master’s degree after the completion 
of a Bachelor’s degree, but allow for Bachelor graduates to take up positions in 
working life and continue studying after a break, re-orientating if necessary. To 
implement this principle, the required educational standards qualifying for public 
sector positions should probably be revised. The principle of modularisation in 
vocational training and studies at polytechnics, which are basically less time-
consuming, involves a choice of various progress paths after the completion of 
all basic courses. In spite of positive development in this area, deficiencies still 
exist. There is also reason to assess the degree of specificity in education 
provided at various levels: many curricula provided even at higher education 
institutions aim at quite specific professional expertise. This is a vulnerable 
solution. Within the higher education system, a key requirement for advanced 
competencies is the degree of interest in a researcher’s career, and its 
continuance. Efficient co-operation between the research system and labour 
market is a prerequisite for benefiting from investments made in the education 
of researchers. Thorough preparations have been made with respect to this 
issue, providing a sound basis for action, which should be taken rapidly. 
(3) Quality more important than the formal level of education. Since the 
mere level of education will not continue to ensure demand for labour as in the 
past and, on the other hand, successful production in Finland requires a wide 
variety of competences, a high percentage of higher education cannot be an end 
in itself. Instead, it is essential for education provided at various levels to be of 
high quality and to meet the needs of working life. In vocational training, this 
requires sufficiently modern equipment and effective interaction between 
teaching staff and working life. In all types of education, the development of 
entrepreneurship qualifications and attitudes is essential. With regard to quality, 
an undeniable problem lies in the high number of students per teacher due to 
expanding education, particularly in many fields of higher education. In this 
respect, more resources must be allocated to enhance quality. 
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(4) A comprehensive adult education system and financing system 
providing efficient incentives. It is essential that those in working life have 
clear and flexible opportunities for complementing their education or, if 
necessary, for retraining for another profession. In spite of the extensive nature 
of the Finnish adult education system, or possibly partly due to it, it is obvious 
that it does not form such a clear system. The financing of studies (training itself 
and subsistence during studies) in particular varies illogically between different 
situations. Responsibility for financing should be divided between the student, 
employer and Government, in a consistent and appropriately motivating manner, 
on the basis of the benefits/competencies provided by training, instead of on 
that of which party arranges the training. The development of the adult 
education system has been analysed recently, but the obvious risk lies in 
development measures excessively cleaving to existing structures. A special 
concern is how to educate workers who have not completed any vocational 
training. The so-called Noste programme created for the purpose has not 
reached its targets in terms of participants. Nevertheless, the programme should 
be intensified, not ended because of this. 
(5) Excellence requires international support. Finnish production at the 
forefront of technology needs top level expertise in order to succeed in global 
comparisons. The talent reserves of a small nation are not necessarily adequate 
for this purpose, however energetically pooled. In a way, the fact that the 
average mathematical basic abilities of engineering students have become 
poorer as education has been expanded considerably, is indicative of the 
problem. On the other hand, as “ordinary” competencies in tasks requiring 
analytic deduction can be prone to outsourcing abroad in international 
competition, the quantitative objectives of education in, for instance, information 
technology and the corresponding sectors should be re-evaluated in relation to 
qualitative objectives. In this context, new determined measures to enhance 
Finland’s attractiveness among talented foreign students and qualified experts 
must be considered. Such reorientation will hardly be successful unless 
educational institutions are provided with the clear opportunity to offer high-
quality study modules directed at (mainly) foreign students, subject to a charge. 
The efficiency of the higher education system and its ability to meet 
changing challenges 
The abovementioned requirements to compact the structure of the higher 
education system and shorten its reaction times require reforms on several 
fronts. The first issue involves specifying the principles for the structural 
development of the higher education system and revising the administrative 
guidance and control procedures in line with needs for change. 
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Although the difference should be clear between education that distinctly 
prepares students for applied tasks, currently characteristic of polytechnics, and 
more theoretical education orientated more towards research, typical of 
universities, the creation of units of a sufficient size may require the merging of 
polytechnics with universities. Legislation should provide for this, because there 
is no reason to cling to a so-called dual model if it prevents adopting sensible 
measures.
The specialisation and profiling of higher education institutions must be based 
on existing strengths, and is most successfully implemented via spontaneous 
choices by units themselves. However, specific requirements in terms of the size 
of an institution or unit must be set for this process, using the results gained 
from the qualitative evaluation of education and research as primary criteria for 
allocating fields of teaching to various higher education institutions, instead e.g. 
of the size of the institutions. 
The ability of higher education institutions to react to the workforce needs of 
labour markets alongside needs for research important to economic 
development, and the ability to recruit the best possible researchers and 
teachers, require the reform of the administration and financing of higher 
education institutions. Universities need a higher degree of autonomy to be able 
to decide, in an expedient manner, on how best to target research and teaching 
resources within the specified educational fields, on the recruitment and salaries 
of teachers and researchers, on the dimensioning of further and other education 
subject to a charge, on exploiting the rights to research results etc. 
In turn, the efficient use of autonomy requires professional management, for 
which a natural solution would be a distinct board comprising more outside 
expertise (e.g. from working life) than at present, and a rector subordinate to 
the board, acting with sufficient authority as a managing director. 
Basic funding provided by the Government must continue to form the financial 
basis, the extent of which will be determined with reference to the success of 
the higher education institution in achieving its goals. On the other hand, 
research financing subject to competition is a key tool for maintaining scientific 
excellence and steering the focus areas of research. However, with regard to 
financing subject to competition, the need for a more long-term approach is 
obvious. Moreover, higher education institutions must be able to use private 
sources of financing for purposes other than project financing only, i.e. 
donations and income from education subject to a charge. To facilitate this, the 
maximum sum of a tax-free donation should be eliminated without delay for 
corporate bodies. In terms of financial autonomy, the facilitation of fund holding 
and fund-based financing for all higher education institutions, currently under 
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preparation, is essential, but without new sources of income this will remain 
insignificant in practical terms. 
The minimum objective for expanding education subject to a charge could be to 
endow universities with the possibility to sell graduate education to students 
outside the European Economic Area. The next step to be considered would be 
to render advanced, postgraduate and further education subject to a charge, 
and to compensate this to students, to the chosen extent, for instance through a 
voucher system. A voucher system could help intensify competition among 
educational institutions. When sensibly implemented, a financing system based 
on charges but providing adequate government subsidies may be the best way 
to ensure sufficient public support for investment in education, while 
simultaneously leaving it more than at present up to the individuals to decide on 
the amount and contents of “educational consumption”. Such a system would 
provide a natural solution to the problem of covering the costs of education 
offered to foreign graduate students (at least from outside EEA). Charging for 
education, even if complemented by a voucher system, requires naturally a 
careful reflection from different points of view. 
Required resources 
Based on existing knowledge on the marginal benefits of such investments, it is 
impossible to give any exact, optimal value for the share of R&D expenditure of 
GDP. Regardless of that, from the viewpoint of the abovementioned creation of 
focus areas for R&D measures and the parallel securing of an extensive basis of 
competence, a 4 per cent share of GDP, set as a target by the Government, can 
be considered justified. In order to achieve this target by the beginning of the 
next decade, an annual increase of approximately 7 per cent in public R&D 
expenditures is required, assuming that the private sector’s share of total input 
will remain at the current, internationally high 70 per cent level. 
In terms of educational expenditure, the views presented on the development 
needs of education involve a substantial increase in costs unless the solutions 
chosen are ones that markedly increase the private sector’s financial 
responsibility. Considering that Finland’s current investments in education are on 
an average level only in international comparison, and the results are good, 
there is no realistic basis for assuming that the problem can be solved merely 
through improving productivity. Neither will the declining size of age groups 
allow cutting costs in any significant way during the current decade. This will 
help financing in the next decade, but will not necessarily suffice to compensate, 
at least fully, the need for increasing real education expenditures due to the 
aforementioned reasons. 
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8.2 The economy’s capacity for change 
On the level of an individual enterprise, the capacity for change refers to how 
well the enterprise manages to anticipate and take notice of the changes 
occurring in its business environment and react to them, i.e. how well it 
manages to create and get new products to the market when demand changes, 
adapt the scale of production and reorganise production. 
On the level of the aggregate economy, the capacity for change refers more to 
the economy’s ability to direct resources to new, more effective uses when old 
ones prove uncompetitive. The central part of this process is directing the labour 
resources to effective use within enterprises, between enterprises, and also out 
of unemployment and from outside the labour force. 
The economy’s capacity for change is decisively affected by the conventions and 
institutions of the surrounding society and by their reactions when 
circumstances change. One could also refer to the capacity for social 
innovations. 
8.2.1 Transforming enterprise activities 
One of the central concerns of an economy that copes with new challenges and 
efficiently utilises new possibilities is how enterprises manage to change their 
activities when circumstances change. In the light of the presented analysis, the 
operating environment of Finnish enterprises has changed and is still changing 
in three important ways: (1) an increasing part of production is taking place in 
the face of global competition, (2) innovation in many of Finland’s top fields 
requires pushing the frontiers of technology further instead of learning from 
others, and (3) customers’ needs and preferences are an increasingly important 
competitive factor for the production of a country like Finland. These facts are 
important in different ways with regard to the success factors of an enterprise, 
whether they concern the enterprise’s own knowledge and other resources, the 
ability to adapt current productive inputs, or the ability to acquire new resources 
or incentives. 
197 
Competition and the right attitudes to risk are important starting 
points
Increasing competition is a good thing with regard to incentives. Research has 
clearly shown that effective competition is good not only for what is termed 
static efficiency, but mainly dynamically, forcing enterprises to innovate.7 There 
is a lot of experience in Finland, especially in the telecommunications field, on 
the advantages of domestic and local international competition in getting 
enterprises ready to deal with intensifying global competition. In this light, 
furthering domestic and European competition in service sectors where, in part, 
it is much less effective than in manufacturing, would be advantageous to the 
global adaptive ability of the economy. 
A very general question is the attitude to risk taking. Opinion polls on the 
aspiration among citizens to start up a business or of enterprise owners to 
expand the scale of business activities indicate that the Finns hold stability and 
safety in high regard. Since circumstances will, in future, change in an even 
more unexpected fashion, it would of course be an advantage if the attitude 
climate could develop in a direction that is more risk-tolerant. It is, however, 
difficult to see how and to what extent it would be possible for the policy 
makers to exercise an influence on an issue of such a fundamental nature. 
Increasing the speed of establishing new enterprises 
An important channel for stimulating commercial activity is the creation of new 
enterprises. Over recent years the number of enterprises in Finland has 
increased noticeably. This does not, however, necessarily mean that the stock of 
enterprises is undergoing sufficient renewal. International comparisons indicate 
that renewal has not been especially strong during the current decade – unlike 
during the years following the trough of the slump of the early 1990s (Finnish 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2006a). 
Over the last few years a lot of attention has been paid to improving the general 
conditions of entrepreneurship, including within the framework of a policy 
programme. Several practical obstacles with regard to setting up a business 
deemed problematic have been either removed or significantly reduced. 
Measures to reduce such obstacles should be continued, and in the creation of 
new regulations special attention should be paid to its effects on incentives with 
regard to commercial activity. It is, however, difficult to identify any single 
                                               
7  The connection between competition and productivity is not straightforward. The latest research 
emphasises that competition may also be excessive with regard to innovative stimuli. In 
empirical studies it has, however, usually been shown that competition increases innovation. The 
positive effect of competition is emphasised in areas that are at the forefront of technology. See 
e.g. Griffith, Harrison & Simpson (2006) and Aghion (2006). 
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regulatory factors that make the establishment of an enterprise in Finland so 
difficult that changing them would lead to a major increase in the number of 
enterprises being set up. 
In the end, starting up a business depends on the relationship between 
expected profits and risks. The Government can influence this process in 
different ways through economic policy; for example with the R&D and training 
policies mentioned above, or by developing the operating environment of the 
labour market. A direct means is the taxation of business activity. With regard to 
corporate taxation, Finland is relatively competitive among the developed 
(OECD) countries following the latest reforms, but tax competition may make 
additional reforms necessary very quickly. The risks for small-scale 
entrepreneurs have also been reduced by e.g. improving social security. 
However, to some extent risk reduction could be much better than it is, for 
example with regard to the possibilities for entrepreneurs who have gone 
bankrupt to start up a new enterprise. With respect to both legislation and 
general attitudes there are perhaps fewer such possibilities than in many other 
countries.
The growth of enterprises is even more important 
Seen from the point of view of the dynamics of the economy, the question of 
whether good business ideas quickly lead to expanding production is more 
important than the number of enterprises and the turnover of the stock of 
enterprises. Various indicators reveal that the number of so-called growth 
enterprises is relatively low in Finland (Finnish Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
2006). This may partly be due to the previously mentioned cautious general 
attitude towards risk taking. 
One potential problem may still lie in the financing of very risky projects. This 
especially concerns business activities based on intangible capital, where the 
investments necessary for development do not involve the generation of capital 
which is suitable as collateral. Although the finance markets in Finland have 
developed, as elsewhere in Europe, the adequate availability of risk financing for 
such growth enterprises is still a problem in comparison to e.g. the United States 
(Murray & Maula). 
Additional public investment for the financing of growth enterprises can still be 
considered to be well-founded. International experience shows that early-stage 
risk financing is best supported by actors that are able to combine finance and 
strong business acumen based on experience and knowledge of market 
conditions. This points to both business angels and venture capital funds. To 
incentivise such activity it is worth considering tax expenditure programmes that 
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encourage investors to invest in higher-risk enterprises. Such systems are in use 
in e.g. the United States, the United Kingdom and France. 
The market risks related to new technology are significant, especially for 
enterprises that are active at or near the forefront of technology. The 
Government can, to some extent, reduce these risks with the help of innovative 
procurement policies (Bartelsman 2005, Georghiou 2006). By undertaking to 
procure products and services that have certain qualities, the Government can 
reduce the risks arising from experimental activities for the developers of such 
products. Innovativeness, however, has not yet become a central criterion for 
public procurements. This needs to be changed. 
A significant number of new enterprises are, objectively viewed, one-man-
enterprises. This is characteristic of the service sectors, especially for high 
knowledge business service enterprises. At the very beginning of business 
operations, hiring the first employee is probably a significant step, and this 
justifies considering whether it would be possible to make it easier and/or 
cheaper for entrepreneurs to hire their first employee. 
The simplicity of operational adaptation 
A significant part of the capacity for change is the ability to reduce and even 
discontinue operations that are not profitable under changed circumstances, as 
well as to change the structure of the used production factors. 
On the basis of the estimates made by the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, working hours in Finland are 
relatively flexible in comparison to many other countries. With the help of 
various working hour banks, flexibility has been developed even further, at least 
in some branches. Developing appropriately flexible arrangements even further 
could, however, be assumed to be in both employers’ and employees’ interests. 
A more important question with regard to adjustment is the reduction of the 
labour force if circumstances dictate it. In this regard too, Finland is 
unexceptional. It is, however, obvious that the ability to reduce the labour force 
if necessary is an important competitive factor in rapidly changing market 
conditions. A low dismissal or layeff threshold is often considered to be one of 
the key strengths of Denmark’s dynamic labour market. Moderate job protection 
makes it easier (less risky) for enterprises to hire manpower for new tasks. It 
would make sense to consider reducing job protection as part of a greater whole 
that develops a new sharing of risks between the individual employer, the 
individual employee, and collective risk bearing, by broadening the operating 
model of ”change security” introduced in 2005 (see 8.2.2). 
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Expanding the range of innovations 
Finland is a technology-oriented economy. Therefore, the increase in the level of 
technological knowledge in developing countries presents a bigger challenge to 
Finland than for countries whose competitive advantages are more based on 
other factors. In addition to technology, another central competitive factor is the 
ability to produce products and services that correspond to (potential) 
customers’ needs and wishes. Customer-driven innovation activity that aims to 
take this into account is becoming increasingly important, but at the same time 
it can be considered one of Finland’s weaknesses. 
Instilling customer-driven innovative activities in the day-to-day operations of 
Finnish enterprises is not something that can be done instantly. It can, however, 
be promoted in many ways. Paying attention to it in the teaching programmes 
of universities and polytechnics where those who will be playing key roles in 
business are educated is, in the long term, of importance. More rapid results can 
be obtained by linking the requirements of developmental activities concerning 
the customer interface to the support that the Government gives to enterprises 
through various channels. This is in fact what is being done in programmes run 
by Tekes, the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation. 
Customer-driven innovative activities offer competitive possibilities, especially to 
enterprises that cannot, due to the nature or size of their field of production or 
their available resources, base their competitiveness predominantly on the 
implementation of new technology. While the development of technology is 
concentrated in localities with universities and polytechnics, the customer-based 
innovative activities of a different kind could be the particular strength of 
enterprises based in smaller cities and the countryside (Karjula 2006). 
Business services in need of special attention 
In many countries, business services have become one of the fastest-growing 
sectors of the economy. In Finland, too, business services are growing and 
becoming more international. However, Finland’s position in international 
comparisons is weak, despite some individual, successful service enterprises and 
the general positive development trend. In an EU-wide comparison Finland was 
placed among the last on the basis of the size of its business service sector 
(Hyypiä & Kautonen 2006). 
Industrial companies and the public sector still produce many services that in 
other countries were long ago outsourced to the private service sector. Due to 
low domestic demand there are no strong units in the field that could benefit 
from advantages of scale and so succeed on an international level. 
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Above all, the public sector can support the development of business services by 
creating innovative demand for them. One field is the development of the public 
enterprise services mentioned previously. Transferring the production of these 
services to the private enterprise sector could partly assist in the successful 
development of service enterprises on the open, global market. The demand for 
services would probably be strengthened by tax incentives, which would be 
granted to the enterprise for the acquisition of knowledge input. 
Ownership supporting renewal 
One of the main characteristics of globalisation is the internationalisation of 
ownership. Finland is an especially good example of this. Research indicates that 
the internationalisation of ownership has increased the efficiency of enterprise 
activity in Finland (Ali-Yrkkö & Ylä-Aanttila 2003). This has mainly been realised 
in such a way that the Finland-based operations of enterprises have been 
focussed on their strongest knowledge areas, and the global market network of 
enterprises and other resources have been called in to support Finland-based 
production. Foreign ownership, therefore, has led to structural changes that 
support efficiency and long-term competitiveness. 
However, there have also been cases of foreign ownership leading to the 
transfer abroad of production and accumulated knowledge capital. There is also 
reason to believe that in the absence of alternative Finnish owners, Finnish 
enterprises have been sold abroad under their market value (Puttonen 2004). 
The greatest fear is that the economy becomes a ‘subsidiary economy’, where 
the key decisions are made abroad. This might become problematic, especially if 
foreign owners act in a short-termist way due to market pressures. In such 
cases, development and innovation in Finland-based business may not have 
time to develop before investors lose patience. 
In this regard, it would be beneficial if there would be an adequate number of 
Finnish-owned enterprises, where it can be assumed that the owners are 
committed to the long-term development of business operations in Finland. 
Indeed, with regard to the efficiency of the economy, it would probably be 
advantageous if there were varied ownership structures. Foreign owners 
probably promote efficiency because they tend to require a high return on 
capital. On the other hand, domestic ownership can be more long-term, and 
they are likely to have better understanding of the conditions related to 
production in Finland. Customer-owned enterprises, on the other hand, tend to 
curb prices where competition is perhaps unable to. Cases in point indicate that 
many kinds of ownership structures can lead to efficiency be it relatively 
concentrated ownership (family enterprises), decentralised share ownership, and 
extremely decentralised ownership by the customers. The natural conclusion is 
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therefore that Government policy should aim at supporting multifaceted 
ownership. 
8.2.2 The functioning of the labour market 
Ensuring labour supply 
The state of Finland’s labour market will essentially be determined over the next 
10 to 15 years by the reduction in the working-age population due to the ageing 
of the population. This change will be difficult to fully compensate for in any one 
way. By raising the participation ratio, the reduction of the labour force can, 
however, be mitigated substantially. Compared to the other Nordic countries, 
Finland’s participation ratio is 4 to 5 per cent units lower. This difference stems 
mainly from the under-25 and the over-55 age groups (Prime Minister’s Office 
2005).
The most useful measures to increase the total labour force supply are 
extending the careers of older workers and bringing forward young people’s 
entrance onto the labour market. These have both been the focuses of 
Government policy for some years, cf. for example Finland’s national reform 
programme. It remains an open question, however, whether the implemented 
policy measures will be enough to increase the labour supply, especially with 
respect to older workers. The question is the adequacy of incentives for 
remaining at work both in the early retirement schemes and in the old age 
pension scheme. Taking it into account that the higher employment rate in the 
other Nordic countries has been achieved at the expense of average working 
time, it will be important to pay particular attention to enabling older workers to 
work part-time. 
The incentives and opportunities the unemployed have to take jobs on offer are 
also important. For a certain number of the unemployed, taxation and income 
transfers undeniably cause a significant incentive problem in accepting work. If 
the unemployment trap is defined as a situation in which at least 80 per cent of 
expected income earned goes on taxes and income transfer losses, then 
according to large-scale studies 13 to 17 per cent of unemployed persons during 
the last few years would have been in such a trap, notwithstanding various trap-
reducing tax and benefit reforms (Parpo 2004, Honkanen et al. 2006). If leisure 
time is considered to be of more value and thus the trap limit is set below 80 
per cent, then the number of people defined as being in the trap naturally 
grows. Developing taxation and social security to reduce incentive traps is 
therefore still justified. 
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As social benefits play a central role in causing incentive traps for most 
unemployed people, it is understandably difficult to reduce them. This manifests 
itself for example in the complexity of the use of the so-called adjusted 
allowance. For the older, long-term unemployed one alternative could be to 
establish the basic allowance or labour market subsidy as basic income, the 
payment of which would not be interrupted even if the recipient were to earn 
income.8 The correct measuring of incentives might require the application of a 
separate tax scale to such people, but that should prove an insurmountable 
problem.
A considerable number of the unemployed, according to the latest estimates 
perhaps 140,000 to 150,000, are long-term or repeatedly unemployed, and are 
difficult to integrate into working life. Many of these unemployed people have 
such low productivity that there is no demand for their work at prevailing wage 
levels, notwithstanding the incentives of supply. When, additionally, a 
substantial number of them are dependent on social assistance it is difficult to 
improve material incentives. Effective participation in the labour market for 
these people will probably require the reduction of employment costs for 
employers one way or another, and more potent active labour market policy 
measures in order to increase productivity. 
Labour needs can also be met from abroad, and in fact net immigration to 
Finland has increased over the last few years. Government policies have also 
become more supportive of employment-related immigration (e.g. the ending of 
the transitional provisions for the new Member States and the immigration policy 
programme). However, needs assesment remains the basic policy outline, which 
can be explained by continuing high domestic unemployment. Needs 
assessment, though, unavoidably slows down the recruitment of foreign labour 
and signals a certain reserve in relation to labour from outside the EU. It would 
be worth re-evaluating immigration policy relatively soon. 
A problem in itself is the migration of the most highly-qualified. Finland is 
obviously not a particularly inviting destination for internationally mobile, highly-
qualified people. Such people, however, take up key positions in knowledge-
based economies, especially in fields where Finland is at the forefront of 
technology. To attract the highly-qualified, additional measures are undoubtedly 
needed. Special measures aimed at immigrants partly help, such as increasing 
and expanding the special treatment of foreign experts with regard to taxation. 
Similarly, attention should be paid to a wider provision of education in foreign 
                                               
8  About a third of those aged 55 and over are long-term unemployed. Implementing a ‘basic 
income’ for them at the level of the labour market subsidy would involve a relatively low risk of 
additional costs for the public sector, but would reduce the incentive problem to some extent, 
maybe even significantly. 
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languages. Attracting highly-qualified people also causes pressure to reduce 
taxation in general for those with higher earnings.9
Increasing the mobility of the labour force 
With changes in the demand for labour caused by globalisation and by the 
reduction in the labour supply due to ageing of the workforce, the mobility of 
labour is a crucial adaptation mechanism for the economy. In the previous 
section, it was seen that the labour force is – contrary to some claims – 
relatively mobile in many respects. However, there are good reasons for 
increasing both occupational and regional mobility. 
Finland aims to invest aggressively in a number of production fields that are at 
the forefront of technology. However, global competition and rapidly changing 
demand prospects are typical of these fields. This necessitates the ability to 
steer the workforce quickly to new tasks, which often involves a change of 
employer. However, due to the scattered location of production and population, 
it is probably less common in Finland than in the densely populated Central 
Europe for new jobs to come into being in the same area of employment from 
which jobs have disappeared.10
Increasing the mobility of labour does not mean the maximisation of mobility. 
While constituting an advantage for employers in certain respects, increasing 
mobility may also harm employers and undoubtedly generates costs for both 
individuals and the immediate community. An obvious danger for enterprises is 
the loss of social capital that they have accumulated, caused by the large 
turnover of the workforce. For individuals regional mobility causes both tangible 
and intangible costs. For communities, large population changes may, 
depending on the situation, lead to various costs related to the development or 
the underutilisation of infrastructure. These factors make it difficult to define 
socially optimal mobility. The requirement to adjust brought about by 
globalisation, however, justifies the reduction of obstacles to mobility. 
In Finland, the regional mobility of labour has often been viewed as 
problematic with regard to balanced regional development. Nevertheless, the 
regional mobility of labour is not necessarily in contradiction to balanced 
regional development. Firstly, a major proportion of total migration is crosswise. 
Approximately 170,000 people move annually from one sub-region (NUTS 4) to 
                                               
9  High earned income tax rate is mentioned almost without exception as a problem in enquiries in 
which adverse factors with regard to working in Finland or immigrating to Finland are 
investigated. 
10  The outsourcing of service sector jobs abroad, however, probably mostly affects areas with large 
working populations; cf. Chapter 2. In this regard, regional mobility is most probably not as 
important as it usually is in connection with structural changes in production. 
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another. Only about 10 per cent of this is net immigration to the sub-regions, 
which gain population. However, only this type of migration is important with 
regard to the regional distribution of population. Secondly, the growth of many 
peripheral areas with growth potential also requires various types of regional 
labour mobility; an example lies in tourism centres that need seasonal labour in 
Finnish Lapland. Thirdly, it benefits no one when the workforce becomes 
unemployed or is used ineffectively because it is not worth moving to another 
locality. 
Of the factors that affect regional mobility within the sphere of influence of the 
authorities the most important is probably the adequate supply of housing in 
rapidly growing areas. The differences in living costs are clearly greater than 
differences in wage levels, especially between the metropolitan area of Helsinki 
and the rest of the country. Since the problem cannot be the quantity of 
undeveloped land, policies are required which aim at increasing the supply of 
plots by making town planning more effective and by supporting incentives to 
bring more land suitable for building onto the market, e.g. by way of real estate 
tax. Supporting effective competition in the construction industry is also 
important. The scaled elimination of the interest deduction on loans taken out 
for buying housing could also ease the housing market situation in the long run, 
because due to supply limits this deduction is reflected in prices.11 Just 
increasing the quantity of dwellings in the market is not enough. As people 
attach increasing value to quality issues, special attention need to be paid to 
providing the sort of housing people demand. 
An important factor affecting both regional and occupational mobility with 
regard to the unemployed is the conditionality of unemployment security, i.e. to 
what extent is the readiness to take an offered job remote from one’s area of 
residence or a job that differs considerably from one’s previous work (the right 
to refuse work other than your profession) a condition of unemployment 
security? With regard to both conditions the practice in Finland does not seem to 
be as severe as for example in Sweden or Denmark (Hasselflug 2005). There 
has also been some measure of uncertainty as to whether the conditions are 
interpreted in the same manner throughout the country. Mobility, therefore, in 
both regional and occupational dimensions, could and should be increased by 
tightening up the conditionality of unemployment security. The mobility subsidy 
introduced in the 2007 State budget gives a small additional incentive for an 
                                               
11  The support included in the interest deduction for owner-occupancy also tends to weaken 
mobility because the costs for owner-occupiers of changing locality are greater than for renters. 
The readiness to move is indeed lower for owner-occupiers than for renters, cf. e.g. Tervo 
(2000). This effect of owner-occupancy, however, is often exaggerated, because owner-
occupiers tend to be people who for various reasons are less mobile. Neither do international 
comparisons support a major quantitative effect due to owner-occupancy in comparison to other 
factors: in the United States, undeniably a country where there is a high willingness to move, 
owner-occupancy is more common than for example in Finland. 
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unemployed person to move, but it is unlikely to have a noteworthy effect on 
overall mobility.  
Commuting does not carry the economic costs accompanying changing one’s 
residence; neither does it lead to a breach in social contacts as commonly 
occurs when moving. Commuting is therefore an easier solution than moving to 
the problem of regional labour mis-match especially when it is assumed to be 
temporary. On the other hand, commuting may also result in significant daily 
commuting costs, including the time spent commuting. 
There seems to be potential for expanding employment areas through an 
increase in commuting even after the period of growth of recent years; fewer 
people spend a great deal of time on daily commutes to and from work in 
Finland than for example in Sweden or Denmark (EU 2006). Commuting can be 
furthered mainly by improving traffic services and refunding the costs it 
involves. A noticeable increase in the right of tax deductions for travel costs in 
the beginning of 2007 will be a significant change in this respect. With regard to 
traffic services, the most cost-effective measures are probably those related to 
the effective utilisation of traffic networks that have already been built (e.g. the 
adequate traffic density of mass public transport). 
Telecommuting is often the most painless form of mobility for employees. In 
chapter 6 it was seen that telecommuting had not started to contribute to 
employment in peripheral areas as hoped by many. This notwithstanding, 
different forms of telecommuting offer a flexible addition to the regional 
incidence of work and labour, especially if combined with commuting and part-
time residence in the locality of work.12 The best path to further mobility in this 
respect is to promote the development of moderately priced broadband 
connections that cover the whole country. In this regard, the need for public 
investments is greatest in areas of sparse population. 
With regard to occupational mobility, areas of key importance include the 
education system, incentives created by the terms of employment and the 
unemployment security mentioned above. Without the capacity of the education 
system to help people obtain the competences necessary for new tasks, even 
the best material incentives cannot achieve the necessary adjustment of the 
labour force. As noted above, the adult education system is in serious need of 
development.
                                               
12  Various types of mobile or remote work seem to be relatively typical in Finland in international 
comparisons (FinnSight2015). 
207 
The incentives to change to a new, more productive task may suffer from the 
reaction of taxes, employers’ contributions and income transfers to a higher 
earned income level. The marginal tax wedge on labour (the share of income 
taxes and the employer’s and employee’s social security contributions in 
additional income) in Finland has decreased systematically since the middle of 
the 1990s. For high income levels, however, it is relatively high. The marginal 
tax wedge of labour is also clearly higher than in Denmark, where the total tax 
ratio is higher than in Finland (Hetemäki & Suvanto 2005). At lower income 
levels, on the other hand, the reduction of social security benefits still causes 
high marginal tax effects (Honkanen et al. 2006). Justification therefore remains 
for reducing the taxation of labour from the point of view of labour mobility. 
The increasing importance of wage flexibility 
On a national level, the Finnish wage formation model has guaranteed 
significant flexibility in real wages, but has led to high real wage rigidity at 
individual level. This has probably partly weakened the integration into working 
life of the least qualified. Although the gradual elimination of the older, low-
qualified labour from the labour market will probably ease the polarisation of 
unemployment related to educational levels in the coming years, the flexibility of 
wage formation at individual level will be more important in future than it used 
to be. 
Globalisation analyses (Baldwin 2006, Andersen 2006) highlight the fact that 
competition among different countries for production locations will affect all 
kinds of jobs more than before. This will make it increasingly difficult to maintain 
wage structures that do not correspond reasonably well to people’s productivity. 
This adds more weight to the previously obtained research results, according to 
which wage rigidity tends to cause unemployment (Pekkarinen & Vartiainen 
2004).
On the other hand, the fact that the same wage has been paid for similar work, 
irrespective of the productivity differences among enterprises and plants, has 
tended to support structural changes which raise productivity.Plants and 
enterprises with weak productivity have disappeared due to competitive 
pressure, while highly productive enterprises have benefited from wages 
determined essentially at the aggregate or branch level.13 This mechanism in 
itself will continue to function in the future too. The change in the nature of 
work, being increasingly based on the knowledge of individuals and groups and 
difficult to supervise, has increased the importance of pay-related productivity 
incentives (Vartiainen 2006).Therefore the increasing determination of wages 
                                               
13  This so-called Rehn-Meidner model factor has probably contributed to the Finnish ICT sector’s 
excellent profitability and rapid expansion in the 1990s. 
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within enterprises, based on the productivity of individuals and groups, may in 
future even support the growth of productivity rather than lowering it. There is 
also recent empirical research in support of this claim (Heyman 2002 & 
Lundborg 2005). 
Due to these factors, the development of wage formation that takes greater 
account of the productivity of individuals and teams of workers is important. In 
practice, this requires increasing the role of the enterprise level in wage 
formation. The need for this was also acknowledged in the dialogues among 
labour market organisations organised in the context of this project. The income 
policy agreement concluded at the end of 2004 included the possibility of using 
part of the total amount of the wage increases in ways to be agreed locally. 
However, only about a fourth or about 0.25 percentage points of the “union 
share” (0.6 % + 0.4 %) has been agreed locally. This is a fairly small part of the 
total quantity of increases (2.5% + 1.8%).14
In connection with the tax policy agreement there were also agreements on 
branch-level negotiations to develop the collective bargaining system (including 
civil servants), especially in terms of promoting plant-specific solutions. There 
have been wide-ranging discussions, and models concerning the organisation of 
the flexible use of working time have produced results. However, it was not 
possible to agree on the strengthening of the role of local agreements in wage 
formation.15 The development of wage formation at enterprise level with local 
agreements is therefore still extremely topical. 
Flexibility and risk sharing 
The turbulence on the labour market arising from globalisation and technological 
development, together with the reduction in the labour force due to an ageing 
population, will demand considerable flexibility from the labour market in many 
respects: labour force mobility from one occupation to another, from one 
enterprise to another, from one region to another, wage flexibility and powerful 
incentives to participate in the labour market. Also a more flexible allocation of 
annual working time according to the work situation may become a more 
important competitive factor. 
In most cases, these flexibility demands will increase the risks borne by 
employees. Examples include weak employment protection, unemployment 
security-related demands to change occupation or location of residence, 
flexibility of working time in line with demand, and the determination of wages 
based more on one’s own productivity and the profitability of the enterprise etc. 
                                               
14  This estimate is based on the information from areas covered by the Confederation of Finnish 
Industries’ agreements. 
15  Labour market organisations’ press release of 27 March 2006. 
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However, bearing such risks would be disadvantageous to individuals, and may 
lead to inappropriate solutions, for example with regard to developing 
competences. 
There is therefore an obvious need to spread the risks related to flexibility wider, 
either collectively to employers and employees, or to the whole of society 
through income transfers financed by tax revenues and through services for 
those affected by the structural change. This need has also been reflected in the 
labour organisations’ high degree of reserve with respect to reforms in many 
countries that increase flexibility in various labour markets. In many European 
countries, such reserve or even hostility has substantially hindered the 
implementation of reforms. 
For these reasons, increasing attention has been paid over recent years to 
reforms in which the flexibility needed by enterprises and the security needed by 
employees can be expediently linked (cf. e.g. OECD 2006d). The Danish 
‘flexicurity’ model has received the most attention. In this model, weak job 
protection and flexible wage formation at enterprise level is combined with high 
unemployment benefits and wide-ranging but strictly implemented active labour 
market policy measures. As the results with regard to unemployment and 
employment have been excellent among the developed countries, this model 
has in many quarters become to be seen as an alternative to the ‘Anglo-
American’ flexibility model.16
The “change securityprogramme” introduced in Finland on 1 July 2005 is a step 
in the direction of the flexible security described above. The employee, who has 
been given notice or is at risk of being given notice due to economic or 
production reasons, can in the programme use working hours to look for a new 
job and he or she has the right to a personal employment programme and to an 
increase in unemployment benefit during the time that the employment 
programme measures remain in force. The employee, however, also has the 
obligation to look for work actively, and to accept work and training. During the 
first 14 months of the new system, approximately 12,000 employees 
participated in it. The effect of the system on the employment of those 
becoming unemployed is still difficult to estimate. According to employees’ and 
employers’ organisations, the system has started well. 
                                               
16  Economic and labour market policy models have been classified in various ways. In recent years 
divisions into groups of four have become popular, with the Nordic countries forming their own 
group, which is able to combine high employment and productivity with a level income 
distribution, cf. e.g. Sapir (2005) and Korkman (2006). Whether Finland belongs to the Nordic 
group is to some extent unclear, due to e.g. its higher unemployment. 
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Change security concerns only a small part of all employment relationship 
terminations.17 It would make sense to develop the Finnish labour market model 
in the direction of the flexible security model. One alternative could be to apply 
the new aggregate of rights and obligations to young employees. The central 
elements would then be reducing employment protection and, as a 
counterbalance, improved training and employment measures and an increased 
unemployment benefit level for the duration of the measures of the change 
security programmme. Such an extension could be justified by the fact that 
employees with little employment experience represent a greater risk for 
employers, and young workers remaining unemployed and the related risk of 
long-term unemployment is a greater problem than older workers drifting into 
long-term unemployment. As experiences with the model accumulate, it could 
be expanded to other groups. 
The flexibility demanded from employees – while, from various standpoints 
important for enterprises in competitive conditions – may also be problematic for 
enterprises. For example, the interest of employees in improving their 
competence is not necessarily very great if they are very unsure about the 
continuation of the employment relationship. The high turnover of the labour 
force, on the other hand, unquestionably weakens employees’ capacity for co-
operation. These may have negative impacts on productivity, and also for these 
reasons it is important that as the flexibility of the labour market is increased in 
different ways, practices are strengthened that support employees’ 
preconditions and incentives for committing themselves to their jobs. In this 
respect, good management is crucial. 
8.2.3 A public sector that supports change 
The influence of the public sector on the renewal capacity of the economy is 
related to specific regulation, to public sector investments in the general 
conditions for innovative activities, to the renewal of the public sector’s own 
production, and also to the utilisation of public projects as promoters of 
innovative production, to the activities of the social security system as a bearer 
of risk, and to the level and allocation of taxes for financing essential 
expenditure.
With regard to the regulation of the product market, Finland is a comparatively 
typical OECD country. Using quantitative indicators, the rigidity of its regulation 
would even seem to be slightly lower than average according to OECD (2006) 
                                               
17  Of the 870,000 instances of unemployment that began in 2005, only 50,000 were given notice 
due to production reasons, and nearly 20,000 for other reasons. 530,000 were related to the 
ending of fixed-term contracts and 70,000 to own requests. 15,000 became unemployed after 
their trial periods had ended. 185,000 people became unemployed for other, undefined reasons. 
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estimates. Although regulation can be developed in many ways to support 
growth and the renewal of commercial activity, regulation itself is hardly the 
central problem. 
Thanks to high R&D revenue, the public sector invests a large amount, in 
international comparison, in the general preconditions for innovative activity. 
Investment in education, however, is average. In the light of the analysis 
presented above, it would be warranted to increase such investments with 
regard to the size of the economy. 
The public sector’s participation in the risks borne by individuals has been shown 
to be important both as a condition for taking risks at individual level, and also 
for maintaining the cohesion of society, and thus as a factor that reduces 
general resistance to change. Since it is very possible that globalisation will 
increase the turbulence of working life (loss of jobs, possibly untypical 
employment relationships, variations in wages etc.), there is no reason to 
reduce the participation of society in bearing the related risks. If the rules of 
working life are developed in a way that reduces enterprises’ risks for employing 
people, there is reason to increase at least to some extentpublic participation in 
risk bearing. This will naturally generate pressure on expenditure. 
Such expenditure pressure does not fit well with the foreseeable increase in 
public expenditure due to the ageing of the population. Already, without these 
new pressures, the long-term sustainability of public finances is questionable; cf. 
the special focus below. Problems in balancing public finances are also difficult 
to solve by increasing taxation, since from the standpoint of a well-functioning 
labour market it makes more sense to lower labour taxation, and tax 
competition is likely to limit the taxation level of mobile production factors 
anyway. 
Of course, this raises the question of alternative methods of reacting to the 
foreseeable weakening of the public finances. Finland’s national reform 
programme emphasises keeping public finances in surplus over the next few 
years in order to build up buffers. In addition, the programme lays stress on 
enhancing public services with the help of both the Government’s productivity 
programme and the municipal and services structures project. With regard to 
limiting pension expenditure, the strategy is to aim at achieving the targets of 
the pension reform through e.g. working life development. In addition, it is 
pointed out that strengthening the growth potential of the economy is obviously 
helpful in meeting the expenditure needs caused by the ageing of the 
population.
The public finance outlook described, needs for additional growth-supporting 
expenditure demands and the need to ensure sufficient public risk bearing make 
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the adequacy of the chosen policy questionable. A natural question is then 
whether there are significant elements in public expenditure that are inessential 
or inefficient as public sector tasks. 
Special focus The sustainability of public finances 
Based on an EU-wide comparison, the balance of Finland’s public finances is excellent. 
The public sector is clearly in surplus, and the GDP share of the public debt is one of the 
lowest. The main part of the surplus derives from the earnings-related pension scheme, 
but central government finances display a surplus too. If economic growth in general 
continues as expected, the public finances situation will remain reasonably strong in the 
near future, so long as growth in expenditure does not accelerate significantly. 
In the long term, however, the pension, healthcare and long-term care costs related to 
the ageing of the population call the stability of public finances into question. Over the 
next few decades, expenditure pressures will come mainly from pensions, but in 2050 
they will arise almost equally from pensions and health and long-term nursing care costs 
(figure). 
Figure  Growth of age-related expenditure, per cent of GDP.   
Source: Finnish Ministry of Finance (2006). 
On the basis of the calculations included in the revision of the stability programme 
(Finnish Ministry of Finance 2006), at the present total tax ratio, public finances would 
show a deficit by 2030, and the deficit would continue to increase, in turn leading to 
accelerating indebtness. Such a scenario cannot, of course, materialise; instead, the 
development path of either expenditure or revenue must change. 
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Calculations that extend for decades into the future are extremely uncertain and sensitive 
to even minor changes in assumptions. Thus, the European Commission, basing its 
figures on the calculations of the EU’s Economic Policy Committee, estimated the stability 
risks of Finland’s public finances to be lower than the stability programme’s estimate 
(European Commission 2006). However, not even this calculation has a risk-free long-
term outlook for public finances. 
One noteworthy aspect of the calculations is that they assume the GDP share of 
education expenditure to diminish following the decline in the size of young people’s age 
groups. In Finland this ‘gain’ is estimated to be around 0.5 per cent of GDP by 2010. 
Therefore, the calculations do not assume that strengthening and maintaining the 
competences of the labour force requires more resources for education in future than at 
present. The reduction in unemployment is also assumed to lower the costs resulting 
from unemployment, in Finland from 0.3 to 0.4 per cent of GDP. This assumption 
presumes that unemployment will decrease without any significant changes in active 
labour market policies aimed at supporting, for example, the mobility of the labour force, 
or without any additions to the risk burden borne by the public sector. 
With regard to financing, the crucial assumption of the calculations is that the total tax 
ratio will remain unchanged. In the revision of the stability programme this means that 
by 2030 pension costs will increase by 2.1 per cent in relation to GDP, and the GDP share 
of other taxes will correspondingly diminish. It is not at all self-evident that it will be 
possible in the conditions of tax competition to maintain Finland’s relatively high total tax 
ratio, even if so desired. 
The pension system 
The question of the appropriate extent of public responsibility can be most 
clearly linked to pension security financed by tax-like payments to the present 
extent. The tasks of the pension system can be divided into three: the levelling 
of consumption over one’s life span, insurance, and reducing poverty (cf. 
Suoniemi, Tanninen & Tuomala 2003). Ensuring a certain basic pension security 
for everybody irrespective of their circumstances forms an essential part of a 
welfare society’s risk bearing, and this can only be the Government’s 
responsibility. There are also matters related to the self-selection of customers 
that speak in favour of a pension insurance system that is obligatory for 
everyone and based on tax-like compulsory payments. 
One may instead justifiably ask whether the obligatory pension level related to 
the current system is optimal, whether the age limits for taking retirement and 
the conditions for early retirement pension systems are suitable, and what kind 
of time profile in accumulating pension funds should be aimed at in the pension 
system. 
It makes sense to pose the question concerning the pension level for two 
reasons. On the one hand, the Finnish financial markets have developed 
considerably since the creation of the current pension system. Citizens now have 
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numerous possibilities in the financial markets to save for their pension security, 
and to add insurance coverage to their savings to the extent desired. In other 
words, citizens now have better possibilities to look after their pension security, 
even when the compulsory system does not do so. On the other hand, the 
income and wealth level of the nation’s citizens has risen. To avoid pension-age 
poverty, it is therefore now less important than previously for the authorities to 
guarantee high pension security through obligatory pension savings rules. 
The age limits for retirement (‘full’ pension at 63–68) can be questioned from 
the point of view of both the adequacy of labour supply and the improving 
health of older people. It is also not self-evident that the concept underlying 
various calculations (e.g. in the revision of the stability programme), which see 
sizes of pension funds rising at least up to the 2050s in relation to gross 
domestic product, would be optimal. 
For these reasons, it would make sense to rethink the pension system and the 
financial burdens it presents. This is obviously problematic in a situation where 
significant reforms have just been carried out. However, due to the sluggishness 
typical of pension systems, postponing necessary reforms leads to a greater 
need for change in the future than if the reforms are carried out in time. 
Publicly-funded services 
Publicly-funded service production employs a significant proportion of the labour 
force, and therefore it is of paramount importance for the productivity of the 
economy as a whole that these resources are used efficiently. Efficiency is also 
important from the standpoint of service users due to the limited scope of public 
funding.
The principal parts of publicly-funded service production are health, social and 
educational services, which are under the responsibility of the municipalities. 
Therefore increasing their productivity and cost-effectiveness is of key 
importance for the whole public sector. The great service production cost 
differences among different producers, documented in many studies, indicate 
that significant productivity increases could be obtained by adopting the best 
practices.18
With regard to increasing the efficiency of public service production, the 
realisation of the municipal and service structure project is of key importance. 
Its central concept is to require a certain minimum scale in service production 
                                               
18  In Finland there are presumably fewer possibilities for increasing efficiency than in EU countries 
in general. The service production of Finland’s public sector seems to be efficient in European 
comparisons, though such comparisons are naturally very complex (SCP 2004). 
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through either cooperation between municipalities or the merger of 
municipalities. This project must be implemented in a determined manner. 
On the other hand, as scale economies fail to be decisive with regard to 
productivity (Loikkanen & Susiluoto 2005), it is important that sufficient 
attention be paid to incentives that promote productivity. Public service 
production is not automatically under the same competitive pressure as private 
production, and it is therefore essential to bring the competition element into 
service production as widely as possible on the basis of the purchaser-provider 
model. Additional demand for private service producers also tends to strengthen 
the ability of domestic enterprises to develop competitive service concepts, 
which can also be successful in open international competition. 
It goes without saying that the utilisation of new technology in making public 
service production more effective is of crucial importance. There are already 
numerous larger and smaller programmes for furthering such utilisation, e.g. 
those funded by Tekes, the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and 
Innovation, and by Sitra, the Finnish National Fund for Research and 
Development. However, from the viewpoint of technological and service 
concept-related innovation of the whole service sector, it is important that in 
public procurements more attention be paid to innovativeness. 
Indeed, a programme should be started up quickly to promote innovative public 
procurements. With such procurements, the creation of new markets for new 
technologies and innovations can be facilitated, whilst they can also improve the 
productivity and quality of the previously mentioned public services. Innovative 
public procurements (incl. planning competitions) could be widely aimed at 
different welfare and infrastructure services. 
However, the realisation of innovative procurements necessitates practical 
measures and guidelines before their wide-scale development into innovation 
policy instruments can be carried out. These include combination of demands 
across administrative sectors as well as strong coordination of procurement 
measures.19
Creating and adjusting policy focuses 
When economic and social changes are rapid, political decision making has to be 
able to predict requirements for change, identify alternatives, form clear policies 
and put them speedily into action in a manner consistent with the change in 
circumstances. The overall impression from this report concerning the nature of 
                                               
19 Cf. e.g. Public procurement for research and innovation. Developing procurement practices 
favourable to R&D and innovation. Expert Group report, September 2005. European Commission 
Directorate-General for Research support for coherent development policies. 
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economic changes indicates that predicting changes will become increasingly 
difficult. This is a serious challenge to the broad but relatively disorderly 
foresight work of the public administration. Increasing this foresight work is 
probably not a wise reaction to this challenge. What is needed is an increase in 
the quality of foresight and a more systematic linkage of foresight activities to 
decision making; cf. the adjoining special focus. 
Implementing significant policy reforms requires a solid knowledge base. In 
principle, there is a good basis for this. In Finland, the production of statistics is 
comprehensive and well organised, and the Government has significant research 
and survey resources directly at its disposal in what are known as sectoral 
research institutes. Additionally, in universities and private research institutes, 
many able researchers can be involved in the analysis of policy alternatives. 
In the preparation of policy measures, however, these resources are not always 
fully utilised. It is important that the research and survey work carried out at 
different ministries be coordinated more effectively at Council of State level so 
that the resources can be allocated to the elucidation of central questions. This 
may require redirecting resources from existing research institutes for 
reallocation at Council of State level, and structural reform of the sectoral 
research system.20 Databases created with public funds must also be made 
more flexibly available in research units active both within the Government and 
outside it. 
During recent parliamentary terms, the Government programme has become an 
instrument defining the policy of the government throughout each term of 
office. Together with the framework procedure for central governent spending 
limits, this has enhanced the predictability of policy and its long-term 
orientation. Emphasising the position of the Government programme may, 
however, make procedures more rigid, making it difficult for the Government to 
come to an agreement with respect to new policy openings, even though a 
change in circumstances might demand this. For this reason, it would be 
expedient when deciding on the Government programme to agree on 
procedures with which the programme can be modified over time. 
Another important issue with respect to the Government programme is the 
planning and implementation of policy measures that cut across ministry 
boundaries. Many new policy challenges probably go beyond ministry 
boundaries, and such boundaries cannot simply be moved every now and again. 
The experiences during the current term with regard to cross-sectoral or 
horizontal policy programmes have been very positive, and this new mode of 
                                               
20 Questions with regard to sectoral research are at present being elucidated by a working group 
appointed by the Council of State, which is to finish its task by the end of 2006. 
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policy implementation should be made use of in future, as well. Care has to be 
taken, however, that not too many programmes are set up or that they do not 
become permanent arrangements that make administration even more 
complicated.
Special focus Foresight in Finland 
In the beginning of the 1990s, Finland came to the realisation that there was a need for 
improved foresight. The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the operating environment 
in many ways and Finland’s economy drifted into a completely unpredicted, deep slump. 
The importance of foresight has also been heightened by the increasing prevalence of 
strategy work in different organisations and rapid technological development. Foresight 
activity has in fact increased over the last few years. Foresight occurs mainly on an ad 
hoc basis, though some foresight processes repeat themselves in a slightly different form. 
The most important recent foresight projects: 
*  Since 1993 a Council of State future report has been prepared for Parliament once 
every parliamentary termunder the direction of the Prime Minister’s Office. It contains 
an analysis of the future development of a specific, usually rather broad theme and 
the Government policies that concern it. In Parliament, the report is discussed by the 
Committee for the Future, whose task also includes the foresight of technology. The 
last report on the future is from 2004 and concerned the preparatory measures for the 
ageing of the population. The Prime Minister’s Office is at present elucidating the 
development possibilities for the report procedure; suggestions will be ready at the 
end of 2006. 
*  In the ministries there is a long tradition of foresight, especially of the economy, the 
labour force, educational needs, regional development and technology. The 
importance of foresight with respect to educational needs and technology has been 
emphasised over the last few years. The tasks of the Council of State’s foresight 
network appointed by the Ministry of Labour include taking care of the coordination of 
foresight, communication between ministries, developing foresight knowledge in 
ministries, supporting regional foresight work and forming a common operating 
environment representation as the background of foresight activity that concentrates 
on various themes. The network’s term will end in May 2007. The network published a 
description of the operating environment as background for ministerial surveys on the 
future in December 2005. Based on the aforementioned description of the operational 
environment, the ministries produced sector-specific surveys for the future in the 
summer of 2006, to help form a basis for government policies during the next 
parliamentary term. 
* FinnSight 2015, a joint foresight project by the Academy of Finland and Tekes (the 
Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation) was made public in June 
2006. Its objective was to explore the future of knowledge areas and prioritisations for 
science, technology, society and business. The aim of the project was also to help 
define strategic centres of excellence in science, technology and innovation in Finland. 
The foresight work was carried out by panels, where research and industry experts 
expressed their views on the themes involved. Ten panel reports resulted, as well as 
the summary report, ‘The Outlook for Science, Technology and Society’. 
218 
*  As a continuation of the above-mentioned project, Tekes has started up a wide-
ranging collection of weak signals (Signals 2006), the results of which will be 
published in December 2006. Also participating are the Finnish Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, Finnvera, Finpro, Sitra (the Finnish National Fund for Research and 
Development), the Academy of Finland, T&E Centres (Employment and Economic 
Development Centres), and the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. This work, 
which places an emphasis on the distribution of knowledge among various parties and 
on international cooperation, will continue next year as strategic work. 
*  Sitra (the Finnish National Fund for Research and Development) started up a national 
foresight network in the summer of 2005. Its aims were designated as the recognition 
of new challenges in the future and the opportunities they represent for Finnish 
society, increasing cooperation between Finnish foresight organisations, and increasing 
the efficiency of the utilisation of foresight knowledge among Finnish decision-makers. 
The report, ‘Towards a Competitive Welfare Society,’ was published in August 2006. 
Sitra is continuing through developing the foresight network and foresight activities. 
*  Foresight is also carried out regionally with different types of cooperation models. The 
central actors are employment and economic development centres, regional councils, 
environment centres and provincial cooperation organs, and business organisations 
and third sector actors. The most significant regional foresight processes are 1) work 
related to provincial plans and regional strategy, 2) labour market, business and 
technology foresight in employment and economic development centres, and 3) 
foresight related to regional education provision. 
*  The Confederation of Finnish Industries has recently implemented the ‘Future Survey’ 
and ‘Services 2020’ projects. ‘Future Survey’ assembles research information and 
views on the present state, future and knowledge requirement of six possible success 
clusters with roots in industry and construction. The objective of the ‘Services 2020’ 
project was to analyse the structural change in service sectors and predict the 
changing knowledge and training needs of enterprises. The final reports of the 
projects were published in 2006. Whether the foresight work will be continued has not 
yet been decided. 
In addition, many other organisations, such as research institutes, enterprises, central 
administrative boards, organisations, etc. carry out foresight in their own fields, and there 
are also enterprises that offer foresight services. 
The Finland Futures Research Centre of the Turku School of Economics is a central actor 
in the foresight knowledge and research field. It offers training and development services 
to organisations and enterprises, and coordinates the Finland Futures Academy, formed 
by 17 Finnish universities, which offers basic academic training in futures research and 
coordinates the national postgraduate programme in futures studies. The main themes in 
the Centre’s research activities are foresight research, training and teaching research, 
culture and welfare, management, and environmental research. 
Evaluation
Whilst Finnish foresight activity has increased over recent years and many interesting 
aspects have been made the subject of public discussion, decision-makers do not feel 
that they are significantly benefiting from foresight research when making decisions. The 
foresight information produced does not adequately meet the needs of decision-makers. 
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Predictions are often made from the narrow point of view of one organisation, leading to 
the danger of dead zones. Restrictedness and sector-specificity also mean that broad, 
horizontal themes do not get enough attention. When predicting changes in the general 
operating environment the same strong trends are often repeated (globalisation, 
information technology, ageing etc.); new forces of change are rarely brought up. The 
results are also often too general to be of real use in decision-making. 
Finland lacks foresight processes that involve decision-makers extensively. Evaluations of 
international foresight projects have shown that decision-makers get the most out of 
foresight projects by participating in the work themselves and by networking with other 
participants. If the distribution, treatment and utilisation of foresight information is 
relegated to the final project report, then it is easily lost in the flood of information and 
the decision-maker’s customary haste. 
Development needs 
Firstly, the diversity of foresight is partly unavoidable, because foresight needs vary from 
one organisation to another. A certain degree of diversity is also beneficial for ensuring a 
varied outlook on the future. This notwithstanding, it is necessary to improve the 
coordination of the public sector’s foresight, so that limited resources are sufficient for 
carrying out high-quality work and no serious dead zones remain outside foresight 
activity, e.g. in the terrain between the spheres of interest of administrative sectors. This 
presupposes assigning responsibility for the development and coordination of the public 
sector’s foresight activities explicitly to a specific actor. The most natural alternatives are 
Sitra (the Finnish National Fund for Research and Development), Tekes (the Finnish 
Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation), or the Prime Minister’s Office. 
Secondly, it is also justified to lay stress on the foresight processes in which decision-
makers themselves participate. In such processes, foresight information is treated from 
the point of view of various experts and decision-makers, which gives the participants a 
broader and more varied understanding of the nature and possible effects of new forces 
of change. 
Thirdly, the international point of view is extremely important in most foresight projects. 
This is due both to the requirements of the subject matter, and the need to ensure 
sufficient ‘uninvolvedness’. Domestic groups of experts and decision-makers, often closely 
networked and used to an atmosphere of consensus, may find it difficult to think in a 
sufficiently radical manner. In addition, it would be beneficial if foresight activity would 
be evaluated by foreign experts from time to time. 
Fourthly, the diversity of the results of foresight could be increased if foresight work were 
not dominated only by the political, Government and research elite, but if also, for 
example, the representation of organised civil society and the participation of different 
generations could be increased. 
Fifth, in so far as foresight projects are concerned that are likely to have a major extent 
of recurrence, the possibility would have to be explored whether part of the foresight 
could not be productised so that it could be easily repeated. This would also contribute to 
improving quality. 
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It is also necessary to link the foresight activities of the public sector more closely to real 
planning and decision-making processes. This would add motivation to the work, ensure 
its sufficient concreteness, and help to allocate the necessary intellectual and material 
resources to foresight activity. 
8.3 Adjustment of the economy to new environmental and 
energy requirements 
Global warming and climate change due to greenhouse gas emissions are more 
extensively recognised as a major problem requiring substantial changes in 
global economic operating conditions. Therefore, climate policy is becoming a 
key issue for global co-operation. On the other hand, regardless of advances in 
climate policy in the next few years, world energy consumption will continue to 
rise for a long time and this growth will still be based on fossil fuels in the first 
instance. 
Measures to control global warming and climate change will, regardless of their 
form, raise the prices of all forms of fossil fuels. With increasing demand 
creating further pressure to raise prices, energy price levels will permanently 
settle at higher than customary levels. Simultaneously, attempts to reduce 
energy consumption and to develop emission-free forms of energy production 
will profoundly influence not only the energy sector but other production and 
consumption too. 
In Finland, the structure of industry is energy-intensive, the climate is cold and 
distances are long. Therefore, Finland consumes high amounts of energy in 
relation to the size of its economy, and energy-related topics are more 
significant than in EU countries on average. 
Energy price and supply and economic competitiveness 
Rising energy prices are likely to raise the relative prices of products that require 
high amounts of energy, hence decreasing demand for such products to some 
extent. On the other hand, the climate and energy policies pursued by various 
countries or in various market areas, particularly the EU in Finland’s case, will 
influence the competitiveness of energy-intensive production operating in 
Finland. The policy pursued in Europe at present and in the near future causes 
higher costs to European, and Finnish, energy-intensive industry than in 
countries where energy prices are not burdened in the same way by 
environmental considerations. Although high energy efficiency compensates for 
these factors, they will weaken Finnish industry’s prerequisites for success in the 
near future. 
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The Finnish energy market is in the process of closer integration beyond 
national borders, with the electricity market pooled with other Nordic countries. 
In integrating market areas, the prices of electricity can also be expected to 
converge although integration of the electricity market is limited by the 
restrictions set by transmission networks. Therefore, in normal conditions, (tax-
free) market prices for energy are likely to diverge less than before from the 
price level of the neighbouring areas. Hence, the expansion of domestic 
electricity capacity may not greatly influence the market price paid for electricity 
in Finland. 
The impacts of this equalisation of energy prices are considerable. In such 
conditions, it will be increasingly more difficult to build the competitiveness of 
the Finnish economy on less expensive energy than in other European countries. 
This will effectively hamper the growth prospects of energy-intensive industry in 
Finland, where energy prices lower than in many competing countries have 
traditionally constituted a competitive edge. 
The average market price of energy is not, however, the only factor influencing 
the situation of energy-intensive industry. Security of energy supply is also 
playing a major role, and in fundamental terms the situation in Finland is good 
in this respect, with the supply of primary energy distributed fairly evenly on 
various sources and almost half of the nation’s energy being generated from 
domestic sources, which are emission-free in relation to greenhouse gases 
(mainly wood and nuclear power). With energy becoming an increasingly 
strategic factor in production, security of energy supply will increase in 
importance.
In terms of economic competitiveness, ensuring a diverse energy supply on a 
continuous basis is advantageous in addition to the fact that a diversified and 
decentralised energy system reduces the risks to society in general. Therefore, 
the future development of all non-fossil fuel based energy sources can be 
considered highly justified. In order to bolster security of supply and provide 
incentives for sensible investments in general, it is important that energy policy 
aim at a long term approach. It is also important for Finland’s energy-intensive 
production that the European Union’s climate policy be developed so that the 
competitive conditions of Finland’s energy-efficient production are equal to those 
of global competitors. 
Impacts of climate policy on the Finnish economy
Finland’s climate policy is based on common EU action, and this is only natural 
considering the global nature of the problem. Emissions trading that sets a price 
on carbon dioxide emissions is the most significant climate policy steering 
method within the EU at present. The purpose of price incentives is not only to 
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control the demand for energy-intensive products and to steer energy 
consumption towards energy forms with low emission levels in the short term, 
but also to create incentives for the development and introduction of more 
energy-efficient production and technologies. 
Within the current Kyoto Protocol period, i.e. by 2012, Finland needs to reduce 
emissions by 15 to 20 per cent more than normal development would indicate. 
GDP will decrease by 0.5–0.9 per cent in comparison with the basic scenario, if 
the price of emission allowances is assumed to settle at €10–20 per tonne of 
carbon dioxide. Higher prices are possible, however, which will raise costs. 
Lower consumer demand is the primary factor likely to decrease GDP, due to 
the direct impact of rising energy prices. Other channels of influence include the 
impact on incomes, with consumers spending a relatively high proportion of 
income on energy. Slower economic growth will also lower incomes, which will 
likewise be reflected in declining GDP figures. 
In the long term, changes in domestic competitiveness depend on the 
commitments formed after the Kyoto Protocol period. EU Ministers of the 
Environment have proclaimed that the Community goal could be as high as a 15 
per cent reduction over the level of 1990 by 2010. If this commitment still 
applies to Europe only, Community competitiveness will naturally suffer. 
However, to prevent climate change, the aim should be to establish a system 
enabling as many countries as possible to join. The Kyoto Process has only 
defined one way of reducing emissions, but there are many contractual 
arrangements that could provide more positive incentives than the Kyoto 
Protocol, encouraging developing countries and rapidly growing new industrial 
countries to join the UN Climate Convention. Since participation by Europe alone 
will not suffice in curbing climate change, it will prove both environmentally and 
economically crucial to examine all of the options available. 
Emissions trading and taxation 
In addition to emissions trading, energy taxation is raising the price of fossil 
fuels, for instance in Finland. In fact, emissions trading is increasing the 
pressure to harmonise the taxation of sectors involved in emissions trading, at 
least as far as emissions are concerned. Because emissions trading as such is a 
method for restricting emissions that enhances cost-efficiency, it is not clear 
whether energy taxation should also be applied to the emissions trading sector. 
If taxes are applied to energy production, they could steer the production 
structure in a different direction than mere emissions trading. Emissions trading 
as such is increasing the share of cogeneration and renewable energy sources in 
electricity and heat production, but the use of wood, for instance, will become 
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even more profitable in relative terms if sectors involved in emissions trading 
apply fuel taxes to fossil fuels. In such a case, however, the costs of reducing 
emissions may rise. Then again, if the emissions trading sector is exempted 
from energy taxes, tax revenues will be lost, and the method for compensating 
such losses may have negative consequences through the tax system. 
Moreover, the fact that other Nordic countries belonging to the same market 
area still apply energy taxes should not be forgotten. 
A functioning market steers towards cost-efficient operations, which is why all 
control that distorts the market should also be kept to a minimum in the energy 
market. Therefore, problems created by emissions trading should be reduced 
and the detrimental side-effects of emissions trading cut down. This is an EU 
level issue that Finland must try to influence actively. 
The role of domestic policies
Despite a common climate policy, energy policies differ considerably between 
European countries, which is evident in their highly divergent utilisation of 
energy sources. As mentioned above, Finland has systematically tried to 
diversify its energy supply and resort to domestic emission-free energy forms as 
much as possible. In addition to this, energy production has succeeded in 
benefiting from synergies improving energy efficiency. In Finland, the 
cogeneration of heat and electricity, and district heating, account for a major 
proportion of energy production. As a consequence, enhancing the efficiency 
ratio of energy production by increasing the share of district heating is only 
possible to a limited extent in this country, because the need for heat sets a 
limit on district heat production. 
District heat and co-generation also differ from electricity in that their market is 
local and they thus allow the implementation of solutions based on local 
circumstances. This also means that in this kind of local use, energy prices can 
differ from those applicable elsewhere. There are several examples of local 
energy system integration in Finland, where the exploitation of local special 
characteristics of the industrial and energy sector has facilitated the more 
efficient use of energy and increasing the use of biofuels, for instance. 
New energy technologies require long-term development that often takes 
decades before such technologies achieve commercial viability. Sufficiently long-
term development work can, however, create and launch new solutions on the 
market, related to the cogeneration of heat and electricity, energy production 
for industry, decentralised energy production and efficient energy use. 
Therefore, active participation is necessary in the development of emission-free 
production methods such as nuclear power, renewable energy sources and 
production technologies based on emissions-free fossil fuels. Due to the 
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abovementioned reasons, the proposal by the Science and Technology Policy 
Council of Finland to establish a Strategic Centre of Excellence focusing on 
research into energy and environment issues is a key initiative. 
In the best possible case scenario, energy technology development will provide 
opportunities for successful business, as demonstrated in Finland by examples in 
fields such as combustion technology and electric motor control systems. 
However, several other countries seem to have adopted a more active approach 
than Finland to the development of the energy and environmental technology 
business. With the inevitable high global demand for energy saving and new 
emission-free production technologies with higher cost-efficiency, Finland has 
good reason to provide firm support for this business. 
In addition to investments in public research and development operations, public 
support for creating markets for new technologies may be necessary in some 
cases. In energy production, with its homogenous end product and the typically 
strong position of incumbent operators, the creation of markets for energy 
produced with new technologies, and therefore the technologies themselves, 
may be more difficult than, for instance, in the case of mobile phones (Stern 
2006). That is why the significance of innovative public procurement policy and 
other support for the creation of markets may, at least for some energy 
technologies, be greater than usual. 
The significance of regulation aiming at energy efficiency, and the distribution of 
information, should not be underestimated either, although poorly implemented 
regulation can result in inefficient solutions. For instance, the forthcoming 
requirement that liquid fuels include a certain amount of biofuel can be 
considered justified from the viewpoint of creating a market. Indeed, such 
decisions have been proven crucial to launching investments based on new 
technology. 
The possibilities of renewable energy 
The continuous pressure for higher fossil fuel prices is enhancing the profitability 
of all alternative energy sources. The renewable energy sources used in Finland 
comprise hydropower, wind power, heat recovered from the environment and 
solar energy, as well as renewable bioenergy which includes wood-based fuels, 
agricultural biomass (energy crops), biogas and the biodegradable part of REF, 
or recycled energy fuels. Peat is a renewable energy source too, but with a very 
slow pace of renewal. In terms of volume, wood-based biomass is by far the 
most important. 
Bioenergy also provides the best opportunity for additional production among 
Finland’s renewable energy sources. The use of bioenergy can be increased 
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above all in communities and industrial plants and for heating purposes. The use 
of bioenergy can also be increased in transportation, but based on current 
technologies, the profitability of the production of transportation fuels based on 
biomass is low without tax-based or other support.21 Moreover, it is questionable 
whether so-called first generation biofuels are useful in reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions (Mäkinen et al. 2006).
In Finland, biofuel is primarily produced as a by-product of the forest industry, 
and in the form of logging waste. With respect to forest industry by-products, 
black lye generated in chemical pulp production is the most important, while 
forest processed chips are produced in both regeneration cutting and 
intermediate felling. According to VTT, Technical Research Centre of Finland, 
wood chips produced as a forest industry by-product and other side flows are, 
indeed, clearly the most profitable form of wood fuel. This also seems to be true 
of transportation fuels.
However, it is projected that technological advances will create new 
opportunities at a relatively rapid pace. So-called second generation biofuels will 
also provide more cost-efficient and better alternatives in terms of aggregate 
emissions, for transportation use. Simultaneously, the range of raw material 
available is increasing as, for instance, fuels based on reed canary grass become 
more profitable.
There is good reason to exploit the potential of bioenergy fully. This will require 
a definitive, long-term commitment to promoting bioenergy, even if future 
technological development remains uncertain. On the other hand, since the 
long-term economic and environmental benefits of various options are hard to 
determine, political measures should encourage rather than unnecessarily 
restrict trials of various technologies. In addition to the measures already 
determined, the development of new forms of bioenergy production may require 
the use of tax incentives in order to create a functioning market. However, such 
measures must be carefully planned in order to avoid encouraging producers 
and consumers to begin using expensive systems that will quickly become 
unprofitable due to further technological advances. 
8.4 Research needs 
The changes in Finland’s economic operating environment and their implications 
for economic activity in Finland give rise to many open questions. Many of the 
potential changes are extremely difficult to predict, in view of which the only 
                                               
21  However, projects initiated by various parties in biofuel production are an indication of greater 
opportunities. Profitability is highest when the biomass can be exploited fully in one way or 
another, and Altia’s decision to launch the production of ethanol is probably based on this. 
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wise precautionary approach is to improve society’s capacity for self-renewal. 
However, in certain areas competent research can provide useful insights into 
the external pressures of change and the preconditions for wise policies, for the 
benefit of political decision-makers and the economy and society more broadly. 
In what follows we discuss a number of areas in which research is warranted 
and would be likely to serve a useful purpose. 
One central issue concerns the type of skills the education system should be 
able to provide citizens with. The question can be approached from many 
angles. One is to examine how well the forecasting of educational needs has 
succeeded in the past. Forecasting demand for different types of skills has a 
long tradition in Finland. Nevertheless, relatively little is known about the 
accuracy of the forecasts. Data on the labour market status of individuals are 
plentiful in Finland and provide a good basis for analysis. There are also 
qualitative data available to facilitate inference about how well the education 
received by recent graduates matches the demands of the jobs in which they 
find themselves. 
One research tradition is to investigate the return on investment in education for 
both individuals and society as a whole. Such returns have been estimated in 
many international studies, as reported in one of the articles forming part of this 
project, and such studies have been done using Finnish date as well. However, 
there is a clear need for additional work in this field. New work is required in 
particular to assess the social returns on investment in different fields and levels 
of education. 
A fundamental question is what kinds of tasks are vulnerable to offshoring and 
automation in a country like Finland. The approach used in this report is only 
one of many alternatives. In some other studies, cited in earlier chapters, the 
issue has been approached by examining in detail the nature of the skills 
required in different tasks. Although the data requirements for such an analysis 
are rather demanding, the approach could most likely substantially enhance our 
understanding of the extent to which different types of jobs may become 
subject to pressures from foreign competition and technological change in 
Finland in the coming years. 
Professor Baldwin’s theoretical analysis focuses on how “co-ordination costs” 
affect the advantages of bundling various phases of production in one location 
as opposed to a more dispersed unbundled arrangement. It is very important to 
know to what extent these pressures to un-bundle production can be estimated 
empirically. This is a very hard question. Nevertheless, the data that are 
available in Finland are exceptionally good for such an attempt, as rich data on 
firms and plants can be linked to equally rich data on individual employees. This 
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should provide good opportunities to examine the effects of different 
organisational arrangements on productivity and profitability. 
This theme links closely with the analysis of “creative destruction” i.e. the 
analysis of how changes in firm and plant structures affect productivity. Some 
very good research has been carried out on these questions in Finland, but the 
analyses do not cover the most recent and highly interesting years. 
Just as it is important to investigate the returns on educational investments, one 
can ask about the optimal amount and allocation of public research and 
development expenditure. So far research has not been able to provide very 
good guidance as to how much and where to invest. Yet the need for such 
analyses is great in a country like Finland, where the R&D expenditure is among 
the highest in the world in relation to GDP. Based on the existing literature and, 
again, the availability of high quality micro-data, useful research could be done. 
An important sub-theme in the field of R&D research is how widely (other 
enterprises, regionally etc.) the effects of a company or research institute’s R&D 
activities tend to spread. Knowledge of such diffusion and spill-over effects is 
important, for example, for understanding how various types of clusters form, 
regionally or otherwise. Another adjacent question concerns the locations of 
R&D and production activities with regard to one another: to what extent do 
these have a tendency to cluster geographically? Such analyses would be useful 
for the planning of industrial and innovation policies at national as well as 
regional level. 
The functioning of the labour market also raises many interesting questions. The 
“traditional” questions about the effects of taxation and social security on labour 
supply, the incentive effects of the pension systems, the level and determinants 
of the structural unemployment rate etc. are all highly relevant in light of the 
analysis of this report. Equally important would be to gain a better 
understanding of the various obstacles and costs associated with different types 
of labour mobility. Clearly more needs to be known about the capacity of the 
Finnish system of adult education to respond to the needs of occupational 
mobility. The effects of pay systems and the age structure of the labour force on 
productivity and the effects of the length of employment spells on the 
acquisition of new skills etc. are also very important questions. 
The links between, on the one hand, economic activity and, on the other hand, 
the physical environment and the use of different types of energy clearly pose 
an array of important policy questions that warrant thorough research. From the 
point of view of policy, the incentive and distributional effects of various types of 
emission trading systems and tax systems are essential, both individually and 
jointly. Furthermore, work must also be done to prepare in advance for the 
228 
post-Kyoto emission targets. Although many of the questions that arise in these 
fields are very difficult to answer, the extensive international interest in these 
issues provides a good basis for Finnish research. Similarly, there is a great need 
for research on the economic efficiency of various types of policy measures that 
seek to promote energy conservation and new non-polluting technologies of 
energy production. 
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